☢ test - Í

had any knowledge of the circumstances surrounding his death. The record also clearly establishes that although Judge Bagley and Turner were acquainted, their acquaintance was limited to a few professional encounters while both were working in the Forsyth County Courthouse. Although the location of their respective offices caused Judge Bagley to encounter Turner’s mother on a more frequent basis, this Court has not generally required recusal simply because the judge knew socially or professionally one of the parties or their attorneys. See Sears [ v. State, 262 Ga. 805(1), 426 S.E.2d 553 (1993)]; Smith v. State, 189 Ga.App. 27(2), 375 S.E.2d 69 (1988). ‘[K]eeping in mind the reality that any judge will have “come to the bench after having had extensive contacts with the community,” [cit.]’ Sears, supra, we conclude that Judge Bagley’s limited contact with Turner and her mother is not enough to call into question his impartiality in this case.” 7. PRIOR JUDICIAL DEALINGS WITH PARTIES Heidt v. State, 292 Ga. 343, 736 S.E.2d 384 (January 7, 2013). Murder and related convictions affirmed; no error in denying motion to disqualify trial judge where “the judge twice had issued search warrants related to his case and because he had signed ten orders for records relating to the case. Heidt also argued that the trial judge had made an out-of-court statement that, according to Heidt, showed a bias against him.” Motion was heard by another judge. Issuance of search warrants and orders was not an extra-judicial basis for disqualification. Brown v. State, 307 Ga.App. 99, 704 S.E.2d 227 (November 24, 2010). Convictions for cocaine trafficking and related offenses affirmed; judge wasn’t required to sua sponte recuse from presiding over trial based on prior experiences as district attorney prosecuting defendant, or as judge presiding over defendant’s probation revocation. Accord, Leverette v. State , 291 Ga. 834, 732 S.E.2d 255 (October 1, 2012); Rembert v. State , 324 Ga.App. 146, 749 S.E.2d 744 (October 7, 2013). Crosbie v. State, 304 Ga.App. 613, 697 S.E.2d 278 (June 25, 2010). Defendant’s convictions for armed robbery and related offenses affirmed; trial court properly denied defendant’s recusal motion. “Crosbie moved to recuse based on a general allegation that the judge ‘has a personal bias or prejudice concerning the Defendant’ and that the judge ‘has presided over two previous hearings involving the Defendant unrelated to the present case’ in which the judge's ‘bias against him was demonstrated when he was precluded from presenting crucial evidence, that the Court improperly exercised jurisdiction over him, and that improper statements were directed to him.’” “As noted by the trial court in its order, Crosbie did not move for recusal until four months after his criminal case was assigned to the same judge who had previously presided over his other two cases . The affidavit submitted in support of his motion fails to provide any explanation for the delay in filing the motion. Based on this delay and the lack of any good cause shown for the delay, the trial court did not err by denying the motion to recuse. Id. (affirming denial of motion to recuse based upon 48-day delay in filing motion to recuse). See also Walker v. Walker, 248 Ga.App. 177, 179(5) (546 S.E.2d 315) (2001).” Hargrove v. State, 299 Ga.App. 27, 681 S.E.2d 707 (July 13, 2009). At defendant’s trial for family violence aggravated battery, judge wasn’t required to sua sponte recuse because he had previously issued temporary protective order between the parties (making findings of fact in the process). “‘[T]here is no duty for a trial judge to sua sponte recuse himself absent a violation of a specific standard of OCGA § 15-1-8 or Canon 3(E)(1)(a) through (c) of the Code of Judicial Conduct, which is not waived by a party after disclosure.’ Phillips v. State, 267 Ga.App. 733, 736(2) (601 S.E.2d 147) (2004) (citations omitted). Here, the trial judge did not violate OCGA § 15-1-8(a)(3), as claimed by Hargrove, because the temporary restraining order he issued was not the subject of review at Hargrove's criminal trial. The fact that the trial court granted a temporary restraining order against Hargrove was not alone sufficient to require a sua sponte recusal. See id. (recusal not required where trial judge previously heard same evidence at probation revocation hearing); Baptiste v. State, 229 Ga.App. 691, 697(1) (494 S.E.2d 530) (1997) (‘The fact that the judge has sat on prior cases of the party or ruled on prior matters in the case before the judge is legally insufficient as a ground[ ] for recusal.’) (citations omitted).” Judge’s findings of fact justifying the TRO were never placed before the jury. English v. State, 290 Ga.App. 378, 659 S.E.2d 783 (March 19, 2008). Trial judge properly denied motion to recuse, filed in amended motion for new trial over a year after trial (which began July, 2005). One month before trial, judge sentenced defendant in another case, saying “‘I don’t like you. I don’t like you for what you've done to your folks and your brother. They’re not going to jail, but you have put them through hell.... I could sentence you to sixty-six years and I’m not going to do that.’ (Emphasis supplied.) The judge then sentenced English to serve five years.” Defendant also notes that he had knowledge of property stolen from judge’s family, which judge became aware of. Held, decision not to recuse was not error because no evidence “that any harm resulted from either example of alleged impropriety. Gillman v. State, 239 Ga.App. 880, 883(2)(b) (522 S.E.2d 284) (1999).”