☢ test - Í

constitutional guarantee of due process is not concerned with mere appearances of partiality. To the contrary, due process is concerned with actual bias, see Caperton, 556 U.S. at 883(III), and absent a showing of actual bias, due process requires recusal only in particular circumstances in which ‘the probability of actual bias on the part of the judge or decisionmaker is too high to be constitutionally tolerable.’ Id. at 872 (citation and punctuation omitted),” such as when the judge has an actual pecuniary interest in the case, or brought the criminal charges on trial, or is personally embroiled in a contempt proceeding [cits.]. “The record in this case, however, discloses no actual bias[fn] and involves no circumstance that has been recognized as presenting an intolerably high probability of actual bias. The law presumes ‘honesty and integrity [on the part of] those serving as adjudicators,’ Withrow v. Larkin, 421 U.S. 35, 47(III) (95 S.Ct. 1456, 43 L.Ed.2d 712) (1975), and Pyatt has failed to overcome the presumption in this case.” While coaching may be indicative of bias, it may also be indicative of frustration. “When a judge sees a lawyer presenting his case in a way that seems to be wasting the time of the jury or confusing the jurors, we are aware of no absolute rule against the judge saying something to the lawyer, although the judge must take care not to do so by way of an impermissible ex parte conversation.” Post v. State, 298 Ga. 241, 779 S.E.2d 624 (November 16, 2015). Felony murder and related convictions reversed; trial court erred by failing to refer recusal motions to another judge. Judge’s attempt to defend himself at argument of Post’s recusal motion was grounds for recusal in subsequent motions filed by co-defendants Fripp and Brown. At oral argument, Judge Green disputed the facts alleged by Post’s attorney, regarding whether the DA was then acting as his campaign treasurer and whether he was holding money for the campaign. This was improper, even though invited by counsel. “[A] judge considering a motion seeking his recusal must evaluate the motion and accompanying affidavit solely on their face and assume that the facts set forth in the affidavit are true, even if the judge knows them to be false or incomplete; consideration of additional evidence is inappropriate at this point in the process. See Henderson [ v. State, 295 Ga. 333, 334, 759 S.E.2d 827 (2014)] (explaining that the Uniform Superior Court Rules do not contemplate an evidentiary hearing by the judge whose recusal is sought). It is not error per se to have oral argument on a recusal motion, although in many instances scheduling oral argument would conflict with Rule 25.3’s requirement that the judge presented with a recusal motion and affidavit determine ‘immediately’ if the three threshold requirements have been met. The risks of such a hearing are demonstrated by this case. Oral argument may draw the judge into presenting his side of the story, which in turn may create a perception that the judge is an advocate or hostile witness rather than an impartial adjudicator in the case. Oral argument also may result in discussion and consideration of facts beyond those set forth in the recusal motion and affidavit, which also is inappropriate. … It may be appropriate for the judge to disclose information relevant to his potential recusal, which the Code of Judicial Conduct encourages judges to do sua sponte, … and such disclosure may be necessary if the judge to whom a recusal motion has been referred for decision holds an evidentiary hearing and the judge whose recusal is sought is the only readily available source of relevant information. See, e.g., Turner v. State, 280 Ga. 174, 174, 626 S.E.2d 86 (2006). In these situations, however, the disclosure must be made in a way that is as objective, dispassionate, and non- argumentative as possible, so that the judge is not reasonably perceived as a hostile witness or advocate. [fn] … Oral disclosures at a hearing on a recusal motion are far riskier than, say, disclosures that are not made in the context of a motion challenging the judge’s impartiality or that are made in writing, which reduces the danger of the judge’s being pulled into a back-and-forth exchange with counsel about recusal allegations as occurred here.” Based on the judge’s statements here, “the judge to whom the motion should have been referred would have had no choice based on those facts but to grant the motion and order Judge Green’s recusal from Fripp’s and Brown’s cases.” Russell v. State, 322 Ga.App. 553, 745 S.E.2d 774 (July 1, 2013). Burglary conviction affirmed; 1. trial court showed no bias in “advising Russell that he could not have another attorney appointed simply because he did not like his current attorney. ‘While an indigent defendant accused of a crime for which imprisonment is possible is entitled to have reasonably effective counsel provided to assist him, he is not entitled to counsel of his own choosing. A request by an indigent criminal defendant to discharge one court-appointed counsel and have another substituted in his place addressees itself to the sound discretion of the trial court.’ (Citations and punctuation omitted.) Reynolds v. State, 231 Ga.App. 33, 36(4), 497 S.E.2d 580 (1998) (trial court acted within its discretion in declining to appoint new counsel simply because defendant ‘tended not to like or trust his lawyer.’)” 2. “ Moreover, we find no error in the trial court's statement to Russell that ‘the State offered you an extremely good deal to plea bargain this case out.’ The record shows that the statement was made within the context of Russell's request to fire his attorney and proceed pro se, not within the context of a plea hearing. The trial court advised Russell that he would receive 20 years because of his prior felonies, that the State's offer of one year in jail had been a ‘good deal,’ and that he was not ‘helping [himself] by doing all of this.’ Although Russell contends within the context of an ineffective assistance allegation for his attorney not objecting and in a separate enumeration that this behavior exhibited the ‘judge's apparent bias’ against him, we do not agree. There was nothing