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Smith v. State, 263 Ga.App. 707, 589 S.E.2d 252 (October 2, 2003). Burglary and related convictions affirmed; trial court properly denied motion to suppress. Stop was justified where “the police knew that a gray car was seen leaving the burglary where $3,500 in coins were stolen, and that shortly thereafter an individual driving a gray Mustang with chrome wheels was seen cashing in hundreds of dollars in coins at a nearby store. These were specific and articulable facts which, together with rational inferences the police were entitled to draw from the facts, gave a particularized and objective basis for suspecting that the driver of the described Mustang was involved in the burglary.” Welch v. State, 263 Ga.App. 70, 587 S.E.2d 220 (September 4, 2003). Cocaine possession and related convictions affirmed; trial court properly denied motion to suppress. Officer “observed Welch parked in the middle of the road at the end of a dead-end street. There are no occupied homes or businesses on the road, but there are three condemned houses near the end of the road. This area was well known for its drug activity and prostitution, and the officer personally had made several drug-related arrests there prior to this date. The officer drove toward Welch’s car in his marked patrol vehicle. Upon seeing the officer, Welch started driving toward him. The officer activated his blue lights, but it appeared to him that Welch was not going to stop and was attempting to drive away from the scene. The officer pulled his car slightly into Welch’s lane, partially blocking the road and causing Welch to stop.” Stop was permissible both upon basis of traffic violation (improper stopping in roadway, OCGA § 40-6-202) and because area “was used ‘almost exclusively’ by those ‘engaged in illegal sexual or drug activities,’” citing Popham v. State, 214 Ga.App. 775, 449 S.E.2d 150 (1994) (“denial of motion to suppress upheld when traffic stop was based upon a car being stopped in an uninhabited construction site that had a history of illegal activity”); Harris v. State, 205 Ga.App. 813, 423 S.E.2d 723 (1992) (“stop permissible after flight from officers patrolling a known drug area”); Jones v. State, 156 Ga.App. 730, 275 S.E.2d 778 (1980) (“evidence admissible after officers conducted an investigatory stop of a car leaving an uninhabited subdivision with a history of vandalism, then observed marijuana in plain view”). Cox v. State, 263 Ga.App. 266, 587 S.E.2d 205 (September 3, 2003). DUI conviction affirmed; trial court properly denied motion to suppress. “[A] vehicle discovered at 3:40 a.m. in a no-trespassing-posted parking lot behind a closed business in an area plagued by burglaries and which vehicle attempts evasive action upon the approach of a police cruiser provides a sufficient basis for an investigative stop.” Distinguishes Howden v. State , 240 Ga.App. 139, 522 S.E.2d 279 (1999) (presence of vehicle was not suspicious or unexplained, but was business’s owner; burglaries in area could not justify stop); State v. Winnie , 242 Ga.App. 228, 529 S.E.2d 215 (2000) (no evidence of area crime or evasive action). Sims v. State, 258 Ga.App. 662, 574 S.E.2d 879 (December 3, 2002). Cocaine conviction affirmed; trial court properly denied motion to suppress. Stop was justified where officers were twice called to scene of complaint of loud music being played late at night in a residential area, and found said music emanating from a house and a car parked in front of that house. The second time, they found defendant in the car. When officers approached, defendant started to walk away despite officers’ “repeated orders to stop,” which gave officers further grounds for stop. Accord, Martin v. State , 291 Ga.App. 363, 662 S.E.2d 185 (May 2, 2008) (loud music, refusal to identify self provided basis for second-tier encounter). Blount v. State, 257 Ga.App. 302, 570 S.E.2d 705 (September 6, 2002). DUI conviction affirmed; trial court properly denied motion to suppress. While searching for a person observed apparently attempting to steal a vehicle at a home in a subdivision near midnight, no one was observed moving in the subdivision for thirty minutes to an hour, following which a pickup truck was observed leaving the subdivision. “[T]he truck had dew across the windshield and the hood, making it appear as though the truck had been sitting stationary for quite some time,” such that the officer could not see inside the truck. Held, the officer had articulable suspicion to stop the truck. The officer could conclude from the dew that the truck “had been started recently from a nearby location. ... The brief investigatory stop to determine whether the driver matched the suspect’s description was warranted under the totality of the circumstances.” Baker v. State, 256 Ga.App. 75, 567 S.E.2d 738 (June 24, 2002). Misdemeanor drug conviction reversed; trial court erred by denying motion to suppress. Officer pulled over defendant’s vehicle after midnight in a commercial area plagued with late-night thefts and burglaries. Defendant’s “route would have placed him in the back parking lot of a used car lot which had experienced numerous thefts.” The officer observed no violations by defendant, and had no reports of specific crimes in the area. Held, officer lacked particularized suspicion of criminal activity sufficient to justify stop. Citing Winnie (February 3, 2000), and Attaway (February 8, 1999), below. Gray v. State, 254 Ga.App. 487, 562 S.E.2d 712 (January 25, 2002). Drug convictions affirmed; trial court properly denied motion to suppress. Defendant jumped out of his car and ran when police signaled the driver to pull over. As he ran, police saw him throw down a paper bag containing marijuana and cocaine. Defendant moves to suppress the drugs