☢ test - Í

Sutton v. State , A16A0446, ___ Ga.App. ___, ___ S.E.2d ___, 2016 WL 1577187 (April 20, 2016) (no severance of charges of molestation of defendant’s two granddaughters, several years apart). Boatright v. State, 308 Ga.App. 266, 707 S.E.2d 158 (March 8, 2011). Child molestation and related convictions affirmed; no error where trial court refused to sever counts relating to different victims, or “to sever the tattooing offenses from the sex offenses.” “Here, although the charged sex offenses involved different female victims and occurred on different dates, they all reflected Boatright's pattern of touching or fondling adolescent females while they were sleeping in Boatright's home. See Freeman v. State, 202 Ga.App. 185, 188(7), 413 S.E.2d 774 (1991); Seidel v. State, 197 Ga.App. 14, 16(3), 397 S.E.2d 480 (1990). As argued by the State, all of the sex offenses were similar and showed Boatright's common motive, plan, scheme, or bent of mind to satisfy his sexual desires. See id. In addition, the circumstances surrounding the tattooing offenses would have been admissible at the trial of the sex offenses to show Boatright's lustful disposition and bent of mind. See Freeman, supra, 202 Ga.App. at 188(7), 413 S.E.2d 774. See also Dickerson v. State, 304 Ga.App. 762, 765(1), 697 S.E.2d 874 (2010) (concluding that severance was not required since the circumstances related to defendant's sexual exploitation charges would have been admissible as similar transaction evidence in the trial of defendant's child molestation and aggravated sexual battery charges).” Dickerson v. State, 304 Ga.App. 762, 697 S.E.2d 874 (July 1, 2010). Defendant’s convictions for child molestation, sexual exploitation, and related offenses affirmed; no error where trial court joined two separate indictments for trial, where severance not demanded. “See Stewart v. State, 277 Ga. 138, 140, 587 S.E.2d 602 (2003) (‘severance is not mandatory when evidence of one offense is admissible upon the trial of another offense’) (citations omitted; emphasis omitted). ‘The [trial] court is vested with discretion in this matter, and in the exercise of that discretion it must balance the interest of the defendant with the interest of the State.’ (Citations omitted.) Id. at 139, 587 S.E.2d 602.” Accord, Boatright (March 8, 2011), above. Bryant v. State, 304 Ga.App. 456, 696 S.E.2d 439 (June 17, 2010). Defendant’s convictions for rape, aggravated assault, and nine counts of burglary affirmed; trial court properly declined to sever the one incident involving rape and aggravated assault from the others which only involved burglary. “Here, ‘[t]he charges against [Bryant] clearly show a recurring pattern of conduct suggesting a common scheme or modus operandi.’ Greenway v. State, 207 Ga.App. 511, 513(2), 428 S.E.2d 415 (1993). Each incident involved a daytime break-in to a residence in or next to the Lakebrooke Run subdivision, and in each case the perpetrator accessed the home through a back window. The intruder always took the same kinds of items, all of which were small enough to be carried away, and in all but two cases, the intruder ransacked the home. All of the burglaries occurred within an eight-month period, and seven of the nine occurred within a single, four-month period. Moreover, the aggravated assault, false imprisonment, and rape occurred during one of these burglaries, when the homeowner's daughter interrupted the burglary. (Notably, this was the only occasion where the intruder actually encountered a resident of the home being burgled.) Given that ‘the [burglaries] charged were so similar as to evidence a common plan or scheme and revealed an identical modus operandi,’ evidence of the other burglaries would have been admissible at the trial on the charges of rape, false imprisonment, aggravated assault, and the burglary charge related thereto. (Punctuation omitted.) Muckle v. State, 202 Ga.App. 733(1), 415 S.E.2d 299 (1992). See also Shabazz v. State, 265 Ga.App. 64, 65(1), 592 S.E.2d 876 (2004). Thus, the trial court did not abuse its discretion in denying Bryant's motion for severance. See Thrasher [ v. State, 261 Ga.App. 650, 652(3), 583 S.E.2d 504 (2003)] (no abuse of discretion in refusing to sever burglary charges from burglary and rape charges arising out of separate incidents where the offenses ‘constituted a series of criminal acts closely connected by geography, time, and manner so as to constitute a scheme or plan of criminal conduct’) (punctuation omitted); Evans v. State, 201 Ga.App. 20, 25(1), 410 S.E.2d 146 (1991) (trial court properly refused to sever burglary charges from sexual assault charges where the burglary charges ‘were part and parcel of appellant's crime spree in the apartment complex where he raped and sodomized [a victim]’).” Henderson v. State, 303 Ga.App. 527, 693 S.E.2d 896 (April 7, 2010). Defendant’s convictions for armed robbery, aggravated assault, and related offenses affirmed. Trial court properly declined to sever two separate incidents: “Here, Henderson, brandishing a gun, stole a car from Willis, and less than 24 hours later, used the same gun and the stolen car to commit an armed robbery. ‘The test for the court to consider is whether, in light of the number of offenses charged and the complexity of the evidence, the fact-trier will be able to distinguish the evidence and apply the law intelligently to each offense.’ (Citation and punctuation omitted.) Overton v. State, 295 Ga.App. 223, 235(3), 671 S.E.2d 507 (2008). Accord Campbell v. State, 206 Ga.App. 456, 458(2), 426 S.E.2d 45 (1992). Here, the trial court could find that the jury could distinguish the evidence and apply the applicable law to each offense.”