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material in misdemeanor cases, which include a copy of the indictment or accusation, a witness list if requested, in- custody statements, and written scientific reports. See OCGA §§ 17-16-20 through 17-16-23.” No contention here that the photograph was exculpatory. State v. Jones, 283 Ga.App. 539, 642 S.E.2d 183 (February 9, 2007). Trial court erred in excluding state’s evidence based on discovery violation “in the absence of findings of bad faith and prejudice.” Evidence in question was graphic sexual photographs of minor victim. “The prosecutor argued that a protective order was a necessary prerequisite to its production of the materials. The trial court ruled that compliance with its prior discovery order had not been conditioned upon the defendant's agreement to a protective order and excluded the state’s videotape and photographs from evidence at trial. The trial court’s order excluding the evidence contains no finding of either bad faith by the state or prejudice to Jones. ‘[A] showing of bad faith and prejudice to the [defense] is required to warrant exclusion of evidence.’ Brown v. State, 268 Ga.App. 24, 27(2) (601 S.E.2d 405) (2004). Here, ‘[t]he trial court made no specific finding that [the state] acted in bad faith and that [Jones] was prejudiced thereby. Absent those findings, the exclusion of the evidence was error.’ Id.” See note on Brown (June 18, 2004), below. Accord, Wilkins v. State , 291 Ga. 483, 731 S.E.2d 346 (September 10, 2012). Castillo v. State, 281 Ga. 579, 642 S.E.2d 8 (February 5, 2007). OCGA § 17-16-4(a)(3), which “requires a prosecuting attorney to give the defendant access to evidence within the possession, custody, or control of the State or the prosecution that is ‘intended for use by the prosecuting attorney as evidence in the prosecution’s case-in-chief or rebuttal at the trial’” is not violated by failure to produce evidence not used by the State at trial. Likewise, OCGA § 17-16-4(a)(4), requiring production of “scientific test reports ‘if the state intends to introduce in evidence in its case-in-chief or in rebuttal the results” is not violated by failure to produce reports not actually used at trial. Here, crime lab produced report listing three types of guns from which the fatal bullet might have been fired. Later, the actual murder weapon was found – one of the types described in the earlier report. The crime lab witness testified that the shot was fired from the specific weapon, so the State didn’t use the earlier report or provide it in discovery. Stinski v. State, 281 Ga. 783, 642 S.E.2d 1 (February 2, 2007). In his still-pending death-penalty prosecution, defendant opted in to reciprocal discovery in 2002. The discovery “procedure was amended during the pendency of Stinski’s pre- trial proceedings by the Criminal Justice Act of 2005 and a subsequent, untitled act. Ga. Laws 2005, p. 20, §§ 12, 13; 2005 Ga. Laws, p. 474, § 1,” which applies to all trials commencing on or after July 1, 2005. Held, procedure is not unconstitutional and defendant is not entitled to now opt out of discovery. 1. Opt out: General Assembly made no provision for defendants who had already opted in to opt out. “In light of the General Assembly’s clear intent, we hold that the amendments to the discovery procedure apply to Stinski’s case, and that his previous election to participate in that procedure continues to be binding upon him.” No additional waiver of rights is required because “the additional discovery requirements were imposed on him by the General Assembly, making an inquiry into his waiver of rights irrelevant.” 2. Constitutionality – reciprocity: “Stinski argues that the amended discovery procedure is unconstitutional because it imposes certain discovery burdens on him without imposing reciprocal burdens on the State. While it is true that a discovery procedure that imposes discovery burdens on criminal defendants must impose reciprocal burdens on the State in order to satisfy due process, see Wardius v. Oregon , 412 U.S. 470 (II), 93 S.Ct. 2208, 37 L.Ed.2d 82 (1973), we find that the amended discovery procedure does impose such reciprocal duties on the State.” Defendant contends that the new provisions require defendants to provide specific information to the State regarding evidence to be presented during sentencing phase, while the State is merely required to provide “notice” of sentencing evidence. Court finds, however, that the duties are reciprocal: construing all relevant discovery provisions in pari materia , “the State is required to provide the same discovery regarding the sentencing phase as it is required to provide regarding the guilt/innocence phase. The content of the discovery the State is required to provide exactly mirrors the discovery required of the defendant under OCGA § 17-16-4(b)(3). See OCGA §§ 17-16-3, 17-16-4(a)(1-4), 17-16-7, 17-16-8.” Contrary to defendant’s contention, the potential “scope” of mitigation evidence is not significantly greater than the “scope” of aggravating evidence; “ any difference in the scope of mitigating evidence and the scope of non-statutory aggravating evidence is too minimal to be of constitutional significance on the question of reciprocity of discovery.” 3. Constitutionality – ex post facto/bill of attainder: “The amended statute is not an ex post facto law because it affects purely procedural rights and duties. See Cannon v. State , 246 Ga. 754 (1), 272 S.E.2d 709 (1980). See also 1 LaFave, Substantive Criminal Law, § 2.4(a), p. 160 (2 nd ed. 2003). We find meritless Stinski’s argument that the amended statute constitutes a bill of attainder. See id. at § 2- 4(d), p. 167 (bill of attainder refers to legislative imposition of punishment on specific persons or on class of persons without any judicial proceeding).” Cockrell v. State, 281 Ga. 536, 640 S.E.2d 262 (January 22, 2007). Trial court properly declined to exclude evidence of