☢ test - Í

Burroughs v. State, 292 Ga.App. 580, 665 S.E.2d 4 (June 17, 2008). Where trial court offered defendant the opportunity to withdraw guilty plea after sentencing, the right to withdraw was lost where not exercised before accepting it; and defendant apparently accepted the sentence by not moving to withdraw the plea for more than three weeks. “Following Burroughs’s plea of guilty and prior to sentencing, the trial court stated, ‘if you should disagree with the Court’s sentence, this Court would allow you to withdraw your plea and just go to trial on this case....’ When the court then sentenced Burroughs to 20 years to serve 10 in confinement, Burroughs did not object immediately. Instead, Burroughs waited nearly three weeks following his conviction to file a motion to withdraw his guilty plea. Burroughs’s motion was based in part upon the statement by the court that he could withdraw his plea if he was not satisfied with the sentencing imposed. The trial court denied the motion and explained that the offer to allow Burroughs to withdraw his plea and proceed to trial was to be ‘exercised immediately or not at all’ after the court announced the sentence. Here, ‘[w]e agree with the trial court that once sentence was pronounced, the defendant or his counsel was obligated to respond if the sentence was not acceptable to them. By their silence, clearly reflected in the transcript, they indicated acceptance of the sentence. The offer then expired, because knowing the sentence and having had the benefit of counsel, [the defendant] freely and voluntarily let his guilty plea stand.’ Id. Under these circumstances, the trial court did not abuse its discretion in denying Burroughs’s motion to withdraw his guilty plea. Id.” Franklin v. State, 291 Ga.App. 267, 661 S.E.2d 870 (April 23, 2008). No ineffective assistance shown such as would call into question the voluntariness of defendant’s guilty plea. “[I]n order to withdraw a guilty plea based on counsel’s ineffectiveness, Franklin must show that, had it not been for his attorney’s deficient representation, a reasonable probability exists that he would have insisted on a trial. See Whitesides v. State, 266 Ga.App. 181, 188-189(4) (596 S.E.2d 706) (2004) (record showed that the defendant sufficiently understood the plea agreement despite his protestations that counsel did not give him adequate advice). Even if we were to assume that trial counsel’s performance was in some manner deficient, Franklin cannot prove that he would have insisted on a trial. Franklin testified at the hearing that he informed his trial counsel that he would take a plea if the trafficking charge were reduced. Franklin achieved the result he sought; i.e., the reduction of the trafficking charge. Therefore, Franklin’s ineffectiveness claim fails.” Smith v. State, 283 Ga. 376, 659 S.E.2d 380 (March 31, 2008). Defendant’s motion to withdraw guilty plea, filed within 30 days of plea but outside term of court, was untimely. Fact that defendant found guilty at trial has 30 days to appeal, regardless of term of court, does not violate Equal Protection. “Smith has failed to show that these classes of individuals are similarly situated. Indeed, they are not; while a defendant who pleads guilty admits committing a crime, a convicted defendant has not done so. Reed v. Hannigan, 295 F.3d 1061, 1064 (10 th Cir., 2002) (fact that defendant who pleads guilty is treated differently than one who is convicted after trial does not violate the Equal Protection clause because the defendants are not similarly situated).” Accord, Sheffield v. State , 317 Ga.App. 692, 732 S.E.2d 546 (September 25, 2012). Hallford v. State, 289 Ga.App. 350, 657 S.E.2d 10 (January 8, 2008). 1. Illegal condition of sentence – here, banishment from state – did not entitle defendant to withdraw his guilty plea; rather, remedy was to correct the sentence. “If Hallford’s sentence was void … he had a right to withdraw his guilty plea. Here, Hallford shows only that a condition of his probation was illegal, but not that the improper condition of probation otherwise rendered his sentence void. Generally, invalid conditions of probation may simply be stricken. Inman v. State, 124 Ga.App. 190, 195(2) (183 S.E.2d 413) (1971) (trial court directed to enter original sentence with direction to remove condition of probation that required defendant to maintain a ‘short haircut’). See also Harrison v. State, 201 Ga.App. 577, 583(5) (411 S.E.2d 738) (1991) (condition banning defendant from engaging in the bond business was invalid and ordered stricken upon return of the case to superior court); Wyatt v. State, 113 Ga.App. 857, 859(3)(b) (149 S.E.2d 837) (1966) (‘[t]he general rule is that if a sentence is legal in part and illegal in part, and the one may be separated from the other, that which is legal will be enforced and that which is illegal will be ignored’). This court has also vacated conditions of probation and remanded the case for resentencing only as to the vacated condition. Ellis v. State, 221 Ga.App. 103, 104(1) (470 S.E.2d 495) (1996) (vacating condition of probation prohibiting defendant from ‘spending time where children were present’); Davis v. State, 172 Ga.App. 787, 791(6) (324 S.E.2d 767) (1984) (vacating condition of probation prohibiting defendant from entering any establishment where alcohol is sold or consumed, other than ‘community recognized “convenience stores”’). By implication, if not expressly stated, an invalid condition of probation does not necessarily render a defendant’s sentence otherwise void so as to require resentencing except to correct the improper condition of probation.” Distinguishing Kaiser (March 28, 2007), below (defendant was entitled to withdraw plea after entire sentence vacated). 2. Improper sentencing procedure, such as consideration of hearsay, does not make a sentence “void;” rather, sentence is void if “the trial court imposed punishment that the law does not allow.” “Rulings on pleadings asserting erroneous procedure or unfair