☢ test - Í

Johnson, 529 U.S. at 700(II)(A), the United States Supreme Court described the view espoused by N.M. as having the potential of raising “serious constitutional questions” and observed that ‘[t]reating postrevocation sanctions as part of the penalty for the initial offense ... avoids these difficulties.’” D. MODIFICATION OF PROBATION See also POST-CONVICTION RELIEF – MODIFICATION OF JUDGMENTS, above, and SENTENCING – CORRECTION, and SENTENCING -MODIFICATION, below Harrison v. State, 330 Ga.App. 570, 768 S.E.2d 762 (January 30, 2015). Following guilty plea to child molestation, no error in modifying defendant’s probation by “the subsequent imposition of the general condition of probation that he not violate the laws of any governmental unit.” Contrary to defendant’s argument, “the addition of the general condition that he not violate the laws of any governmental unit did not constitute an increase in punishment in violation of double jeopardy principles. … A condition of probation requiring compliance with the law is rehabilitative, not punitive, in nature. See Inman [ v. State, 124 Ga.App. 190, 194(2), 183 S.E.2d 413 (1971)] (certain conditions of probation, including condition that a defendant violate no penal laws, ‘are believed to directly affect the probationer's ... tendency to either further anti-social behavior or rehabilitation.’). Such a condition simply encourages lawful conduct and requires of a defendant only what is expected of all citizens.” Bell v. State, 323 Ga.App. 751, 748 S.E.2d 114 (August 23, 2013). Trial court’s modification of defendant’s probation (for family violence battery and disorderly conduct) was proper. Contrary to defendant’s argument, changing “no violent contact” provision to require “no contact” with victim didn’t increase his punishment, and so didn’t constitute double jeopardy. “[T]he clear and primary purpose of such a condition, as is apparent from the related statutory scheme, is to protect the victim of the crime. … Also, in this case, the no contact condition supports the rehabilitative goals of Bell's probation. As a condition of his probation, Bell was required to complete a domestic violence intervention program within the first two months of his probated sentence. Having no contact with the victim both reduced the risk that he would re-offend and offered him the hope of a reward-renewed contact with his wife-if he successfully completed the domestic violence intervention program.” Stephens v. State, 289 Ga. 758, 716 S.E.2d 154 (October 3, 2011). Affirming 305 Ga.App. 339, 699 S.E.2d 558. Incest conviction affirmed; no error where trial court imposed special conditions of probation in written sentence not orally pronounced in court. 1. The written sentence “did not alter the length of the sentence orally pronounced to Appellant … . As for modifying the conditions of probation, the trial court has specific statutory authority to modify probation conditions not just between the oral pronouncement and the filing of the written sentence but throughout the period of the sentence. OCGA § 17–10–1(a)(5)(A) provides that the sentencing court ‘shall retain jurisdiction throughout the period of the probated sentence,’ and OCGA § 42–8–34(g) authorizes the court to ‘modify or change the probated sentence ... at any time during the period of time prescribed for the probated sentence to run’ and ‘in any manner deemed advisable by the judge.’ See Tyson v. State, 301 Ga.App. 295, 298 (687 S.E.2d 284) (2009) (‘Probationary terms and conditions can be modified by the trial judge at any time during the probated sentence.’).” 2. No double jeopardy. “Double jeopardy does prevent a court from imposing additional punishment where doing so would upset the defendant's legitimate ‘expectation of finality in his sentence.’ United States v. DiFrancesco, 449 U.S. 117, 136 (109 S.Ct. 2522, 105 L.Ed.2d 322) (1980). See also Wilford v. State, 278 Ga. 718, 719–720 (606 S.E.2d 252) (2004) (‘The DiFrancesco decision then went on to hold that a defendant may be resentenced after the original sentence has begun being served, so long as (a) such resentencing is allowed by law, and (b) the defendant has no reasonable expectation in the finality of the original sentence.’). However, even assuming (dubiously) that Appellant began serving his sentence when the court asked him to go with the deputy at the sentencing hearing, and further assuming (even more dubiously) that Appellant had a legitimate expectation of finality in his sentence at that point, his double jeopardy argument would still fail, because the special conditions of probation he challenges do not, individually or in the aggregate, constitute additional punishment. Compare Inman v. State, 124 Ga.App. 190, 190–193 (183 S.E.2d 413) (1971) (holding that double jeopardy barred imposition of a one-year prison term four days after the court orally sentenced the defendant to two years of probation and a fine, where the defendant had already paid the fine and begun serving his probationary term). It is well established that double jeopardy ‘does not prohibit the imposition of all additional sanctions that could, in common parlance, be described as punishment.’ Hudson v. United States, 522 U.S. 93, 98–99 (118 S.Ct. 488, 139 L.Ed.2d 450) (1997) (citations and quotation marks omitted). And ‘the United States Supreme Court and this Court have made clear that sexual offender registry requirements such as those contained in OCGA § 42–1–12 are regulatory, and not punitive, in nature.’ Rainer v. State, 286 Ga. 675, 675–676 (690 S.E.2d 827) (2010) (citing Smith v. Doe, 538 U.S. 84, 93 (123 S.Ct. 1140, 155 L.Ed.2d 164) (2003), and Frazier v. State, 284 Ga. 638, 640 (668 S.E.2d 646) (2008)).” 3. No due process violation. Contrary to defendant’s argument, he neither lacked notice of the conditions nor the opportunity to object or discuss them with the