☢ test - Í

improper in the trial court's discussion with Russell.” Both issues presented in context of ineffective assistance for failure to object. Brunson v. State, 293 Ga. 226, 744 S.E.2d 695 (June 17, 2013). Felony murder conviction affirmed; no violation of defendant’s “due process right to a fair and impartial judge … based on the trial court's comments outside the presence of the jury or its [correct] decision that the evidence presented at trial did not support the giving of a charge on self-defense.” Ellicott v. State, 320 Ga.App. 729, 740 S.E.2d 716 (March 25, 2013). Aggravated battery and related convictions affirmed; trial court’s comments during sentencing didn’t require recusal or deprive defendant of fair trial. “Ellicott argues that the trial court's comments during his sentencing provide clear evidence of the trial judge's substantial bias against him. During the sentencing hearing, prior to pronouncing sentence, the trial judge commented on the evidence and Ellicott's demeanor during the trial. The trial court compared Ellicott's conviction to the “death of a monster,” and commented that, given his family's history, Ellicott should have committed suicide. The trial court also stated that he was imposing a sentence that would insure that Ellicott would spend his life confined to a small cell where he would spend every day thinking about the freedom that he once had. … [W]e conclude that the comments did not result in any prejudice to Ellicott, because his sentences were well within applicable statutory limits.” Heidt v. State, 292 Ga. 343, 736 S.E.2d 384 (January 7, 2013). Murder and related convictions affirmed; no error in denying motion to disqualify trial judge. “And at the hearing on the motion to recuse, the testimony about the judge's out-of-court statement merely showed that the judge had expressed ‘some sort of agreement’ to a statement of a third party that Heidt would not receive a fair trial in Effingham County, but it failed to show that the judge had revealed any bias against Heidt.” Fitzpatrick v. State, 317 Ga.App. 873, 733 S.E.2d 46 (October 11, 2012). Burglary and related convictions affirmed; no bias requiring recusal shown in trial court’s comment in sentencing that defendant had taken up the court and the jury’s time while his testimony “defie[d] belief.” “‘In order to be disqualifying an alleged judicial bias must stem from an extra-judicial source and result in an opinion on the merits on some basis other than what the judge learned from his or her participation in the case.’ (Punctuation and footnote omitted.) Butts v. State, 273 Ga. 760, 762–763(3) (546 S.E.2d 472) (2001). The record does not show, nor does Fitzpatrick contend, that the alleged bias resulted from an extra-judicial source.” Hubert v. State, 297 Ga.App. 71, 676 S.E.2d 436 (March 26, 2009). 1. “Hubert … argues that the trial court's behavior toward defense counsel during the trial indicated an undue bias and prejudice toward the defense and partiality in favor of the state. He contends that the trial judge should have recused himself from the trial. Neither Hubert nor his trial counsel asked the trial judge to recuse himself at any time; therefore, this issue is waived for appeal. See Butts v. State, 273 Ga. 760, 762(3) (546 S.E.2d 472) (2001); Hall v. State, 235 Ga.App. 44, 45-46(2) (508 S.E.2d 703) (1998).” 2. Counsel wasn’t ineffective for failing to seek recusal based on improper comment made by judge during voir dire. “At the request of Hubert's counsel, the trial judge … excused every potential juror who was present when the statement was made in order to ensure that his comment had not prejudiced the jury. The trial judge therefore demonstrated his impartiality by acceding to Hubert's concerns and excusing the jurors.” English v. State, 290 Ga.App. 378, 659 S.E.2d 783 (March 19, 2008). Conviction for solicitation of murder and related offenses affirmed. Trial judge properly denied motion to recuse, filed in amended motion for new trial over a year after trial (which began July, 2005). One month before trial, judge sentenced defendant in another case, saying “‘I don’t like you. I don’t like you for what you've done to your folks and your brother. They’re not going to jail, but you have put them through hell.... I could sentence you to sixty-six years and I’m not going to do that.’ (Emphasis supplied.) The judge then sentenced English to serve five years.” Defendant also notes that he had knowledge of property stolen from judge’s family, which judge became aware of. Held, decision not to recuse was not error because no evidence “that any harm resulted from either example of alleged impropriety. Gillman v. State, 239 Ga.App. 880, 883(2)(b) (522 S.E.2d 284) (1999).” Williams v. State, 290 Ga.App. 829, 661 S.E.2d 563 (March 12, 2008). “Williams contends he is entitled to a new trial because the trial court exhibited bias during the sentencing hearing by stating, ‘if it were legal to sentence you to a longer period of time, I probably would.’ As in Wyciskala v. State, 147 Ga.App. 518 (249 S.E.2d 329) (1978), ‘[s]uch a statement by the trial court would certainly be an expression of the trial court’s disapproval of [the defendant’s] conduct.’ Id. at 519(1). It does not, however, indicate personal bias or prejudice against Williams on the part of the trial judge. Id. (no bias