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whether or not the trial court found Leavell to be indigent. The trial court did not make an express finding regarding indigency in his order. While he was not required to do so, see Harris v. State, 170 Ga.App. 726 (318 S.E.2d 315) (1984), the order is worded in a way that could support either an inference that the trial court found Leavell to be indigent or an inference that he did not find her to be indigent. On the one hand, the trial court finds in the order ‘that the payment of certain Appellate cost[s] could work a financial hardship on [Leavell]’ and waives the requirement that she pay filing or record costs. Elsewhere in the order, however, the trial court ‘den[ies Leavell] leave to proceed in the forma pauperis as to the transcript cost’ and instead imposes personal responsibility for any transcript costs upon Leavell's pro bono counsel. … When asked at a hearing on the matter to make an explicit finding on the issue of indigency, the trial court did not do so. … Based on this record, we cannot determine whether or not the trial court found Leavell to be indigent and, consequently, whether the trial court erred in denying Leavell cost-free transcripts. Moreover, without the transcripts we cannot determine the merits of Leavell's other claims of error.” Walker v. State, 330 Ga.App. 872, 769 S.E.2d 602 (March 3, 2015). Superior court had jurisdiction to accept defendant’s guilty plea to felony obstruction; prosecution was properly transferred from juvenile court. Walker contends that superior court improperly granted extension of time to indict under OCGA § 17-7-50.1 because the juvenile court’s transfer order wasn’t yet filed; superior court found in its order granting the extension that the transfer order was already on file. “The record is silent as to what then ensued in relation to the order, and no transfer order, filed or otherwise, is included with the appellate record. … Given that Walker has failed to perfect the record by including in the record on appeal the transfer order which is complained, we must assume that the trial court's finding that a valid transfer order had been filed into the record before the superior court considered the State's Motion for Extension of Time is correct. ‘[W]hen a portion of the record which is necessary for our determination of one or more appellate issues is not before the court, the trial court's express or implicit ruling as to those issues must be affirmed.’ (Citation and punctuation omitted). Portee v. State, 277 Ga.App. 536, 537(1)(a) (627 S.E.2d 63) (2006). Accordingly, under these circumstances, we find that, given the valid transfer under former OCGA § 15–11–30.2, the superior court had jurisdiction pursuant to OCGA § 17–7– 50.1(a) to grant the State an extension of time to indict Walker, and further had jurisdiction to accept Walker's guilty plea.” Leeks v. State, 296 Ga. 515, 769 S.E.2d 296 (February 16, 2015). Felony murder and related convictions affirmed. Trial court properly granted State’s motion to supplement the record. Record included five notes from jury to court during deliberations, but the transcript included no discussion regarding two of them, just the note and the court’s handwritten responses. One note asked if there were lesser offenses to consider, such as manslaughter; the response directed the jury “to rely upon the charge of the court.” The other note asked to see a certain letter; the response directed the jury “to rely upon the evidence that was presented.” Post-trial, the trial judge was away on military duty, so another judge heard the State’s motion, pursuant to OCGA § 5-6-41(f), to supplement the transcript regarding the trial judge’s usual practice regarding juror notes. Based on evidence of the trial court’s usual practice and the recollections of trial counsel, the post- trial judge found that the trial judge had considered one note at bench conference with counsel, with defendant in the courtroom but not at the bench; and that the trial judge considered the second note in open court with defendant present. Held, contrary to defendant’s argument, the post-trial procedure was correct pursuant to OCGA § 5-6-41(f) and did not “hamper[ ] her right to an appeal.” The post-trial judge conducted a hearing on State’s motion and supplemented the record. “‘Where the correctness of the record is called into question the matter is to be resolved by the trial court.’ Patterson v. State, 233 Ga. 724, 731(7) (213 S.E.2d 612) (1975). Judge Manis' findings as to what transpired with regard to the two jury notes are dispositive and not subject to our review. See [ State v. Nejad, 286 Ga. 695, 698 (690 S.E.2d 846) (2010)] (trial court's adoption of the prosecutor's testimony regarding the trial proceedings, in the absence of a record, was dispositive); Smith v. State, 260 Ga. 274(3) (393 S.E.2d 229) (1990) (trial court's adoption of prosecutor's affidavit was dispositive, where the appellant argued that the record was unclear as to the charge conference and the prosecutor's affidavit conflicted with the affidavits of appellant's trial counsel); see also OCGA § 5–6–41(g) (‘where for any other reason the transcript of the proceedings is not obtainable and a transcript of evidence and proceedings is prepared from recollection,’ and the parties are unable to agree on the correctness of such a transcript, ‘the decision of the trial judge thereon shall be final and not subject to review’). [FN4. We note that it makes no difference that [post-trial] Judge Manis held the hearing on the State's motion to supplement the record and granted the motion, rather than [trial] Judge Glanville who presided over Appellant's trial. See Nejad, 286 Ga. at 700 (presiding judge at trial recused from the case and a different judge heard the motion to supplement and issued a ruling thereon). ] ” Chernowski v. State, 330 Ga.App. 702, 769 S.E.2d 126 (February 12, 2015). DUI conviction reversed; claim of due process violation in seven-year delay in processing appeal can’t be considered on appeal because not presented to trial court. Defendant also contends, apparently correctly, that the record transmitted to the Court of Appeals is