☢ test - Í

Ga.App. 530, 714 S.E.2d 82 (July 6, 2011) (not ineffective to deal with improper bolstering by cross-examination rather than by objection); Barmore v. State , 323 Ga.App. 377, 746 S.E.2d 289 (July 15, 2013) (same as Damerow ). Word v. State, 308 Ga.App. 639, 708 S.E.2d 623 (March 23, 2011). Armed robbery conviction reversed due to ineffective assistance of counsel. “[C]ounsel was ineffective in failing to object to a police officer's comment on the credibility of the victim,” whose testimony was the only evidence incriminating defendant. Counsel failed to object when prosecutor directly asked officer his opinion about the victim’s truthfulness. “Trial counsel testified that he had no independent recollection of the trial, and even under questioning by the State could only speculate as to possible reasons that he might have failed to object. While his proffered speculation did address his strategy for attacking the victim's credibility and his failure to object to other testimony on that topic, it could not explain his failure to object to plainly improper testimony from the investigating officer that he believed the victim was telling the truth about being robbed.” Prejudice prong of ineffective assistance test was also satisfied: “We find here a reasonable probability that the outcome of the trial would have been different but for this deficiency. The evidence was not overwhelming. The victim was the only witness who identified Word as the robber. No video of the incident was available, and no other evidence connecting Word with the crime was introduced. As noted above, the victim's credibility was very much at issue. Word testified and insisted that he was innocent,” and presented alibi evidence. Rouse v. State, 290 Ga.App. 740, 660 S.E.2d 476 (April 3, 2008). No ineffective assistance where trial counsel filed and won motion in limine pre-trial, then failed to object to evidence violating the ruling (here, improper bolstering). “[H]aving successfully filed a motion in limine, trial counsel did not need to object to the evidence when it was introduced at trial. See Lewis v. State, 279 Ga. 69, 73(5) fn. 17 (608 S.E.2d 602) (2005); Harley-Davidson Motor Co. v. Daniel, 244 Ga. 284, 286(1) (260 S.E.2d 20) (1979) (following a motion in limine, ‘failure to object at trial when the evidence is introduced by the other party cannot constitute a waiver. Requiring another objection indeed may further highlight the inflammatory evidence, as well as unduly burden the trial court, which has already ruled on the issue’).” Jackson v. State, 288 Ga.App. 432, 654 S.E.2d 232 (November 15, 2007). Battery and aggravated assault convictions affirmed; decision not to object to some questions bolstering victim’s credibility was strategic, not ineffective assistance. Prosecutor here asked officer “did you fell like [the victim] was the primary aggressor in the case?” and “you felt like she was the victim in the case?” “Under Georgia law, determining credibility is a task solely within the province of the jury. OCGA § 24-9-80. ‘We have repeatedly held that a witness, even an expert, can never bolster the credibility of another witness as to whether the witness is telling the truth.’ (Punctuation omitted.) Mann v. State, 252 Ga.App. 70, 72(1), 555 S.E.2d 527 (2001). However, ‘the law does not mandate that trial counsel object when the prosecutor poses a question that allegedly violates that rule.... [T]he decision of whether to interpose certain objections is a matter of trial strategy and tactics.’ (Citation and punctuation omitted.) Powell v. State, 272 Ga.App. 628, 631-632(2)(c), 612 S.E.2d 916 (2005).” Counsel’s decision not to object presumed strategic, as counsel wasn’t questioned about it at hearing on motion for new trial. Powell v. State , 272 Ga.App. 628, 612 S.E.2d 916 (March 31, 2005). Rape and sexual battery convictions affirmed; no ineffective assistance where counsel failed to object to testimony of two witnesses “who opined that they believed the victim was being truthful about the fact that she had been raped.” “Although witness credibility is clearly a matter for the jury alone to determine, OCGA § 24-9-80, the law does not mandate that trial counsel object when the prosecutor poses a question that allegedly violates that rule. ‘It is well established that the decision of whether to interpose certain objections is a matter of trial strategy and tactics.’ (Footnote omitted.) Gosnell v. State, 247 Ga.App. 508, 511(3), 544 S.E.2d 477 (2001). In this case, Powell's primary and strongest defense was mistaken identity, not whether the victim had been raped. Given that witness testimony established that the well-liked, elderly victim suffered vaginal trauma consistent with sexual intercourse, vigorously attacking the question of whether she had been raped would have been inconsistent with counsel's trial strategy and may have alienated the jury. As counsel argued in closing: ‘Something happened to [the victim], I do not deny that. Do not get that idea in your head.... She is a very sweet lady, a very kind lady. But more importantly, she is very easily led, or misled.’ Consequently, if counsel had objected to the witnesses' opinions as to the victim's belief that she had been raped, he risked the appearance of calling a kindly, elderly rape victim a liar. Given the facts of this case, we cannot say that counsel's failure to object was unreasonable.” 14. BOND CONDITIONS Sevostiyanova v. State, 313 Ga.App. 729, 722 S.E.2d 333 (January 12, 2012). Hit and run and related convictions affirmed; no ineffective assistance shown from “consenting to bond conditions which Sevostiyanova found irksome. Appellant has cited no authority, nor have we found any, which supports her contention that a claim of ineffective