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trial.’ (Citations omitted.) Oliver v. State, 276 Ga. 665, 668(6) (581 S.E.2d 538) (2003). Here, even if the victim’s family reacted emotionally when the pictures of her injuries were shown, the only indication is that some family members were crying. ‘Such emotions are reasonably expected’ from a victim’s family members. Dick v. State, 246 Ga. 697, 705(14) (273 S.E.2d 124) (1980). The record does not reflect that any of the family members ‘became hysterical or made any prejudicial comments.’ Williams v. State, 276 Ga. 384, 385(2) (578 S.E.2d 858) (2003).” Accord, Simmons v. State , 291 Ga. 705, 733 S.E.2d 280 (October 15, 2012) (victim’s mother cried quietly on the stand on one occasion, causing brief recess); Foster v. State , 294 Ga. 383, 754 S.E.2d 33 (January 21, 2014) (No mistrial based on witness crying, not hysterical. “Such emotions are reasonably expected by one who is a close friend of a murder victim.”). Lonergan v. State, 281 Ga. 637, 641 S.E.2d 792 (February 26, 2007). No mistrial required “based on the presence at trial of a group of spectators wearing white ribbons. Lonergan argues that the ribbons were meant as a display of solidarity with the victim and his family and, as such, constituted a subtle attempt to influence the jury. The trial court is vested with considerable discretion in its conduct of court proceedings. Lemley v. State, 245 Ga. 350(3) (264 S.E.2d 881) (1980). Here, the trial court considered Lonergan’s objections and resolved them by ruling that it would permit spectators to wear such insignia but would prohibit persons appearing as witnesses from doing so. The trial court did not abuse its discretion in so ruling. See, e.g., Lemley v. State, supra ( no abuse of discretion where trial court prescribed location in courtroom where law enforcement spectators could sit but refused to limit number of officers present in courtroom ). In addition, Lonergan has offered no evidence that any member of the jury saw the ribbons or attached any significance to them and thus has not shown any harm resulting therefrom.” Brown v. State, 275 Ga.App. 99, 619 S.E.2d 789 (August 12, 2005). “‘Measures to be taken as a result of demonstrations and outbursts which occur during the course of a trial are matters within the trial court’s discretion unless a new trial is necessary to insure a fair trial. Where the trial court fails to act to stop a disturbance, or fails to instruct the jury to disregard it, and the demonstration will prevent the defendant from receiving a fair trial, the court must grant a new trial.’ (Citation and punctuation omitted.) Oliver v. State, 276 Ga. 665, 669(6) (581 S.E.2d 538) (2003).” Victim’s outburst during closing argument was adequately handled by first cautioning victim, giving curative instruction to jury, then excluding victim from courtroom and again giving curative instruction to jury. Both times the court asked the jury if they could follow the instructions. “In light of the prompt, adequate, and curative action taken by the trial court, and the minimal nature of the disruption, we cannot say that the victim’s outburst denied Brown a fair and impartial trial.” Accord, Thomason v. State , 281 Ga. 429, 637 S.E.2d 639 (November 6, 2006) (murder “victim’s mother pointed at Thomason as she left the witness stand and asked, ‘Why did you do it?’”). Williams v. State, 267 Ga.App. 283, 599 S.E.2d 256 (May 6, 2004). No mistrial required “when the persons showing an emotional reaction to the evidence had been immediately removed from the courtroom and curative instructions were given following the subsequent polling of the jury to see if the comment had been heard. See Todd v. State, 274 Ga. 98, 102(5) (549 S.E.2d 116) (2001); Sheppard v. State, 235 Ga. 89, 91(2) (218 S.E.2d 830) (1975).” Christian v. State, 277 Ga. 775, 596 S.E.2d 6 (April 27, 2004). “The record shows that during [witness’s] testimony, there was an emotional outburst in the courtroom from the victim’s family. After a recess, the trial court granted counsel’s request for a curative instruction reminding the jury to evaluate the case based only upon the evidence and testimony. Contrary to [defendant’s] argument, this curative instruction was sufficient to alleviate the potential for prejudice and to ensure a fair trial. See Todd v. State, 274 Ga. 98, 102 (549 S.E.2d 116) (2001).” Davis v. State , 272 Ga. 327, 528 S.E.2d 800 (May 1, 2000). Malice murder and related convictions affirmed; mistrial not required based on spectator’s “emotional outburst in the courtroom. During the state's case the investigating officer was asked to identify clothing the victim had been wearing at the time of the murder. A member of the victim's family began to cry and left the courtroom; other spectators followed her. The record does not indicate whether the jury was aware that the outburst involved the victim's friends or relatives. The trial court denied Davis's motion for a mistrial, but gave curative instructions to the jury to disregard the incident. In these circumstances there was no abuse of the trial court's discretion. Lowe v. State, 267 Ga. 410(3), 478 S.E.2d 762 (1996); Byrd v. State, 262 Ga. 426(1), 420 S.E.2d 748 (1992).” Cross v. State, 271 Ga. 427, 520 S.E.2d 457 (September 13, 1999). “Cross … fails in his claim that [trial counsel] was ineffective in not seeking curative instructions after a spectator at trial made an inflammatory statement about Cross, possibly within the hearing of the jury. [Attorney] Prince moved for a mistrial, which was denied, and he then declined the court's offer to give curative instructions to the jury. He stated to the court that he thought such instruction would ‘just