☢ test - Í

from Fripp’s and Brown’s cases.” 3. “As the Court of Appeals has cautioned: ‘The judge hearing the motion to recuse should exercise extreme caution in permitting the trial judge, against whom the motion has been brought, to be called as a witness, because the very process of examination or cross-examination of the judge may be such as to cause the perception of prejudice or cause the judge to “become so involved in a controversy that his [or her] objectivity could reasonably be questioned” by the treatment by movant’s counsel intentionally. Isaacs v. State, [257 Ga. 126, 128, 355 S.E.2d 644 (1987)]. While the motion may be without legal grounds, the hearing process may through indirection achieve what the movant could not achieve directly. [Only w]here there is no other available witness as to the subject of inquiry and the subject of inquiry is relevant and material to the motion and does not invade the privileged thought processes of the judge in reaching prior rulings should the hearing judge permit the trial judge to be examined; then, only the hearing judge can protect the trial judge from being abused as a witness.’ Baptiste v. State, 229 Ga.App. 691, 696 n. 4, 494 S.E.2d 530 (1997) (emphasis in original).” Horn v. Shepherd, 294 Ga. 468, 754 S.E.2d 367 (January 27, 2014). In post-divorce civil proceedings, judge assigned to hear recusal motion against presiding judge “lacked authority to act on unrelated matters in the case” such as guardian ad litem’s motion to hold husband in contempt. “Judge Blackmon was assigned to the case only ‘to hear [Husband's] motion to recuse.’ … The Uniform Superior Court Rules are clear that ‘[t]he judge to whom any action is assigned shall have exclusive control of such action, except as provided in these rules,’ USCR 3.3, and that the assignment of a recusal motion to another judge authorizes the new judge only ‘to hear the motion to recuse,’ not the whole case, USCR 25.3. When Judge Blackmon entered the contempt order at issue, the case was still assigned to Judge Kirby. Thus, Judge Blackmon acted outside the scope of his limited appointment to decide the recusal motion.” “Nothing in this opinion should be read to suggest that Judge Blackmon lacked the authority to hold Husband in contempt for conduct committed in the court's presence or for conduct that was otherwise related to the recusal motion.” Braddy v. State, 316 Ga.App. 292, 729 S.E.2d 461 (June 20, 2012). In burglary and forgery prosecution, trial judge erred in failing to refer recusal motion to another judge, as motion met the threshold requirements of USCR 25.3. “[T]he threshold inquiries concerning the motion to recuse are: ‘was the motion timely filed, were the affidavits supporting the motion legally sufficient, and did the affidavits aver facts that, when assumed to be true, would warrant the trial judge's recusal from hearing the case? If all three conditions precedent were met, the trial judge was required to refer the motion to another judge.’ Mayor & Aldermen of City of Savannah v. Batson–Cook Co., 291 Ga. 114, 728 S.E.2d 189 (May 29, 2012).” Affidavit here alleged that trial judge had had ex parte communication about defendant’s case with someone and had formed and expressed opinions about defendant’s guilt; but rather than referring the motion, trial judge disputed the allegations. Mayor & Alderman of City of Savannah v. Batson-Cook Co., 291 Ga. 114, 728 S.E.2d 189 (May 29, 2012). Reversing 310 Ga.App. 878, 714 S.E.2d 242 (2011); civil case remanded to trial court for reconsideration of motion to recuse trial judge. 1. Trial judge erred by failing to refer recusal motion to another judge, as motion and supporting affidavits satisfied the requirements of USCR 25. Motion was filed within five days of learning of grounds for recusal (omitting weekends, pursuant to OCGA § 1-3-1(d)(3)); affidavit stated specific facts, not bare conclusions; and facts stated, if true, would warrant recusal. 2. Court of Appeals used wrong standard to review trial court’s decision on legal sufficiency of the motion and affidavits. Proper standard on appeal is de novo review, not abuse of discretion, as “USCR 25.3 does not authorize a discretionary determination on the part of the trial judge presented with a motion and affidavit to recuse— the Rule states that another judge shall be assigned to hear the recusal motion if the motion is timely, the affidavit legally sufficient, and the facts set forth in the affidavit, when taken as true, would authorize recusal.” Overrules numerous prior decisions of Court of Appeals applying an abuse of discretion standard. Gray v. Manis, 282 Ga. 336, 647 S.E.2d 588 (July 13, 2007). 1. Pro se plaintiff filed civil suit against several county officials, alleging that they were part of a conspiracy against him. Plaintiff then moved to recuse trial judge for being part of the same conspiracy. Trial judge denied the motion, and Plaintiff filed this mandamus action to compel her to recuse herself. Plaintiff then moved to recuse the judge assigned the mandamus action. Held, mandamus judge properly denied the motion to recuse himself, as the affidavit supporting the recusal motion “did not suggest any reason why Judge Baxter was a material witness related to whether mandamus would lie against Judge Manis. Instead, it contains rambling conclusions and opinions alleging that Judge Baxter was somehow implicated in the racketeering scheme of which Gray believed himself to be the victim. ‘An affidavit is insufficient if it contains mere conclusions rather than showing facts indicating the judge’s personal (rather than judicial) bias. [Cit.]’ Stevens v. Morris Communications Corp., 170 Ga.App. 612, 613 (317 S.E.2d 652) (1984). ‘“To warrant disqualification of a trial judge the affidavit supporting the recusal