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it would have been ‘apparent to all reasonable jurists.’ Lambrix v. Singletary, 520 U.S. 518, 527–528, 117 S.Ct. 1517, 137 L.Ed.2d 771 (1997). But that account has a flipside. Teague also made clear that a case does not ‘announce a new rule, [when] it “[is] merely an application of the principle that governed”’ a prior decision to a different set of facts. 489 U.S., at 307, 109 S.Ct. 1060 (quoting Yates v. Aiken, 484 U.S. 211, 217, 108 S.Ct. 534, 98 L.Ed.2d 546 (1988)).” 2. Application here. Padilla did more than apply prior rules regarding ineffective assistance to a different set of facts. “[P]rior to asking how the Strickland test applied (‘Did this attorney act unreasonably?’), Padilla asked whether the Strickland test applied (‘Should we even evaluate if this attorney acted unreasonably?’). And … that preliminary question about Strickland 's ambit came to the Padilla Court unsettled—so that the Court's answer (‘Yes, Strickland governs here’) required a new rule.” “ Padilla answered a question about the Sixth Amendment's reach that we had left open, in a way that altered the law of most jurisdictions,” which had assumed a distinction between direct and collateral effects of a plea never expressly stated by the Supreme Court. 3. Exceptions to Teague rule not applicable here: “‘[W]atershed rules of criminal procedure’ and rules placing ‘conduct beyond the power of the [government] to proscribe’ apply on collateral review, even if novel. 489 U.S., at 311, 109 S.Ct. 1060 (internal quotation marks omitted). Chaidez does not argue that either of those exceptions is relevant here.” Sotomayor, writing for Ginsburg, dissents, would find that Padilla didn’t create a new rule, but simply applied Strickland ineffective assistance analysis in a predictable way. State v. Martinez, 291 Ga. 455, 729 S.E.2d 390 (July 13, 2012). Following his guilty plea to aggravated battery, grant of defendant’s habeas petition reversed. Evidence didn’t support habeas court’s finding that defendant received ineffective assistance in the form of erroneous advice on the immigration consequences of his guilty plea. At plea entry, trial court specifically explained to defendant “that, because the plea was to a serious felony charge of aggravated battery, his understanding was ‘that the federal government will, in fact, maybe not today, maybe not tomorrow, but some time in the future will take action to deport you even though you are a legal resident alien....’” Habeas court found that, during the plea colloquy, defendant “was also receiving advice from his attorney calling into question the information from the trial court, and he likely relied more heavily on counsel's advice.” This finding is not supported by the record, however; rather counsel’s “alleged assurances during the colloquy that Martinez should go forward with the plea and answer in the affirmative consisted only of counsel's statements … that there was no ICE hold and no pending immigration issue at that time. These statements are in no way inconsistent with the trial court's preceding and subsequent warnings that, in its opinion, Martinez would in fact be deported at a future date as a result of the guilty plea.” “[A] finding of a contemporaneous contradiction of the trial court, if authorized by the evidence, may undermine the curative effect of an otherwise clear warning of adverse immigration consequences. So too may prior advice by counsel to disregard any such warning.” Melton and Nahmias concur in judgment only. Medrano v. State, 315 Ga.App. 880, 729 S.E.2d 37 (May 16, 2012). Conviction for child molestation and aggravated sexual battery affirmed; no ineffective assistance merely because counsel “was unaware of Medrano's immigration status.” “Medrano has not shown that the result of the trial would have changed if his trial counsel had full knowledge of his immigration status.” Lopez v. State, 309 Ga.App. 756, 711 S.E.2d 345 (June 2, 2011). Trial court properly denied motion to withdraw guilty plea to DUI, based on ineffective assistance of counsel “in advising him regarding the effect of the plea on his immigration status.” At plea entry, defendant acknowledged “that he knew that if he pled guilty he would likely be deported from this country,” but claimed defense counsel claimed he would be deported immediately rather than serving a year in jail here. “During the motion hearing, trial counsel testified that he had made it clear to Lopez that counsel did not know when ICE would take physical possession of him and denied telling him that the Gwinnett County's participation in a special program with ICE would hasten his deportation. When Lopez's new counsel asked trial counsel if he had tried to determine the specific immigration consequences to Lopez of this guilty plea, trial counsel responded that he had not, because he had not been retained to do so, and Lopez argues that this failure to investigate constituted per se ineffective assistance. We do not agree,” finding this to be a situation described in Padilla (March 31, 2010) , below , where “‘the deportation consequences of a particular plea are unclear or uncertain. The duty of the private practitioner in such cases is more limited. When the law is not succinct and straightforward, ... a criminal defense attorney need do no more than advise a noncitizen client that pending criminal charges may carry a risk of adverse immigration consequences.’” Smith v. State, 287 Ga. 391, 697 S.E.2d 177 (June 28, 2010). Affirming 298 Ga.App. 458, 459 (680 S.E.2d 516) (2009), trial court properly denied defendant’s motion for out-of-time appeal from his pleas of guilty but mentally ill to “several child molestation offenses.” Defendant contended that trial court erred by failing to advise defendant “that his guilty plea may have an impact on his immigration status.” Warning on immigration impact of plea. Although Padilla v. Kentucky ,