☢ test - Í

in trial court’s statement that it would sentence defendant to maximum if defendant found guilty of burglary again). ‘In order to be disqualifying the alleged bias must stem from an extra-judicial source and result in an opinion on the merits on some basis other than what the judge learned from his participation in the case.’ Baptiste v. State, 229 Ga.App. 691, 696(1) (494 S.E.2d 530) (1997). Because the trial court’s statement does not demonstrate bias, we find no merit in Williams’s claim.” Accord, Rooney v. State , 311 Ga.App. 376, 715 S.E.2d 780 (August 9, 2011) (rulings adverse to defendant, even if erroneous, didn’t demonstrate bias or prejudice against defendant requiring reversal). 5. MISCELLANEOUS Battle v. State, S15A1510, ___ Ga. ___, ___ S.E.2d ___, 2016 WL 1085248 (March 21, 2016). Malice murder and related convictions affirmed. Judge wasn’t required to recuse sua sponte based on defendant’s alleged plot to kill judge, prosecutors and investigators in his case. “Absent extraordinary circumstances, threats or plots by a criminal defendant against the judge presiding over his case—even serious ones—do not mandate the judge’s recusal. See In re Basciano, 542 F.3d 950, 956 (2d Cir., 2008) (collecting cases). [FN4: The federal cases on this issue typically apply 28 USC § 455(a), which requires federal judges to disqualify themselves ‘in any proceeding in which [their] impartiality might reasonably be questioned.’ This standard corresponds to the default recusal standard for Georgia judges found in Canon 3(E)(1) of the version of the Georgia Code of Judicial Conduct applicable at the time of Appellant’s trial, as well as Rule 2.11(A) of the revised version that took effect on January 1, 2016. ] As the Ninth Circuit put it in United States v. Holland, 519 F.3d 909 (9 th Cir., 2008), if threats or plots of violence against judges ordinarily sufficed to require recusal, ‘defendants could readily manipulate the system, threatening every jurist assigned on the ‘wheel’ until the defendant gets a judge he preferred. Also, the defendant could force delays, perhaps making the cases against him more difficult to try, perhaps putting witnesses at greater risk. Such blatant manipulation would subvert our processes, undermine our notions of fair play and justice, and damage the public’s perception of the judiciary.’ Id. at 915.” “[I]n this case there is little to indicate that the alleged plot by Appellant to kill Judge Ennis was serious or credible or that Judge Ennis believed that it was. Moreover, Appellant points to no allegedly improper rulings by Judge Ennis that might have been motivated by bias resulting from the threat. See Basciano, 542 F.3d at 957.” Beasley v. State, 335 Ga.App. 530, 782 S.E.2d 315 (January 27, 2016). Cocaine trafficking conviction affirmed. Following remand for determination of conflict of interest of trial judge, no error in instead retrying the case. Contrary to defendant’s argument, retrial was the proper remedy in the event the original trial judge was determined to have a conflict of interest (as conceded by the State here). “After a conviction is reversed based on a procedural error, as opposed to an evidentiary insufficiency, cases are routinely retried in new trials.” “Here, the error Beasley complained of, a conflict of interest on the part of the trial judge, did not implicate his guilt or innocence or the sufficiency of the evidence introduced by the State at trial. Thus, as Beasley concedes, if the State adduced sufficient evidence of his guilt to authorize his conviction in his first trial, double jeopardy concerns would not bar his retrial in the event of a procedural error.” Moore v. State, 313 Ga.App. 519, 722 S.E.2d 160 (January 12, 2012). In defendant’s prosecution for cocaine trafficking and marijuana possession, trial court properly denied defendant’s motion to recuse the trial judge on grounds “that in 27 years on the bench, [judge] has never granted a motion to suppress based on a violation of the Fourth Amendment of the U.S. Constitution, or has exhibited a policy of denying such motions, presenting an appearance of partiality.” “[W]hile Moore argues a generalized bias based on [judge's] prior rulings, this court has distinguished between prior judicial actions and bias. ‘[W]ithout such a demarcation, no judge might ever rule but once upon a disputed question of law or factual circumstances without forever thereafter being disqualified from hearing similar matters.’ Smith v. State, 250 Ga. 438, 439(1) (298 S.E.2d 482) (1983) (trial judge's decision not to assign motion to recuse to another judge upheld even where trial judge had indicated support of laboratory whose testing accuracy movant intended to challenge). … The only remedy for the type of bias or prejudice alleged in the affidavit before us is an appeal in this case and in each case where the judge has decided facts in a clearly erroneous direction or has decided facts based upon an erroneous understanding of the law. The only other possible remedy is at the ballot box.” Overruled based on improper application of ‘abuse of discretion’ standard on appeal, Mayor & Alderman of City of Savannah (May 29, 2012), above. Brown v. State, 275 Ga.App. 281, 620 S.E.2d 394 (July 28, 2005). Trial court did not exhibit bias toward defendant by ordering the jail not to give defendant medication without the court’s approval, based on his attempted suicide. Trial court subsequently modified the order at defense counsel’s request. Trial court’s contact with jail personnel was not improper ex parte communication under USCR 4.1. 6. PRIOR EXTRA-JUDICIAL DEALINGS WITH PARTY