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Lemming v. State, 292 Ga.App. 138, 663 S.E.2d 375 (May 23, 2008). Trial judge was not required to recuse herself where she had formerly prosecuted defendant as an assistant district attorney. Here, defendant made strategic decision not to seek recusal. Accord, Brown ( November 24, 2010), above; Leverette v. State , 291 Ga. 834, 732 S.E.2d 255 (October 1, 2012). Johnson v. State, 260 Ga.App. 413, 579 S.E.2d 809 (March 19, 2003). “[P]revious contact with a defendant by a judge in his judicial capacity is not grounds for recusal.” Likewise, the fact that some of the charges arose when judge was district attorney is not grounds for recusal, absent “evidence the district attorney’s office handled any charges against Johnson when the judge was district attorney.” Accord, Horne v. State , 318 Ga.App. 484, 733 S.E.2d 487 (October 25, 2012). Wise v. State, 257 Ga.App. 211, 570 S.E.2d 656 (August 29, 2002). “[A] judge is not automatically disqualified from sitting or acting in criminal cases merely on the ground that the judge, in prior employment, has previously prosecuted the defendant in unrelated criminal proceedings.” Even if recusal were required, “for reasons other than bias or prejudice regarding the parties in the case, does not invalidate earlier pretrial rulings of that trial judge.” Gillman v. State, 239 Ga.App. 880, 522 S.E.2d 284 (September 9, 1999). Recusal not required where trial judge previously prosecuted defendant as district attorney, even where prior conviction tendered in aggravation of sentence. Trial court did, however, allow another judge to determine voluntariness of the prior plea. Speed v. State, 270 Ga. 688, 512 S.E.2d 896 (March 1, 1999). 1. “ The trial court did not err by denying Speed's motion for recusal of the trial judge due mainly to the judge’s previous employment as an Atlanta police officer, investigator for the district attorney’s office, and assistant district attorney. The trial court correctly determined, pursuant to Uniform Superior Court Rule 25, that a reasonable person would not conclude, assuming the truth of all alleged facts, that the judge harbored a bias stemming from an extrajudicial source, which is of such a nature and intensity that it would impede the exercise of impartial judgment. See Wellons v. State, 266 Ga. 77, 88(18), 463 S.E.2d 868 (1995).” Accord, Gillman (September 9, 1999), above; Williams, (March 12, 2008), above. 2. No recusal required where judge’s law clerk applied for position with Attorney General’s office and submitted, as a writing sample, memoranda on defendant’s still-pending capital murder case. Judge didn’t authorize and was not aware of clerk’s act. Held, trial court properly denied the motion to recuse, concluding “that the state gained no advantage from the disclosure of the memoranda and that no reasonable person would find an appearance of impropriety warranting the recusal of the trial judge. [Cits.]” 4. JUDICIAL COMMENTS Pyatt v. State, S15A1734, ___ Ga. ___, ___ S.E.2d ___, 2016 WL 1180124 (March 25, 2016). Felony murder and related convictions affirmed. No Due Process violation in trial judge’s alleged bias in favor of State, as shown by coaching prosecutor in conference in chambers. Defendant failed to object or timely seek recusal, but on appeal claims that “the bias of the trial judge was so profound and pervasive that it worked a denial of his constitutional right to due process, and Pyatt contends that such a denial can be reviewed on appeal, even in the absence of a timely motion to recuse the trial judge. Our precedents, however, do not recognize such a distinction. And although the denial of a trial before a fair and impartial judge in violation of the constitutional guarantee of due process may amount to a ‘structural error,’ even structural errors are capable of forfeiture. See United States v. Christi, 682 F.3d 138, 142–143 (1 st Cir., 2012) (Souter, J.). See also Johnson v. United States, 520 U.S. 461, 466(I) (117 S.Ct. 1544, 137 L.Ed.2d 718) (1997) (even a ‘structural error’ is subject to plain error review under Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 30 in the absence of a timely objection).” “A trial judge generally ought not give advice to a lawyer about trial strategy in a case in which the judge is presiding. At least in some circumstances, the giving of such advice could create an appearance of partiality, which is a proper ground for a motion to recuse under our Code of Judicial Conduct. See Code of Judicial Conduct, Rule 2.11(A) (‘Judges shall disqualify themselves in any proceeding in which their impartiality might reasonably be questioned....’). … But not every violation of the Code of Judicial Conduct implicates the constitutional guarantee of due process. As the United States Supreme Court has explained, ‘[t]he Due Process Clause demarks only the outer boundaries of judicial disqualifications,’ Aetna Life Ins. Co. v. Lavoie, 475 U.S. 813, 828(III) (106 S.Ct. 1580, 89 L.Ed.2d 823) (1986), and generally speaking, ‘the codes of judicial conduct provide more protection than due process requires.’ Caperton v. A.T. Massey Coal Co., 556 U.S. 868, 890(IV) (129 S.Ct. 2252, 173 L.Ed.2d 1208) (2009). Accordingly, the constitutional standard for judicial disqualification is ‘confined to rare instances.’ Id. See also Federal Trade Commission v. Cement Institute, 333 U.S. 683, 702 (68 S.Ct. 793, 92 L.Ed. 1010) (1948) (‘[M]ost matters relating to judicial disqualification d[o] not rise to a constitutional level.’ (Citation omitted)). … Unlike our Code of Judicial Conduct, the