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evidence because it was not disclosed to defense counsel prior to trial as required by OCGA § 17-16-4(a)(4). We find no merit in this contention. The study was not admitted into evidence but was simply acknowledged by the nurse as one of the studies she was familiar with which was part of the medical literature on which her expertise was based. … The study at issue was not introduced into evidence, nor was it a report on the results of an examination, test or experiment within the meaning of OCGA § 17-16-4(a)(4). The trial court did not err by overruling the objection.” Hunt v. State, 278 Ga. 479, 604 S.E.2d 144 (October 12, 2004). “Although OCGA § 17-16-7 requires the State to produce ‘any statement of any witness that is in the possession, custody, or control of the state,’ that requirement applies only to statements that have either been recorded or committed to writing. OCGA § 17-16-1(1); Forehand v. State, 267 Ga. 254(3) (477 S.E.2d 560) (1996). ‘This statutory obligation is not triggered when a witness merely makes an oral statement.’ Id. at 255(3).” Accord, Walker v. State , 314 Ga.App. 714, 725 S.E.2d 771 (February 24, 2012). Putman v. State, 270 Ga.App. 45, 606 S.E.2d 50 (October 8, 2004). Certificate of calibration of radar device is not “a scientific report subject to discovery under OCGA § 17-16-23(b);” thus, no error in failing to produce before trial. Banks v. State, 269 Ga.App. 653, 605 S.E.2d 47 (September 16, 2004). “‘The plain language of the statute does not require the State to take the initiative and “furnish” the defense with copies of photographs.’ McSears v. State. 226 Ga.App. 90, 91(1) (485 S.E.2d 589) (1997). Rather, just as the prosecution did here, the statute requires only that the State permit the defendant to inspect and copy the photographs. Id. Banks’s choice not to conduct that inspection following the State’s offer of inspection cannot serve as a basis for error.” Accord, Rogers v. State , 298 Ga.App. 895, 681S.E.2d 693 (July 10, 2009) (State not required to “furnish” lab reports, but to permit inspection and copying). Barrow v. State, 269 Ga.App. 635, 605 S.E.2d 67 (September 16, 2004). “On the morning of trial, the prosecutor informed Barrow’s attorney that he had a videotape from [second officer’s] patrol car that showed [first officer] chasing the Mustang and the plastic bags flying from the car window. Barrow moved to exclude the videotape, arguing that because he opted into reciprocal discovery, the State was required to provide it sooner. See OCGA § 17-16-1 et seq. In the alternative, Barrow requested a continuance, arguing that he needed time ‘to deal with [the] tape.’ The prosecutor responded that he was unaware of the tape’s existence until that morning, that he brought it to the attorney’s attention as soon as he learned of it, and that he played the video for Barrow’s counsel. The prosecutor further stated that the tape simply reflected what was set forth in the incident report, and thus Barrow was not harmed by the introduction of new evidence. The trial court agreed with the prosecutor and denied Barrow’s motion.” Held, trial court did not abuse its discretion: “When the State fails to timely provide evidence pursuant to a reciprocal discovery request, the trial court may order the State to permit examination of the evidence, grant a continuance, or, upon a showing of prejudice and bad faith, prohibit the State from tendering the evidence. See OCGA § 17-16-6; [cit.] The trial court retains discretion in determining what remedy, if any, is required to ensure a fair trial. [Cit.] Here, the record shows that the prosecutor showed the video to the defense upon learning of its existence. And the video merely confirmed the details of the police report. Under these circumstances, the trial court did not abuse its discretion in admitting the tape.” Taylor v. State, 269 Ga.App. 74, 603 S.E.2d 504 (August 11, 2004). No error admitting photographs not produced in discovery prior to trial: “The trial court concluded that the photographs were newly discovered, relevant evidence, that the State in good faith notified the defense of that evidence as soon as it was discovered, and that Taylor could not claim he was surprised by photos of himself provided by his own alibi witness.” Morris v. State, 268 Ga.App. 325, 601 S.E.2d 804 (July 2, 2004). “In the absence of bad faith and prejudice, allowing a witness to be interviewed before trial ‘is the remedy for failure to comply with the requirement that a witness must be identified prior to trial.’ Massey v. State, 272 Ga. 50, 51-52(4) (525 S.E.2d 694) (2000). Morris has not shown bad faith or prejudice here. It appears that Morris was aware of the witnesses’ identity and the State’s intention to call them as witnesses. ‘The witness list rule is designed to prevent a defendant from being surprised at trial by a witness that the defendant has not had an opportunity to interview.’ (Citation and punctuation omitted.) Rose v. State, 275 Ga. 214, 217(3) (563 S.E.2d 865) (2002). Morris had the opportunity to interview Mason. Moreover, while the information on both witnesses may not have been complete, the State never attempted to conceal the witnesses’ names from Morris, and updated Morris when more information was available. Morris knew the substance of both witnesses’ testimony from documents provided by the State, including the similar transaction notice,” one of the witnesses being a similar transactions witness. Accord, Childs v. State , 287 Ga. 488, 696 S.E.2d 670 (July 5, 2010). Brown v. State, 268 Ga.App. 24, 601 S.E.2d 405 (June 18, 2004). Trial court erred in excluding letters proffered by