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mistrial when the trial court read the redacted count along with the rest of the indictment because he believed that it would not have any influence on the jury and because the trial court gave an adequate curative instruction. … Vanstavern maintains that counsel was remiss for not requesting the trial court to further instruct the jury regarding the redacted charge, presumably by specifically directing the jury to disregard its mention of the charge. However, it would be difficult to find that it is unreasonable as a matter of law to elect not to draw the jury's attention to the mention of a prior conviction, but rather to allow the court to emphasize which charges the jury is to decide.” Jackson v. State, 321 Ga.App. 607, 739 S.E.2d 86 (March 1, 2013). Conviction for selling cocaine affirmed; counsel was deficient, but no prejudice shown, in failing to object to comment on video that defendant was “the one who shot Freak Nasty in the stomach,” an incident not related to the charge on trial. No prejudice shown, however, as the comment was brief, unsolicited, not clearly referential of defendant, not highlighted in any way by the prosecution, and not similar to the charge on trial. Smith v. State, 316 Ga.App. 175, 728 S.E.2d 808 (June 12, 2012). Conviction for cocaine trafficking affirmed; no ineffective assistance where counsel failed to object to bad character evidence as to co-defendant (that co-defendant was on probation following a cocaine conviction); decision not to object could have been strategic, given the defense that the drugs belonged to co-defendant, not Smith. Jennings v. State, 288 Ga. 120, 702 S.E.2d 151 (November 1, 2010). Convictions for malice murder and concealing a death affirmed; no ineffective assistance for failure to object to bad character evidence. “Jennings' counsel made a reasonable strategic decision not to object to Craven's mother's passing reference to Jennings as ‘bad news’ and her testimony that she had seen Jennings ‘at the jail’ where she worked. Specifically, counsel wanted the jury to see that Craven's mother hated Jennings and believed that this testimony would show that she was simply biased against him. In light of this reasonable strategy, evidence supported the trial court's conclusion that counsel rendered effective assistance. McKenzie v. State, 284 Ga. 342(4)(a) (667 S.E.2d 43) (2008).” Accord, Ford v. State , 290 Ga. 45, 717 S.E.2d 464 (November 7, 2011) (no ineffective assistance in allowing witness to testify that murder defendant failed to pay her child support, to show witness’s bias against defendant). Boggs v. State, 304 Ga.App. 698, 697 S.E.2d 843 (June 30, 2010). Defendant’s robbery conviction affirmed; counsel wasn’t deficient in choosing to attack prosecutor’s attempts to impeach defendant via closing argument, rather than by objection. Prosecutor asked defendant about a prior DUI and about dishonorable discharge from the military, both of which defendant denied; prosecutor didn’t pursue the questioning further. Rather than objecting, defense counsel “did address the prosecutor's questions during closing argument. Trial counsel emphasized at several points in his closing argument that the state never presented any evidence that Boggs had any prior arrests or was dishonorably discharged, and repeatedly maintained that Boggs had a clean criminal record and military history. It is apparent from the record that defense counsel made the strategic decision to wait until closing argument to respond to the prosecutor's questions.” Bell v. State, 302 Ga.App. 359, 691 S.E.2d 259 (February 15, 2010). No ineffective assistance where trial counsel failed to object to officer’s “testimony that he and Bell ‘had a knowledge of each other outside of this incident,’ and that he asked Bell why had he gotten himself ‘in trouble again’ … . Trial counsel testified that he did not object to the testimony because of the similar transaction evidence that the State was going to introduce of Bell's prior shoplifting convictions, and the jury ‘would be aware of the fact that he had been in trouble before.’” Bonker v. State, 298 Ga.App. 867, 681 S.E.2d 256 (July 9, 2009). At defendant’s trial for armed robbery and related offenses, no ineffective assistance for failure to object to evidence of circumstances of defendant’s arrest a week later, where he was charged with public drunkenness and found in possession of the handgun used in the earlier robbery. “Here, even though the gun was discovered during a separate criminal incident, it is relevant because it shows that the handgun was in Bonker's possession only about a week after the robbery.” Failure to object was strategic: “Bonker's trial counsel testified at the motion for a new trial that he chose not to pursue a motion in limine because the gun was coming into evidence and he would rather the jury know that Bonker came into possession of the handgun while intoxicated, rather than to speculate that ‘it was for something more serious.’” Greene v. State, 295 Ga.App. 803, 673 S.E.2d 292 (January 30, 2009). No ineffective assistance for failing to object to character evidence. “On direct examination, the victim testified that Greene was a casual acquaintance with whom she had occasionally socialized in a group. When asked by the prosecutor what she, Greene, and their friends did when together, the victim responded that they usually ‘just listened to music and smoked marijuana.’ Greene claims that trial