☢ test - Í

State v. Winnie, 242 Ga.App. 228, 529 S.E.2d 215 (February 3, 2000). In defendant’s prosecution for cocaine possession, trial court properly granted defendant’s motion to suppress based on lack of articulable suspicion for stop. At 4:00 a.m., officer “saw a truck turn into the parking lot of a Salvation Army facility. … [Officer] thought this was suspicious because the facility was closed, so he turned around to look for the truck. As Ottaway pulled into the back of the facility, the truck began to drive away.” Subsequent stop revealed cocaine. “Clearly, an officer is justified in ‘closely observing’ a vehicle that pulls into the parking lot of a closed business at 4:00 in the morning. However, as a police officer admitted at the hearing on the motion, such conduct itself is not illegal. In holding that there was no articulable suspicion for the stop, the trial court relied upon the fact that ‘the vehicle had begun to exit the parking lot as Officer Ottaway approached.’ Although Ottaway might have suspected an attempted burglary when he saw the truck enter the parking lot, the basis for such suspicion disappeared when the truck started to leave the parking lot. Ottaway did not claim that the truck had been parked or out of his sight long enough to have already accomplished a burglary. Thus, once the vehicle started to leave the premises, there was no longer any ‘particularized and objective’ reason for Officer Ottaway to suspect that the occupants of the vehicle were involved in criminal activity.” Note, trial court found no evidence of “flight or evasive action.” Distinguished, Cox (September 3, 2003), Welch (September 4, 2003), Taylor (March 5, 2009), Bishop (July 16, 2009) and LeRoux (October 6, 2009), all above. Accord, Baker (June 24, 2002), above. Roberts v. State, 242 Ga.App. 120, 527 S.E.2d 617 (January 11, 2000). DUI and related convictions affirmed. Trial court properly denied motion to suppress as officer had reasonable cause to make investigatory stop based upon defendant’s stop in roadway on two-lane street for four minutes without discharging any passengers. Gilbert v. State, 241 Ga.App. 57, 526 S.E.2d 88 (November 22, 1999). Defendant’s convictions for armed robbery and aggravated assault affirmed; trial court properly denied motion to suppress. Officers had probable cause to stop defendant’s vehicle “because it was the sole vehicle leaving the immediate scene of an armed robbery in progress . Moreover, Gilbert did not have his headlights on.” Green v. State, 240 Ga.App. 377, 523 S.E.2d 581 (October 15, 1999). Trial court properly denied defendant’s motion to suppress; officer had reasonable suspicion to stop vehicles where, “at about 3:15 a.m., she noticed two U-haul trucks backed into the parking lot of a restaurant located next to a Wal-mart. One of the trucks had its lights off, and she observed several men walking around. She knew that the restaurant was closed and that the last employees left around 1:30 a.m. Mindful that there had been other burglaries in the area, she called a 911 dispatcher who informed her that the emergency contact for the restaurant stated that no one should be at the building. When she decided to approach the trucks to investigate, they drove away and she followed, eventually stopping them.” In re: M.J.H., 239 Ga.App. 894, 522 S.E.2d 491 (September 10, 1999). Juvenile court properly granted juvenile’s motion to suppress; officer lacked aticulable suspicion for stop: Officer drove past a park at 10 p.m. and “noticed a pickup truck parked ‘sideways’ across the marked spaces in the parking lot. The officer acknowledged, however, that this manner of parking did not violate any law and that he did not observe the occupants doing anything wrong. On further investigation, he found no evidence of vandalism in the park. He also testified that he was unsure if hours were posted for use of the park. The officer decided to question the occupants of the truck; he pulled up in the parking lot, activated his emergency warning lights, and approached the truck with his hand on his firearm. He acknowledged that the occupants of the vehicle were not free to leave at the time he approached the vehicle. When he tapped on the passenger side window, the occupant rolled down the window, and the officer smelled a distinctive odor of burning marijuana.” Citing Attaway (February 8, 1999), below. Howden v. State, 240 Ga.App. 139, 522 S.E.2d 279 (September 9, 1999). Defendant’s DUI conviction reversed; trial court erred in denying defendant’s motion to suppress based on illegal stop. “Officer Martin testified that he stopped defendant because it was late at night and defendant's warehouse is located in an area known for criminal activity. Officer Martin explained that his suspicions were first aroused when he arrived on the scene because he observed defendant's van ‘backed into one of the [closed warehouse's] doors.’ Officer Martin testified that he decided to make an investigative stop because defendant's van exited the deserted parking lot just a couple of minutes after his patrol car arrived on the scene.” “Officer Martin did not articulate any particular fact indicating that the occupant of defendant's van was or was about to be engaged in criminal activity. He did not explain that crimes had been committed in the area under similar circumstances, nor did he testify that he observed unusual loading activity into defendant's van. Officer Martin's testimony proves only that defendant's warehouse is in an area known for criminal activity and that a van was leaving this warehouse late at night. These circumstances do not justify an investigative detention under Terry .” Distinguishing Dillard v. State, 177 Ga.App. 805, 806(1), 341 S.E.2d 310 (1986): “unlike the case sub