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police station, it was determined that its overall length – 36 inches – was within the limit allowed by law.” Defendant moved to suppress drugs uncovered in the subsequent search, contending that the legal weapon gave officers no grounds for his continued detention. Held, officers had reasonable, articulable suspicion of criminal activity. “The mere fact that the shotgun did not violate the law is not dispositive. [Cit.] The proper inquiry is whether the officers reasonably could have believed that the weapon violated the law. Here, [officer] testified that the barrel of the gun had recently been sawed off and that he believed the gun was illegal. Under these circumstances, [officer] acted reasonably in further detaining Castleberry to determine whether he had in fact violated the law.” Whitener v. State, 272 Ga.App. 28, 611 S.E.2d 707 (March 7, 2005). Interlocutory appeal in marijuana possession prosecution. Trial court properly denied motion to suppress, as stop was justified: “[O]fficer received a dispatch around 10:00 p.m. on November 3, 2003 to go to a Cracker Barrel Restaurant parking lot because a suspicious person was squatting and looking into parked vehicles on the darkest side of the building and parking lot.” Report came from off- duty deputy. Accord, Hopkins v. State , 209 Ga.App. 337, 433 S.E.2d 423 (1993) (physical precedent only; officer observed defendant peering into cars in parking lot); distinguishes Brooks v. State , 144 Ga.App. 97, 240 S.E.2d 593 (1977) (no articulable suspicion where defendant “looked into a car window in a parking lot in broad daylight and abruptly left in his own vehicle after noticing the police officer.”). Dawson v. State, 271 Ga.App. 217, 609 S.E.2d 158 (January 6, 2005). Theft by receiving and related convictions affirmed; trial court properly denied motion to suppress. Officers needed no “particularized and objective basis for suspecting … criminal activity” to justify running the tag on a vehicle. No analysis, howver, other than: defendant cited no authority for the proposition; the panel could find none; and the practice has been allowed, albeit unchallenged, in previous decisions. “Further, as Dawson was knowingly using a stolen vehicle on a public roadway, he ‘was in constant expectation of intrusion by authorities,’ Burgeson v. State, 267 Ga. 102, 105-106(3)(b) (475 S.E.2d 580) (1996).” Stop based on computer check of tag accepted without comment in State v. Joyner, 270 Ga.App. 533, 607 S.E.2d 184 (November 19, 2004) ( overruled on other grounds , Matthews v. State , 294 Ga.App. 836, 670 S.E.2d 520 (November 25, 2008) (full court opinion)). Query: what Fourth Amendment interest is implicated where an officer randomly checks a tag, without stopping the vehicle? Williams v. State, 269 Ga.App. 616, 604 S.E.2d 640 (September 15, 2004). Armed robbery and related convictions affirmed; trial court properly denied motion to suppress. Officer’s observation of defendant in a high-crime area (area had history of armed robberies, drug offenders and prostitutes) at night, quickly turning away from officer’s patrol unit and going behind hotel, then found behind the hotel “carrying a number of wallets in one of his hands even though he was wearing pants with pockets,” justified Terry stop. “When Williams fled without responding to the officer’s inquiry as to why none of the wallets he was carrying contained any documentation of his identity, [officer] was authorized to subdue Williams.” McNair v. State, 267 Ga.App. 872, 600 S.E.2d 830 (June 15, 2004). Conviction for possession of crime tools affirmed; trial court properly denied motion to suppress. Officer responding to bank burglar alarm at 3:30 a.m. saw a car leaving the scene and gave a radio look-out for it. There were no other vehicles on the scene. Other officers saw it coming from direction of the bank five minutes later and pulled it over. The stop was supported by “reasonable, articulable suspicion of criminal activity.” Accord, Lamb v. State , 269 Ga.App. 335, 604 S.E.2d 207 (August 6, 2004). Distinguished in Murray v. State, 282 Ga.App. 741, 639 S.E.2d 631 (December 6, 2006) (not enough specific information, not proximate enough in time/place). Crowley v. State, 267 Ga.App. 718, 601 S.E.2d 154 (June 9, 2004). Cocaine possession and related convictions affirmed; trial court properly denied motion to suppress. On patrol in the early morning hours, officer saw a car with its parking and brake lights flashing. Suspecting it might be a silent alarm going off, but recognizing that alarms can be set off by random motion, officer stopped to look for evidence of someone attempting to enter the vehicle, but saw no one. Patrolling the area, five to seven minutes later he encountered defendant coming out of the woods 50-75 yards away, pushing a bicycle. Officer stopped him, defendant said he was on his way home from work from a plant 10 miles away, hurriedly “said ‘Man, I got to go,’ and took off on his bike.” Officer pursued, saw defendant drop something; officer drew his gun and ordered defendant to stop, but defendant kept going. Officer ultimately caught up with him. Held, officer had no articulable suspicion for first stop, but did for the second stop based on “headlong flight.” Based on Illinois v. Wardlow , 528 U.S. 119, 120 S.Ct. 673, 145 L.Ed.2d 570 (2000). Cited in Franklin (August 31, 2006), above.