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detained Jones longer than was necessary and effected more than just a brief investigative stop. DiSanti [ v. State, 190 Ga.App. 331, 378 S.E.2d 729 (1989)], citing Schmidt v. State, 188 Ga.App. 85, 87, 372 S.E.2d 440 (1988); see Migliore v. State, 240 Ga.App. 783, 786, 525 S.E.2d 166 (1999).” 2. Officers lacked probable cause for arrest. “The information possessed by the officer at the time of the arrest—that Jones appeared to be nervous, perhaps because she was late for work, that she had used drugs in the past but had stopped, and that police had very general information from an unknown or at least undisclosed source that Jones was ‘possibly’ transporting drugs—may have established reasonable suspicion to briefly detain her, but it certainly did not establish probable cause to arrest Jones or search her car and purse. See DiSanti, supra.” Williams v. State, 242 Ga.App. 34, 528 S.E.2d 554 (January 21, 2000). In defendant’s prosecution for cocaine trafficking, DEA officers at Atlanta airport lacked probable cause to arrest defendant. “At the suppression hearing, [Agent] Shelton testified that based on the following factors, he believed he had probable cause to transport Williams to the DEA office and procure a warrant to search him: (1) travel characteristics consistent with drug trafficking; (2) incorrect phone number given to Miami ticket agent; (3) manifestations of nervousness; (4) inconsistent answers regarding whom he was visiting in Miami; and (5) the roll of plastic wrap in his backpack. While these factors may give rise to a reasonable suspicion of illicit drug activity, they are insufficient even when combined to constitute probable cause to believe a suspect is transporting drugs. See Murphy v. State, 230 Ga.App. 365, 368, 496 S.E.2d 512 (1998). In support of its argument that there was probable cause, the State cites Clark v. State, 183 Ga.App. 838, 360 S.E.2d 447 (1987), and Miller v. State, 183 Ga.App. 702, 359 S.E.2d 683 (1987). Both cases are distinguishable. Like the present case, Clark and Miller concerned instances where DEA agents stopped individuals in Hartsfield Airport after the individuals deplaned flights from South Florida. In both cases, however, probable cause arose chiefly from the individuals having patent, unusual bulges on their persons and the agents having extensive experience that those sorts of bulges signified the presence of drugs. 183 Ga.App. at 840, 360 S.E.2d 447; 183 Ga.App. at 703, 359 S.E.2d 683. Neither of those elements is present here.” Tukes v. State, 236 Ga.App. 77, 511 S.E.2d 534 (January 25, 1999). “By its nature, knowledge sufficient to satisfy the ‘plain feel’ doctrine, i.e., knowledge that a concealed object is contraband, provides sufficient probable cause to arrest. In this case, ‘[t]he facts and circumstances within the knowledge of the officer[ ] were sufficient to warrant a prudent man in believing that [Tukes] had committed an offense. [Cits.]’ Clark v. State, 212 Ga.App. 486, 487-488, 441 S.E.2d 885 (1994).” This is true even though officer couldn’t tell what kind of drugs defendant was carrying; just that, from defendant’s nervousness and the obvious bulky object in his waistband, that the object officer felt was drugs of some kind. 7. PROBATIONERS Evans v. State, 318 Ga.App. 706, 734 S.E.2d 527 (November 20, 2012). Convictions for possession of marijuana with intent to distribute, and within 1000 feet of public housing, a park, and a school, affirmed; trial court properly denied motion to suppress. Pursuant to OCGA § 42-8-38(a), defendant’s probation supervisor was authorized to arrest him, without warrant, based on his belief that defendant had violated probation (here, by selling drugs). “Thus, although ‘there is nothing in Georgia law that creates a blanket authorization for warrantless searches of probationers' homes based on less than probable cause, this statute clearly attempts to severely limit probationers' rights against arrest, even at home without a warrant, based on less than probable cause. The statutory limitation of rights is subject only to constitutional limitations, and ... the constitutional limitations themselves are affected by the statute's existence. The statute places probationers on notice that their rights have been limited and, in turn, diminishes their expectation of privacy.’ (Emphasis in original.) Jones [ v. State, 282 Ga. 784, 789(1), 653 S.E.2d 456 (2007)].” The standard is “reasonable cause” for the probation supervisor “‘to believe the arrest is necessary to serve the legitimate “special needs” of probation revocation, including the prompt protection of the public.’ (Footnote omitted.) Id.” Probation officer here could act on tip from police, even where that tip originated from an anonymous caller. “Considering that the police had advised the probation officer that Evans had been seen carrying drugs, combined with Evans's refusal to stop and subsequent flight when approached by the police and probation officers and the probation officer's familiarity with Evans's history of drug possession and flight from police and probation officers, we conclude that the probation officer had reasonable cause for Evans's arrest.” Officers’ entry into defendant’s residence was thus authorized. 8. RESIDENCES See subheading SEARCHES – RESIDENCES, below 9. WARRANTLESS ARRESTS Fortson v. State, 283 Ga.App. 120, 640 S.E.2d 693 (December 20, 2006). “ Where, as here, officers observed Fortson sell cocaine to an undercover operative outside the motel room, a warrantless arrest was authorized on the ground