☢ test - Í

and Georgia Constitution. Petitioners’ property was seized based on petition filed by DA, alleging that they were engaged in a criminal enterprise involving tampering with gas pumps at truck stops owned by them. No criminal indictments were brought. Majority determines that the forfeiture is criminal in nature although the statute declares an intent that it be civil; decision relies on factors set out in Hudson v. United States, 522 U.S. 93, 99-100 (118 S.Ct. 488, 139 L.Ed.2d 450) (1997): “(1) whether the sanction involves an affirmative disability or restraint; (2) whether it has historically been regarded as a punishment; (3) whether it comes into play only on a finding of scienter; (4) whether its operation will promote the traditional aims of punishment-retribution and deterrence; (5) whether the behavior to which it applies is already a crime; (6) whether an alternative purpose to which it may rationally be connected is assignable for it; and (7) whether it appears excessive in relation to the alternative purpose assigned.” Majority sites the second, third and fifth factors as particularly indicating the forfeiture here to be criminal, rather than civil. Majority further notes that this proceeding was brought by the DA, not the regulatory authority that supervises gasoline pumps, the Department of Agriculture. Two (Melton, writing for Carley) dissent. Also citing the Hudson factors, they note that the forfeiture involves no incarceration and is intended as a deterrent by taking the profit out of crime. Note this decision does not affect in rem forfeitures under other subsections of OCGA § 16-14-7, which previous decisions have declared to be “legitimately a civil sanction.” See, e.g., “Walker v. State, 281 Ga.App. 526(1) (636 S.E.2d 705) (2006) (in in rem forfeiture, property is the ‘offender’ and nothing suggests personal liability of owner).” GG. GENERALLY Spencer v. State, 286 Ga. 483, 690 S.E.2d 823 (February 8, 2010). Defendant’s conviction for deposit account fraud affirmed. “The trial court did not err by displaying fringed flags of the United States and state of Georgia during trial. The display of the flags would not have led anyone to believe that defendant was being tried in a military setting.” Keller v. State, 275 Ga. 680, 571 S.E.2d 806 (October 28, 2002). Where defendant was convicted on each count of a multi-count indictment, and trial court did not enter sentence on one count of the indictment, defendant’s “case thus was not ripe for appeal at that time even though the trial court did enter a written judgment of conviction and sentence on the other counts of the indictment.” Defendant was entitled to appeal the entire case within thirty days of entry of written sentence on the final count. Edwards v. State, 255 Ga.App. 269, 565 S.E.2d 127 (May 6, 2002). “‘Failing to object at trial is not a waiver of the motion to suppress grounds, but affirmatively stating there is no objection in effect concedes the point.’ (Citations and punctuation omitted.) Mack v. State , 251 Ga.App. 407, 408(1) (554 S.E.2d 542) (2001). It is true that, at the beginning of closing argument, Edwards’ counsel stated that he ‘wanted to comment ... about the stop to complete our record,’ cited a case to support his argument that, in Edwards’ case, there was no articulable suspicion for the stop, and stated that ‘[w]e’re trying to preserve [the unreasonable search] issue.’ We have been unable to find any authority, however, for the proposition that an objection, once waived, may be resuscitated in this – or any – manner. Accordingly, we hold that consideration of the unreasonable search claim is procedurally barred.” Williams v. State, 255 Ga.App. 177, 564 S.E.2d 759 (April 11, 2002). Aggravated assault and related convictions affirmed. Defendant was properly denied discovery of criminal histories of prospective jurors. Prosecutors are entitled to this information “for official law enforcement duties only,” which is construed to include jury selection, OCGA §§ 35-3- 30(3), (6); 35-3- 33(a)(10); Sears v. State , 262 Ga. 805, 808(6), 426 S.E.2d 553 (1993); nothing in the law requires or allows disclosure of this information to defense counsel without the express written consent of the juror. Nel v. State, 252 Ga.App. 761, 557 S.E.2d 44 (November 20, 2001). Conviction for cruelty to animals affirmed. Defendant not entitled to notice of solicitor general’s disqualification based on conflict of interest because he had no substantive right to have his case tried by a specific prosecutor. Carroll v. State, 252 Ga.App. 39, 554 S.E.2d 560 (August 28, 2001). DUI and related convictions. On May 24, 1996, one day after police issued traffic citations to Defendant, the citations were filed in the Atlanta City Court. On July 10, 1998, the State filed accusations for the same offenses. Held, a uniform traffic citation serves as an accusation in any court having jurisdiction over the offense, except superior court; thus, because the July 1998 accusations were based on the same conduct as the original citations, of which there had been no final disposition, and were a continuation of the prosecution of those citations, the trial court correctly found that the state began prosecuting Defendant within the two- year limitation period. Although the better practice is to admit the uniform traffic citations into evidence, the arresting officer’s testimony that on May 23, 1996, he arrested and charged Defendant with DUI is sufficient evidence for the jury to infer that the crimes were prosecuted within the 2-year limitation period.