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judice, the investigative stop in Dillard was authorized by evidence showing that the suspect vehicle was seen parked in the driveway of a house where several burglaries had occurred, and a passenger in that vehicle was observed acting in a suspicious manner when a police cruiser arrived at the scene.” Driver was, in fact, business owner. Compare Cox (September 3, 2003), Welch (September 4, 2003), and Bishop (July 16, 2009), all above. Buck v. State, 239 Ga.App. 828, 522 S.E.2d 252 (September 7, 1999). Conviction for cocaine possession affirmed; trial court properly denied motion to suppress. Officers had articulable suspicion to detain defendant. “The officers testified that they initially sought to find the owner of the car which blocked the shed. When they first encountered Buck and asked him about the car and his reason for being in the area, the officers learned that Buck was carrying women's shoes, was alone, was extremely nervous, and was not the registered owner of the car. The officers' investigation of the area revealed evidence of a struggle, torn clothing and high-heel prints in the sand. The officers' initial questioning and observations caused them to form a reasonable and articulable suspicion that a woman may have been a victim of foul play and that Buck may have been involved. If there is a reasonable suspicion of criminal wrongdoing, based upon specific and articulable facts from which it can be determined that the actions of the police officers are not arbitrary or harassing, the officers may briefly detain the individual in order to determine his identity or to maintain the status quo momentarily while obtaining more information. Gonzalez v. State, 235 Ga.App. 253, 254, 509 S.E.2d 144 (1998). Under the circumstances presented here, the officers were authorized to detain Buck temporarily to maintain the status quo while obtaining more information. See Mallarino v. State, 190 Ga.App. 398, 401(2), 379 S.E.2d 210 (1989).” “[T]he officers' detention of Buck for approximately one hour from the time they approached him until the time he consented to the search of his sunglasses case was not unreasonable.” Morris v. State, 239 Ga.App. 100, 520 S.E.2d 485 (July 1, 1999). Conviction for cocaine possession affirmed; trial court properly denied motion to suppress. Police were called to a closed convenience store at 2:30 a.m. by a frightened cashier who reported a man outside beating on the door trying to get in. The store was totally dark, clearly closed. Deputies stopped defendant in his vehicle as he started to exit the parking lot. Held, the facts reported by the cashier could amount to disorderly conduct and gave the deputies reasonable articulable suspicion of criminal activity sufficient to justify an investigative stop. Accord, State v. Melanson , 291 Ga.App. 853, 663 S.E.2d 280 (June 6, 2008) (officer had articulable suspicion for stop based on McDonald’s employee pointing to vehicle leaving premises; occupants “had been swearing and banging on the restaurant’s drive-through window – i.e., engaging in disorderly conduct.”)” Attaway v. State, 236 Ga.App. 307, 511 S.E.2d 635 (February 8, 1999). DUI conviction reversed. Trial court erred in denying defendant’s motion to suppress; officer lacked particularized articulable suspicion of wrongdoing by defendant. Dispatch received a call reporting “ a small red vehicle, possibly with a white driver” that “had circled around a subdivision several times on Misty Forest Drive . About ten or fifteen minutes later, [Corporal] Martin saw a small red vehicle turn off of Misty Forest Drive. Martin followed the car for between a quarter- and a half-mile, then decided to stop the car because it was on a road leading out of the subdivision. Martin did not observe any violations of law while following the vehicle, but testified that he stopped the vehicle because it matched the dispatcher’s description and because there had been many previous reports of vandalism in the area. He testified that he wanted to see if the driver had any valid reason to be in the neighborhood. Martin testified that, after stopping the vehicle, he smelled alcohol on the driver, Attaway.” Held, defendant’s behavior, reported and observed, “might justify an officer in closely observing the individuals engaged in that behavior,” but “‘is not alone sufficient to indicate that the individuals are or might be engaged in illegal activity so as to provide a reasonable, articulable suspicion to stop those individuals,” quoting Hughes v. State, 269 Ga. 258, 261, 497 S.E.2d 790 (1998) (white man driving slowly through black neighborhood at night did not provide articulable suspicion for stop). Here, “the only arguably suspicious behavior by Attaway was driving around a subdivision several times late at night. No evidence was introduced that such activity violated any local ordinance or other applicable law, or that there was any other basis for the stop. While the police officer testified that there had been past incidents of vandalism in the area, the police received no information that Attaway had committed any such acts.” Distinguished, LeRoux (October 6, 2009), above. Jackson v. State, 236 Ga.App. 492, 512 S.E.2d 24 (February 3, 1999). Armed robbery conviction affirmed; trial court properly denied motion to suppress. Officer investigating a series of armed robberies “obtained, from victims and witnesses, detailed descriptions of the vehicle used during each of these robberies, as well as one of the perpetrators. The car was described to Long as an ‘ ’80s model’ light blue Chevrolet Caprice with a dark blue vinyl top, having chrome around the windows and wheels with silver ‘hammer’ or spiked rims. The car was videotaped during the March robberies, and one witness testified that one videotape showed ‘a full view of the car.’ [Officer] Long testified that he watched these videotapes ‘over and over.’ Long also learned from witnesses that one suspect was a tall black male in his