☢ test - Í

Ford v. State, 306 Ga.App. 606, 703 S.E.2d 71 (October 27, 2010). Cruelty to animals convictions affirmed; defendant couldn’t rely on recitations of fact in “the brief filed with the trial court in support of her directed verdict motion.” “‘Facts alleged in briefs but unsupported by evidence in the record cannot be considered on appeal.’ In re: Ray, 248 Ga.App. 45, 46(2) (545 S.E.2d 617) (2001).” “Ford made no further attempt to avail herself of the right to reconstruct the record under OCGA § 5-6-41(g).” Miller v. State, 301 Ga.App. 706, 689 S.E.2d 46 (November 20, 2009). In a case of first impression, Court of Appeals holds that indigent defendant is not entitled to “a State-provided transcript of his probation revocation hearing.” “[O]ur Supreme Court has held that ‘[w]hile an indigent is entitled to a copy of his trial transcript for a direct appeal of his conviction, such is not the case in collateral post-conviction proceedings.’ (Punctuation omitted.) Orr v. Couch, 244 Ga. 374 (260 S.E.2d 82) (1979). See Billups v. State, 234 Ga. 147, 148 (214 S.E.2d 884) (1975). ‘[T]here is no absolute constitutional or statutory right to a transcript for use in a collateral attack on a conviction.’ Boddie v. State, 259 Ga. 676 (386 S.E.2d 362) (1989). This is because ‘[t]he duty of the State ... is not to duplicate the legal arsenal that may be privately retained by a criminal defendant in a continuing effort to reverse his conviction, but only to assure the indigent defendant an adequate opportunity to present his claims fairly in the context of the State's appellate process.’ (Punctuation omitted.) United States v. MacCollom, 426 U.S. 317, 328(III) (96 S.Ct. 2086, 48 L.Ed.2d 666) (1976). Given these circumstances, we see no reason why a probationer should be afforded a benefit not afforded to an incarcerated appellant seeking to reverse his original conviction. Therefore, we hold that Miller is similarly not entitled to a transcript of his probation-revocation hearing.” Distinguishing Nix v. Dept. of Human Resources, 236 Ga. 794, 794 (225 S.E.2d 306) (1976), holding “that an indigent parent whose parental rights have been terminated is entitled to ‘a paupered transcript of the proceedings’ for use in appealing the decision of the trial court. … [T]he Supreme Court's decision in Nix was based upon a consideration of the ‘permanent jeopardy to the precious rights in issue’ in termination cases. Nix, supra, 236 Ga. at 796. In that regard, our Supreme Court has found that termination of parental rights cases are more akin to initial criminal prosecutions and therefore are not analogous to probation-revocation cases.” “As noted, Miller argues that because he is entitled to appointed counsel in a probation-revocation hearing, he must also be entitled to a free transcript of the hearing. However, Miller's absolute entitlement to appointed counsel in a probation-revocation hearing is a right only recently conferred upon him by statute. See OCGA § 17-12-23(a)(2). Prior to the enactment of that statute, the right to counsel in such proceedings was not absolute. See Banks v. State, 275 Ga.App. 326, 328 (620 S.E.2d 581) (2005) (probationer has no Sixth Amendment right to counsel but only a limited due process right). In this context, any argument that a probationer should be absolutely entitled to a free transcript is more appropriately addressed to the General Assembly.” Vacated on other grounds, 288 Ga. 153, 702 S.E.2d 137 (November 1, 2010). Bynum v. State, 300 Ga.App. 163, 684 S.E.2d 330 (September 22, 2009). “Bynum … asserts that because voir dire was not transcribed, it is impossible to determine whether any errors occurred therein, so the judgment should be reversed or the case should be remanded to the trial court pursuant to OCGA § 5-6-41(f). We disagree. ‘A general unspecified hope of reversible error during voir dire does not win a new trial on the ground that a record should have been made so as to accommodate a search for error now buried in unrecorded history.’ (Punctuation omitted.) Sharp v. State, 278 Ga. 352, 354(3) (602 S.E.2d 591) (2004), citing Primas [ v. State, 231 Ga.App. 861, 863(2) (501 S.E.2d 28) (1998)]. Bynum makes similar complaints concerning his inability to discern whether error occurred during opening statements and closing arguments because those proceedings were not transcribed. This enumeration of error fails because arguments of counsel are statutorily excepted from the recording requirement of OCGA § 17-8-5(a). Primas, supra at 862(1).” Bagley v. State, 298 Ga.App. 513, 680 S.E.2d 565 (June 24, 2009). Defendant’s misdemeanor convictions for criminal trespass, family violence battery, and related offenses affirmed; trial court was not required to sua sponte order transcription of defendant’s misdemeanor trial. “Here, it is undisputed that Bagley's trial was not transcribed, and it appears from the record that neither Bagley nor his retained attorney requested that the trial be transcribed. ‘As a matter of law, whether or not a transcript is to be prepared in a misdemeanor case initially lies within the sound discretion of the trial court. Absent a demand for a transcript prepared at the expense of the requesting party, the reporting of such a case is not demanded by law. There being no demand by [defendant], we will not conclude that he has been denied a transcript of his misdemeanor conviction.’ (Citations omitted.) Williams v. State, 140 Ga.App. 87, 89 (230 S.E.2d 94) (1976). Bagley's argument that the trial court had a duty to advise him of the right to obtain transcription at his own expense, assess his indigency, or otherwise counsel him about the perfection of a trial record is without merit. Bagley ‘has sat on his right to furnish a recollected record[, pursuant to OCGA § 5-6-41(g) or (i), and i]n the absence of a violation of a substantive constitutional right, we will not saddle upon the trial courts of this state a sua sponte duty to foresee and advise an accused of potential procedural remedies available to the accused in the event the case takes some particular turn.’ (Citations