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here, however, as charges didn’t merge in law or fact. Accord, Jones v. State , 290 Ga.App. 490, 659 S.E.2d 875 (March 24, 2008); McKenzie v. State , 302 Ga.App. 538, 691 S.E.2d 352 (March 1, 2010). Sanders v. State, 282 Ga.App. 834, 640 S.E.2d 353 (December 11, 2006). “As stated in Syms v. State, 244 Ga.App. 21 (534 S.E.2d 502) (2000), ‘in order for a trial court to have the power to exercise the subject matter jurisdiction to correct a judgment outside a term of court, the judgment must be, in fact, void. If the judgment is not void, a trial court has no further subject matter jurisdiction outside the term of court and the petition must be dismissed.’ (Punctuation omitted.)” Sentences here were not void; trial court accordingly did not err in dismissing defendant’s motion, filed 20 years after entry of guilty pleas. Overruled on other grounds, Nazario v. State , 293 Ga. 480, 746 S.E.2d 109 (July 11, 2013). Diaz v. State, 279 Ga.App. 134, 630 S.E.2d 618 (April 27, 2006). When sentence on aggravated child molesting was declared void for failing to impose minimum sentence, consecutive sentence on separate count of rape was not affected. “[T]he trial court imposed a separate and distinct sentence for each of the two counts of the indictment, aggravated child molestation and rape, with the sentences to run consecutively. The trial court’s order vacating the probated sentence for aggravated child molestation specifically stated that the order did not affect the rape sentence. Diaz has not shown any basis for finding the 20 year sentence for rape was illegal or void.” Compare “ Crews v. State, 142 Ga.App. 319, 322(8) (235 S.E.2d 756) (1977) (trial court sentenced defendant in the aggregate on multiple counts; when defendant’s conviction on one count was reversed on appeal, resentencing was required on the remaining counts).” Accord, Turner v. State , 314 Ga.App. 263, 724 S.E.2d 6 (February 21, 2012) (Where one of multiple convictions was held on appeal to have merged with another, defendant wasn’t entitled to withdraw his guilty pleas to counts not affected by the appellate decision). Arnold v. State, 278 Ga.App. 188, 628 S.E.2d 605 (March 10, 2006). “Contrary to the state’s contention, Arnold’s failure to first file a motion to correct his sentence in the trial court does not deprive us of jurisdiction to consider the issue . A void sentence may be challenged at any time. Baez v. State, 257 Ga.App. 129, 130 (570 S.E.2d 352) (2002). Jones v. State, 278 Ga. 669 (604 S.E.2d 483) (2004), cited by the state, does not hold otherwise. Jones merely clarified that a defendant may directly appeal a trial court’s denial of his motion to vacate a sentence that imposed punishment not allowed under the law, but direct appeal is not available when the defendant asserts ‘erroneous procedure or unfair treatment.’ Id. at 671. Jones did not hold that a defendant must first present a ‘void sentence’ argument to the trial court before the argument can be considered by an appellate court that is properly entertaining a direct appeal on another issue.” Reynolds v. State, 272 Ga.App. 91, 611 S.E.2d 750 (March 9, 2005). Trial court thought the minimum sentence available on defendant’s charges was 10 years to serve, when in fact it was two years to serve. Defendant did not timely appeal, however, waiting over four years to appeal, contending that the sentence was void. Held, while court committed error, the sentence was not void, since it was within the permissible range of sentences. Only a void sentence can be challenged beyond the time normally allowed for appeal. “A court which misapprehends the law and therefore fails to properly exercise its discretion in sentencing commits a procedural error; since the procedural error does not void the resulting sentence, a dissatisfied defendant must challenge the sentence in a timely manner. [Cits.] ” Accord, Brown v. State , 295 Ga.App. 66, 670 S.E.2d 867 (December 2, 2008). Jones v. State, 278 Ga. 669, 604 S.E.2d 483 (October 25, 2004). “[A] trial court’s jurisdiction to modify a sentence extends beyond its statutory limitation [cit.] only when the sentence is void. [Cit.] ‘A sentence is void if the court imposes punishment that the law does not allow.’ Crumbley v. State, 261 Ga. 610, 611 (409 S.E.2d 517) (1991)…. Assertions taking issue with the procedure employed in imposing a valid sentence [as here, complaining that no pre-sentence hearing was held] or questioning the fairness of an imposed sentence do not allege a sentence is void and therefore are not a means for post-appeal, post [OCGA] § 17-10-1(f) sentence modification.” Accord, Hughes v. State , 273 Ga.App. 705, 615 S.E.2d 819 (June 16, 2005); Guice v. State , 282 Ga.App. 747, 639 S.E.2d 636 (December 7, 2006) (complaining that indictment alleged an impossible future date of the offense, a defect expressly waived upon entry of the guilty plea); State v. Blue , 304 Ga.App. 471, 696 S.E.2d 692 (June 18, 2010) (sentence’s erroneous reference to general recidivist sentencing under OCGA § 17-10-7(a) rather than drug offender recidivist sentencing under OCGA § 16-13-30(d) did not make sentence void, where sentence was within the proper limits); McGruder v. State , 307 Ga.App. 379, 705 S.E.2d 175 (October 15, 2010) (“When a sentence is void, a trial court has jurisdiction to resentence the defendant at any time.”). Distinguished, Wiggins v. State , 288 Ga. 169, 702 S.E.2d 865 (November 8, 2010) (motion to strike sentence based on alleged unconstitutionality of sentencing statute – here, challenging sex offender registration requirement – properly brought).