☢ test - Í

587, 590(5) (436 S.E.2d 213) (1993). If the court has sufficient information at the time of trial to raise a bona fide doubt about the defendant's ability to understand the proceedings, appreciate their significance, or assist his lawyer in presenting his defense, the court must conduct a competency hearing. Mitchell v. State, 207 Ga.App. 306, 308(3) (427 S.E.2d 814) (1993); White v. State, 202 Ga.App. 424, 425 (414 S.E.2d 328) (1992). Here, the record contains no evidence that Powers had been behaving irrationally or that medical opinions existed about his competence to stand trial. The trial court found that Powers' demeanor during court proceedings had been appropriate. Accordingly, absent evidence of incompetence, the trial court did not err in denying Powers' motion seeking a continuance so he could be evaluated on his competence to stand trial. Flesche v. State, 254 Ga.App. 3, 4–6(1) (561 S.E.2d 160) (2002).” Calloway v. State, 313 Ga.App. 708, 722 S.E.2d 422 (January 26, 2012). Kidnapping and related convictions affirmed; no violation of defendant’s right to counsel of choice. After jury selection with appointed counsel, defendant said he wanted to hire a local attorney. The attorney’s wife was in court, and said that they had told defendant’s family that they would have to talk to the court before agreeing to take the case. The court declined to continue the trial. “[T]he record reflects that Calloway failed to use reasonable diligence in obtaining substitute counsel. [fn] Indeed, the trial court stated its belief that because of Calloway's timing, his requested continuance was made for purposes of delay; and the record supports the court's conclusion. [Cits.] Specifically, Calloway's family met with Murray for the first time during the lunch break after a jury had been empaneled and just prior to the start of trial. Further, Murray was never formally retained, as evinced by his wife's statement to the court. [Cits.] Accordingly, the trial court did not abuse its discretion in denying Calloway's request for a continuance and instead proceeding with Calloway's appointed counsel, who was prepared for trial.” Accord, Davis v. State , 295 Ga. 168, 758 S.E.2d 296 (May 5, 2014) (no abuse of discretion in denying continuance where defendant retained new counsel on third day of murder trial). Young v. State, 290 Ga. 392, 721 S.E.2d 855 (January 23, 2012). Murder and related convictions affirmed; no error in holding pre-sentence hearing immediately after trial despite defendant’s request for continuance, absent showing of prejudice. “‘Whether a continuance should be granted for lack of preparation lies within the discretion of the trial court. [Cits.]’ Jackson v. Hopper, 232 Ga. 419, 420(1) (207 S.E.2d 58) (1974). ‘In this case, the trial court did not prevent [Appellant] from participating in [a presentence] hearing; the trial court merely refused to delay the hearing until such time as [Appellant] deemed appropriate.’ Gibbins v. State, 229 Ga.App. 896, 901(7) (495 S.E.2d 46) (1997). See also Jackson v. State, 266 Ga. 308, 309(3) (467 S.E.2d 495) (1996); Scott v. State, 213 Ga.App. 84, 88(5) (444 S.E.2d 96) (1994). The trial court gave Appellant the opportunity to present evidence, introduce witnesses, and argue for mitigation of his sentence. Appellant admits that it was his error that he was not prepared for the hearing. Moreover, Appellant has ‘“failed to identify specific witnesses or evidence to be offered on mitigation”’ and thus has ‘“failed to demonstrate any harm from the denial of the continuance.” [Cit.]’ Hooker v. State, 278 Ga.App. 382, 388(6) (629 S.E.2d 74) (2006). See also Wilson v. State, 250 Ga. 630, 637–638(8) (300 S.E.2d 640) (1983); Schwindler v. State, 254 Ga.App. 579, 590(16) (563 S.E.2d 154) (2002). Therefore, Appellant has not shown that the trial court abused its discretion in denying the motion for continuance.” Sevostiyanova v. State, 313 Ga.App. 729, 722 S.E.2d 333 (January 12, 2012). Hit and run and related convictions affirmed; no abuse of discretion in denying continuance to allow attendance of defendant’s expert witness. “[A]ppellant made no showing as to the expert's identity, no proffer of his expected testimony, and no showing of how that testimony would benefit her. ‘Where there is no indication that a continuance would have benefitted the defendant, there is no showing of necessity and no abuse of discretion.’ (Punctuation and footnote omitted.) Holloway v. State, 278 Ga.App. 709, 712(2) (629 S.E.2d 447) (2006).” Robinson v. State, 312 Ga.App. 736, 719 S.E.2d 601 (November 21, 2011). Theft by receiving and conspiracy convictions affirmed; trial court properly denied continuance despite late production of box of evidence. “[T]he State asserted that it contained only documents concerning older crimes for which Rogers was not on trial and that the State was not going to introduce them at trial.” Defendant fails to show harm: “‘Mere shortness of time for preparation does not in itself show a denial of the rights of the accused. He must also show harmful error.’ (Citation and punctuation omitted.) Robinson v. State, 202 Ga.App. 576, 577(2)(a), 415 S.E.2d 21 (1992). Rogers ‘has not shown how additional time would have benefitted him or how the lack of time harmed him,’ id.; nor has he shown that the evidence of which he complains was in fact relevant to his case. Thus, the trial court did not abuse its discretion in denying Rogers's motion for continuance.” Glass v. State, 289 Ga. 706, 715 S.E.2d 85 (September 12, 2011). Malice murder and related convictions affirmed; no abuse of discretion in refusing continuance based on late identification of witness by State. Witness was called by co- defendant, not State, “and appellant was given the opportunity to interview the witness before the trial commenced.”