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new trial); Cameron v. State , 290 Ga. 334, 720 S.E.2d 644 (January 9, 2012); Stokes v. State , 314 Ga.App. 8, 723 S.E.2d 4 (January 18, 2012) (challenge to lack of venue allegation in indictment cognizable in motion in arrest of judgment, but untimely when filed outside term of court); Johnson v. State , 290 Ga. 531, 722 S.E.2d 699 (January 23, 2012) (same as Stokes ); Jones v. State , 297 Ga. 691, 777 S.E.2d 477 (September 14, 2015). Murkerson v. State, 264 Ga.App. 701, 592 S.E.2d 184 (December 15, 2003). “On the day of trial, Murkerson filed a general demurrer, challenging the validity of the indictment as to the bribery count. And, following trial, he filed a motion in arrest of judgment, contesting the validity of the indictment as to the charge that he violated his oath of office. As this Court noted in Motes v. State [262 Ga.App. 728, 586 S.E.2d 682 (2003)] , a general demurrer does not need to be raised before trial to preserve the issue for appeal, but ‘may even be raised after the verdict by a motion in arrest of judgment, although a motion in arrest of judgment must be made during the term when the judgment was obtained.’” Smith v. State, 257 Ga.App. 468, 571 S.E.2d 446 (September 18, 2002). “A motion in arrest of judgment can only be granted where there is a non-amendable defect on the face of the record, which consists of only the indictment, plea, verdict, and judgment.” Hardeman v. State , 272 Ga. 361, 529 S.E.2d 368 (May 1, 2000). Appeal of defendant’s convictions for aggravated sexual battery and related offenses transferred to Court of Appeals; defendant couldn’t challenge the constitutionality of the statutory definition of “aggravated sexual battery” for the first time by motion in arrest of judgment, implicitly overruling Boswell v. State, 114 Ga. 40, 39 S.E. 897 (1901), in favor of “subsequent decisions holding that such an attack ‘must be made at the first opportunity, and it is too late to raise such question after a guilty verdict has been returned by the jury.’ Brackett v. State, 227 Ga. 493(2), 181 S.E.2d 380 (1971). We have consistently adhered to this requirement that a constitutional challenge must be made as soon as possible and certainly before the return of the guilty verdict. See Kolokouris v. State, [271 Ga. 597(1), 523 S.E.2d 311 (1999)]; Lacey v. State, 270 Ga. 37(1), 507 S.E.2d 441 (1998). These latter cases constitute the controlling authority.” Jones v. State, 240 Ga.App. 484, 523 S.E.2d 73 (October 4, 1999). Defendant’s convictions for child molestation affirmed; trial court properly denied defendant’s motion in arrest of judgment where indictment described an offense, though not the one named – count one claimed to charge aggravated child molestation, but actually charged child molestation. “‘It is not the name, but the description of the crime, which characterizes the offense charged.... An alleged variance between the offense as named or the Code section cited and the allegations specified in the indictment goes only to the form of the indictment. State v. Eubanks, 239 Ga. 483, 489, 238 S.E.2d 38 (1977). Where the accused desires to take exception to the form of an indictment, it is essential that he should do so by a demurrer or motion to quash, made in writing and before entering a pleading to the merits.’ (Punctuation omitted.) Phillips v. State, 215 Ga.App. 526(2), 451 S.E.2d 517 (1994).” “Although the jury verdict stated Jones was guilty of aggravated child molestation, the trial court conformed the verdict to the pleadings and the evidence (see OCGA § 17-9-40), and Jones was convicted of and sentenced for the lesser included offense of child molestation.” K. COLLATERAL ESTOPPEL See CONSTITUTIONAL ISSUES – DOUBLE JEOPARDY – COLLATERAL ESTOPPEL, above, and PROCEDURE – RES JUDICATA, below L. COUNSEL, APPOINTMENT OF See ATTORNEYS – APPOINTMENT OF COUNSEL – Ogburn v. State, 242 Ga.App. 449, 529 S.E.2d 438 (February 10, 2000). After defendant’s acquittal on simple battery charge, trial court properly denied defendant’s motion to set aside the court’s earlier denial of motion for directed verdict. “Defendant's motion for correction of judgment and/or modification of the record does not seek to modify, set aside, or otherwise change the impact of the jury's verdict finding defendant not guilty of simple battery. This motion's only intent was to fortify defendant's alleged rights in a future action for malicious prosecution. The trial court, however, was without authority to provide such relief.” Moody v. State, 272 Ga. 55, 525 S.E.2d 360 (January 18, 2000). Trial court’s grant of defendant’s motion for directed verdict after conviction was error, but grant of State’s “extraordinary motion for new trial” was improper, as “there is no authority for the State to seek a new trial in a criminal case and the trial court was without jurisdiction to entertain the State's motion.” After defendant was convicted of aggravated assault, possession of a firearm in commission of a felony, and related offenses, trial court granted defendant’s motion for directed verdict on the firearm charge. State then filed its APPEALS/POST-CONVICTION RELIEF, above M. DIRECTED VERDICT, AFTER CONVICTION