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application of these conditions to misdemeanor probationers supervised by private probation servicing companies.” “ FN22. Other provisions found excluded by the trial court were those authorizing a court to require probationers to submit to drug and alcohol screening (OCGA § 42–8–35.7) or to require probationers to undergo mental health screening and counseling (OCGA § 42–8–35.6).” Durrance v. State, 319 Ga.App. 866, 738 S.E.2d 692 (February 22, 2013). 1. As conditions of defendant’s sentence for per se DUI, trial court properly ordered defendant to stay away from his wife and to attend family violence counseling. “Notably, the evidence shows that prior to the DUI offense, Durrance was involved in a domestic disturbance with his wife in which he punched a hole in the wall of their residence. Durrance's actions caused his wife to flee the home and call the police. During the subsequent police encounter, officers observed a pistol laying in the rear floorboard of Durrance's vehicle. The pistol was loaded and a round fully chambered ready to fire. Based on these circumstances, the probation conditions that Durrance complete a domestic disturbance program and refrain from contacting his wife until completion of the program were reasonably related to the nature and circumstances of the DUI offense. Additionally, given the above evidence, as well as evidence that Durrance had been previously convicted of family violence battery, the trial court was authorized to conclude that the probation conditions would help rehabilitate Durrance by addressing his issues with anger management and alcohol combined, as well as help prevent further criminal activity. See Payne v. State, 273 Ga.App. 483, 488–489(8), 615 S.E.2d 564 (2005) (in aggravated battery case, affirming conditions seeking to prevent excessive and unlawful drug and alcohol use during the period of probation since condition met objective of preventing further criminal activity); cf. Tuttle v. State, 215 Ga.App. 396, 397–398(2), 450 S.E.2d 863 (1994) (probation condition that precluded contact between defendant and the victim of crime bore a ‘reasonable relation to future criminal activity especially where a family relationship provided the opportunity for the past criminal conduct’).” 2. Trial court could require that defendant not drive without permission of the court. “Here, Durrance's driver's license was suspended by operation of law under OCGA § 40–5–63(a)(1), which provides for a 12–month suspension upon the first DUI conviction. Although Durrance could apply for possible reinstatement of his driver's license before the end of the suspension period, OCGA § 40–5–63(a)(1), this does not change the fact that the license is suspended for at least 12 months. Accordingly, the condition that Durrance seek the court's permission to drive was within the requisite statutory parameters.” Spencer v. State, 286 Ga. 483, 690 S.E.2d 823 (February 8, 2010). Defendant’s sentence for deposit account fraud, requiring him “to refrain from possessing a firearm as a condition of probation … does not violate defendant's constitutional right to bear arms . See District of Columbia v. Heller, 554 U.S. 570 (128 S.Ct. 2783, 2817, 171 L.Ed.2d 637) (2008) (‘longstanding prohibitions on the possession of firearms by felons’ are not in doubt); Landers v. State, 250 Ga. 501, 503(3) (299 S.E.2d 707) (1983) (statute criminalizing possession of firearm by convicted felon does not transgress state constitution's right to bear arms).” Gamble v. State, 290 Ga.App. 37, 658 S.E.2d 785 (March 4, 2008). Trial court erred in revoking balance of defendant’s probation for violation of diversion center requirements. Although “the December 2005 order identified the diversion center requirement as a special condition of probation[,] … neither that document nor the attached ‘Diversion Center Special Conditions’ specifically warns Gamble that failure to comply could ‘require the defendant to serve up to the balance of the sentence in confinement.’ OCGA § 42-8-34.1(a). (Emphasis supplied.)” See Hill (October 19, 2004), below (sentence must identify special conditions and notify defendant that violation thereof may result in revocation of entire sentence). Mullens v. State, 289 Ga.App. 872, 658 S.E.2d 421 (February 29, 2008). At defendant’s probation revocation hearing, defendant’s statements to his probation officer, mandated by the conditions of his probation, were properly admitted over his assertion of Fifth Amendment privilege. “[H]aving accepted the original probationary conditions in a negotiated plea, Mullens validly waived his Fifth Amendment right as part of the plea bargaining process. See Allen v. State, 258 Ga. 424, 425(4) (369 S.E.2d 909) (1988) ; Fox v. State, 272 Ga. 163, 164(1) (527 S.E.2d 847) (2000) (noting that a constitutional waiver is ‘valid on the theory that the defendant has voluntarily consented to such a condition of probation as an acceptable alternative to prison’) (punctuation omitted).” Peardon v. State, 287 Ga.App. 158, 651 S.E.2d 121 (August 9, 2007). “A law enforcement officer may conduct a search pursuant to a special condition of probation ‘at any time, day or night, and with or without a warrant, provided there exists a reasonable or good-faith suspicion for search, that is, the police must not merely be acting in bad faith or in an arbitrary and capricious manner (such as searching to harass [the] probationer).’ (Citations and punctuation omitted.) Reece v. State, 257 Ga.App. 137, 140(2) (570 S.E.2d 424) (2002).” “Peardon’s tacit acceptance of this special condition provided