☢ test - Í

Woodall v. State, 294 Ga. 624, 754 S.E.2d 335 (January 27, 2014). Felony murder and armed robbery convictions affirmed; trial court wasn’t required to recuse where defendant expressed concern about “the appearance of impropriety” arising from trial judge’s former representation of a State’s witness, but never requested recusal. Lacy v. Lacy, 320 Ga.App. 739, 740 S.E.2d 695 (March 25, 2013). In civil custody dispute, no error in denying motions to recuse superior court judges. 1. Mother’s comment on her Facebook page that judge met with her father was insufficient to require recusal . “Even if this is competent evidence that Judge Parrott met with the mother's father at some time before the hearing, the mother's father is not a party to this case, and the Facebook comment does not show, as the father asserts, that Judge Parrott gleaned any personal knowledge of the facts involved in this case from a meeting between the two. The comment provides no information at all about the circumstances of the meeting or what, if anything, was discussed. Although, in the comment, the mother suggested that there was a connection between the meeting and the outcome of the hearing, neither her perception nor the perception of the father is dispositive on this issue. See Lemming [ v. State, 292 Ga.App. 138, 141(1) (663 S.E.2d 375) (2008)]. We cannot say that an indefinite reference to a meeting between the judge and someone not a party to the case necessarily ‘support[s] the inescapable conclusion that a reasonable person would consider [Judge Parrott] to [have] harbor[ed] a bias that affect[ed] his ability to be impartial.’ (Citations omitted.) Id.” 2. Judge wasn’t subject to recusal where his son was married to plaintiff’s aunt. ‘Marriage relates the husband to the wife's kindred, but does not relate any of his kindred to hers.’ (Citations and punctuation omitted). Everett v. Culberson, 215 Ga. 577, 585(8) (111 S.E.2d 367) (1959). Accord Edge v. Calhoun Nat. Bank, 155 Ga. 821, 828 (118 SE 359) (1923). Simply put, Chief Judge Prior was not related under Georgia law to the kindred of his son's wife … and thus was not disqualified from acting in this case under OCGA § 15–1–8(a)(2).” 3. Judge’s voluntary recusal doesn’t void orders entered by him. “Chief Judge Prior made clear in the order that he was voluntarily recusing himself from “any hearing in this case” because his son “is apparently a witness in the case.” “A voluntary recusal shall not be construed as either an admission or denial to any allegations which have been set out in [a recusal] motion.” Ga. Unif.Super. Ct. R. 25.7. See Moody v. State, 256 Ga.App. 65, 67 (567 S.E.2d 709) (2002). And the Chief Judge's son did not appear as a witness in connection with the rulings made in the May 31 order. Gude v. State, 289 Ga. 46, 709 S.E.2d 206 (February 28, 2011). Campaign contribution doesn’t require recusal, unless “exceptionally large.” Although a trial judge should recuse himself or herself from presiding over a case involving a party who has previously made an exceptionally-large campaign contribution, we hold that recusal is not required simply because the judge previously received any campaign contribution from a party. See Patterson v. Butler, 187 Ga.App. 740 (371 S.E.2d 268) (1988) (holding that the trial judge did not err by denying a motion to recuse that alleged, in part, that a defendant had previously worked on the judge's election campaigns). Compare Caperton v. A.T. Massey Coal Co., 556 U.S. 868 (129 S.Ct. 2252, 173 L.Ed.2d 1208) (2009) (holding under ‘extreme facts,’ which included the fact of an exceptionally-large campaign contribution, that constitutional due process was violated by a trial judge's refusal to recuse himself). Because Gude's motion to recuse Judge Adams did not allege that she previously received any financial contribution impermissible under law or received any other specified form of exceptional support of her campaign that would require her recusal, we hold, applying the judicial ethics standards described above, that Judge Adams did not commit reversible error by not granting the motion to recuse based on this allegation. See USCR 25.1.” Wilson v. McNeely, 295 Ga.App. 41, 670 S.E.2d 846 (December 1, 2008). Civil judgment reversed; superior court judge should have recused himself when one of the parties was a judge sitting in another court in the same judicial circuit (here, a part-time municipal court judge). Based on Smith v. Guest Pond Club , 277 Ga. 143, 586 S.E.2d 623 (2003), where “counsel for one of the parties was also a judge on the same court as the presiding judge. Id. at 145(2). The Supreme Court of Georgia observed that ‘our Judicial Qualifications Commission has opined that a judge of a particular court should never preside over a matter involving another judge from the same circuit,’ Id. at 146. ‘Simply stated, the public must believe in the absolute integrity and impartiality of its judges.... Consequently, even without a showing of actual bias, prejudice or unfairness, and regardless of the merits or timeliness of a Motion to Recuse, this Commission concludes that it is inappropriate for any trial court judge to preside in any action wherein one of the parties holds a judicial office on the same or any other court which sits in the same circuit [ ].’ Id., quoting Judicial Qualifications Commission, Opinion 220. … Having determined that the trial court erred by denying the motion to recuse the judge and that the judge should not have presided over or ruled upon the matter, the Court held that ‘the orders entered by [the judge] in this case must be declared void and ordered vacated.’” Turner v. State, 280 Ga. 174, 626 S.E.2d 86 (January 30, 2006). “Turner … contends that recusal is necessary because Judge Bagley may have had knowledge of the victim and because of his association with Turner and her mother. These allegations, however, are belied by the record. The record is devoid of any evidence that Judge Bagley knew the victim or