☢ test - Í

within same term of court as plea entry. Brundidge v. State, 302 Ga.App. 510, 691 S.E.2d 339 (February 25, 2010). Trial court properly denied defendant’s motion to withdraw his first offender plea to motor vehicle theft, eleven years after plea was accepted. “‘Although OCGA § 17-7-93(b) provides that a defendant may withdraw the plea of ‘guilty’ and plead ‘not guilty’ at any time before judgment is pronounced, it does not apply to pleas resulting in treatment as a first offender. To allow a defendant to retain the right to withdraw his plea despite his first offender status would completely subvert the provisions of the First Offender Act and to so hold would constitute an abuse of the statute enacted for the benefit of first offenders, and thus permit them, after the passage of months and even years, and after witnesses are gone or dispersed, or even dead, to withdraw a plea of guilty....’ (Punctuation and footnote omitted.) Winkles v. State, 275 Ga.App. 351, 352(1) (620 S.E.2d 594) (2005). See also State v. Stinson, 278 Ga. 377, 379 (602 S.E.2d 654) (2004) (‘The Court of Appeals rightly reasoned that to accept that [the defendant] retained the right to withdraw his guilty plea [four years later] was to completely subvert the provisions of the First Offender Act and was therefore, “untenable.”’); Fair v. State, 245 Ga. 868, 877(8) (268 S.E.2d 316) (1980).” See also Stinson (September 13, 2004), below. Accord, Simmons v. State , 315 Ga.App. 82, 726 S.E.2d 573 (March 22, 2012). Stinson v. State, 286 Ga. 499, 689 S.E.2d 323 (February 8, 2010). “Stinson … argues that he did not understand that one consequence of his guilty plea would be ineligibility for parole until he had served 30 years. See OCGA § 17-10-6.1(c)(1). However, the defendant's lack of knowledge of such collateral consequences does not affect the voluntariness of the plea. Williams v. Duffy, 270 Ga. 580, 581-582(1) (513 S.E.2d 212) (1999). ‘We have ... distinguished, however, the failure to inform about those consequences from an affirmative misrepresentation about those consequences. [Cit.]’ Smith v. Williams, 277 Ga. 778, 779(1) (596 S.E.2d 112) (2004).” Trial court could find in this case that defendant wasn’t erroneously advised about parole eligibility. Accord, Teemer v. State , 304 Ga.App. 874, 697 S.E.2d 919 (July 7, 2010); Clark (October 5, 2010), above . Cert. granted on whether Williams v. Duffy is still good law in light of Padilla v. Kentucky (see ATTORNEYS – INEFFECTIVE ASSISTANCE OF COUNSEL - ADVICE ON IMMIGRATION CONSEQUENCES, above), Alexander v. State, case no. S14G1762, September 22, 2014. Surh v. State, 303 Ga.App. 380, 693 S.E.2d 501 (January 25, 2010). Trial court properly denied defendant’s motion in autrefois convict and plea of double jeopardy. Defendant pled nolo to marijuana possession before a magistrate appointed to preside over Drug Court in Superior Court. The magistrate accepted the plea, but didn’t sign the sentence, and there is no evidence that the defendant began serving the sentence. The Superior Court judge to whom the sentence was presented refused to sign it, believing the plea and sentence were inappropriate in light of related aggravated assault charges which the district attorney elected not to present. When the defendant refused to be re-sentenced on the plea or withdraw it, the superior court entered an order declaring the plea void as outside the appointment of the magistrate. Held,: 1. The magistrate had authority to accept the plea . “[T]he designation order simply stated that [the magistrate] was ‘designated to preside at the Glynn County Drug Court’ on the relevant date. [fn] The order did not limit his authority to ‘Drug Court matters.’” 2. The Superior Court judge had authority to reject or increase the sentence. “Although [magistrate] verbally pronounced sentence upon Surh in accordance with the negotiated plea, the sentence was never reduced to writing. ‘An oral declaration as to what the sentence shall be is not the sentence of the court; the sentence signed by the judge is.’ Curry v. State, 248 Ga. 183, 185(4) (281 S.E.2d 604) (1981). And oral pronouncements of sentence can be increased at any time during the term before execution of the sentence has begun. Id. See Castillo v. State, 178 Ga.App. 312, 314(5) (342 S.E.2d 782) (1986). Here, because there is no evidence that Surh had commenced serving the probation sentence announced by [magistrate], the trial court was authorized to increase Surh's sentence within the same term. See Curry, 248 Ga. 185(4); Edmondson v. State, 285 Ga.App. 543, 545(2) (647 S.E.2d 92) (2007).” 3. When the judge decided to reject or increase the sentence, the defendant had the right to withdraw the plea. “OCGA § 17- 7-93(b) provides that a defendant may withdraw a guilty plea ‘[a]t any time before judgment is pronounced.’ In State v. Germany, 246 Ga. 455, 456 (271 S.E.2d 851) (1980), our Supreme Court explained that the phrase ‘at any time before judgment is pronounced’ means at any time before the trial court orally pronounces sentencing.” “We note that although this case is unusual in that one judge pronounced oral sentence and a separate judge was going to sign the written sentence, our analysis would be the same even if it was a single judge who pronounced verbal sentence and later decided to reject the negotiated sentence.” Hubbard v. State, 301 Ga.App. 388, 687 S.E.2d 589 (October 7, 2009). Trial court properly denied defendant’s motion to withdraw his plea of guilty to criminal attempt to commit child molestation, based on court’s misstatement of the minimum sentence. Court indicated that minimum sentence was two years, when it was actually one year. “Because Hubbard testified at the hearing on the motion to withdraw his plea that it would not have made any difference to him had