☢ test - Í

Keller v. State, 286 Ga.App. 292, 648 S.E.2d 714 (June 28, 2007). Trial court properly denied defendant’s motion to recuse. “[R]ecusal is warranted only when the alleged bias is the product of an ‘extra-judicial’ source and ‘[t]he fact that the judge has sat on prior cases of the party or ruled on prior matters in the case before the judge is legally insufficient as a ground for recusal.’ Baptiste v. State, 229 Ga.App. 691, 696-697(1) (494 S.E.2d 530) (1997); see Rice, supra at 443-444. As all of the allegations of bias in the motion to recuse arise from what Keller terms his ‘history in the judge’s courtroom and chambers, we conclude that it did not state facts which, if true, would have required recusal. See Vaughn v. State, 247 Ga.App. 368, 370(2) (543 S.E.2d 429) (2000). Moreover, none of the instances of ‘bias’ alleged by Keller to have occurred during the trial are such that would require recusal. Thus, to the extent that Keller argues the judge should have recused himself sua sponte at trial, we find no merit to his claim. See Rice, supra at 444.” Accord, Paul v. State , 296 Ga.App. 6, 673 S.E.2d 551 (February 11, 2009). Overruled based on improper application of ‘abuse of discretion’ standard on appeal, Mayor & Alderman of City of Savannah (May 29, 2012), above. Alexander v. State, 276 Ga.App. 288, 623 S.E.2d 160 (November 8, 2005). Aggravated sodomy and related convictions affirmed. Trial judge was not required to recuse because he signed the original arrest warrant for defendant. “‘The fact that the judge has sat on prior cases of the party or ruled on prior matters in the case before the judge is legally insufficient as a grounds for recusal. [Cits.]’ Baptiste [ v. State, 229 Ga.App. 691, 697, 494 S.E.2d 530 (1997)].” Kendrick v. State, 269 Ga.App. 831, 605 S.E.2d 369 (September 13, 2004). Juvenile judge not required to recuse himself from presiding over defendant’s child molestation trial in superior court where “he had earlier presided over a deprivation proceeding … arising out of the same molestation accusations. … [W]e find nothing in the record here that suggests that [judge’s] previous official contact with Kendrick affected the impartiality of his judgments or created a perception of impropriety.” Phillips v. State, 267 Ga.App. 733, 601 S.E.2d 147 (June 9, 2004). Trial judge not required to recuse himself sua sponte because he heard the evidence against defendant at an earlier probation revocation hearing. “Motions for recusal are governed by Uniform Superior Court Rule (‘USCR’) 25. Under USCR 25.1, all motions to recuse or disqualify [a judge] shall be timely filed in writing and all evidence shall be presented by accompanying affidavits which shall fully set out the facts upon which the motion is founded. Phillips did not make a written motion, and thus, his motion to recuse on such ground was waived by his failure to do so. [Cits.] To the extent Phillips asserts that the trial judge should have recused himself sua sponte, there is no duty for a trial judge to sua sponte recuse himself absent a violation of a specific standard of OCGA § 15-1-8 or Canon 3(E)(1)(a) through (c) of the Code of Judicial Conduct, which is not waived by a party after disclosure. [Cits.] Of the circumstances set out in these prohibitions, the only one that conceivably applies here is where ‘the judge has a personal bias or prejudice concerning a party or a party’s lawyer [.]’ Georgia Code of Judicial Conduct Canon 3(E)(1)(a). To merit recusal, ‘any alleged bias must be of such a nature and intensity to prevent the defendant from obtaining a trial uninfluenced by the court’s prejudgment.’ (Citation and punctuation omitted.) Vaughn v. State, 247 Ga.App. 368, 370(2) (543 S.E.2d 429) (2000). Phillips has not pointed to any evidence the trial judge had any such bias or prejudice against him, and from our examination of the record, we find none. This enumeration is without merit.” Johnson v. State, 260 Ga.App. 413, 579 S.E.2d 809 (March 19, 2003). “[P]revious contact with a defendant by a judge in his judicial capacity is not grounds for recusal.” Likewise, the fact that some of the charges arose when judge was district attorney is not grounds for recusal, absent “evidence the district attorney’s office handled any charges against Johnson when the judge was district attorney.” Accord, Horne v. State , 318 Ga.App. 484, 733 S.E.2d 487 (October 25, 2012). Carter v. State, 259 Ga.App. 798, 578 S.E.2d 508 (February 21, 2003). Mere existence of federal civil action against judge does not mandate judge’s recusal. Accord, Savage (September 11, 2003), above; Robinson v. State , 312 Ga.App. 736, 719 S.E.2d 601 (November 21, 2011) (defendant’s suit against judge did not give judge any pecuniary interest in defendant’s prosecution). Williams v State, 257 Ga.App. 589, 571 S.E.2d 571 (Sept. 25, 2002). A court’s rulings, simply because they were favorable to the state, do not show bias in violation of OCGA § 15-1-8 or Code of Judicial Conduct, Canon 3(E). Additionally, “[i]t has long been regarded as normal and proper for a judge to sit in the same case upon its remand, and to sit in successive trials involving the same defendant.” Citing Butts v. State , 273 Ga. 760, 762-63, 546 S.E.2d 472 (2001). Accord, Henderson v. State , 295 Ga. 333, 759 S.E.2d 827 (June 16, 2014) (“a judicial ruling adverse to a party is not disqualifying”).