☢ test - Í

early twenties with a slim build, dark complexion, close cut hair, thick lips, and a thick, wide nose. This individual was further described as being about six feet tall and weighing one hundred eighty pounds. At least one of these videos captured the perpetrators of one of the March robberies entering the pawn shop.” Held, upon seeing this vehicle near another armed robbery, and seeing defendant, who matched the described perpetrator, officer had articulable suspicion to stop defendant. “In addition to knowing the make and colors of the car, [officer] was familiar with distinguishing characteristics of the wheels and windows. Because he studied photographs of the vehicle taken during the other robberies, he also was familiar with the unusual position of the steering column. [Also,] here, Long had been provided with more information … concerning the suspect’s appearance; Long knew details concerning his race, gender, weight, height, hairstyle, complexion, and facial features .” 8. FLIGHT State v. Williams, A15A1858, ___ Ga.App. ___, ___ S.E.2d ___, 2016 WL 886849 (March 9, 2016). Physical precedent only; in obstruction prosecution, grant of motion to suppress reversed. Officer had grounds to stop defendant based on “headlong flight” from tier one encounter and other circumstances. “‘Flight in connection with other circumstances may be sufficient probable cause to uphold a warrantless arrest or search,’ State v. Smalls, 203 Ga.App. 283, 286(2), 416 S.E.2d 531 (1992), and also sufficient to give rise to articulable suspicion that the person fleeing has been engaged in a criminal act sufficient to perform a brief investigatory stop. Ransom v. State, 239 Ga.App. 501, 504(2), 521 S.E.2d 430 (1999); see also Illinois v. Wardlow, 528 U.S. 119, 124, 120 S.Ct. 673, 145 L.Ed.2d 570 (2000) (‘Headlong flight— wherever it occurs—is the consummate act of evasion: It is not necessarily indicative of wrongdoing, but it is certainly suggestive of such.’); Barber v. State, 317 Ga.App. 600, 602(1)(b), 732 S.E.2d 125 (2012). … Here, ‘other circumstances’ than flight exist. Aaron had just told Williams about the stolen chains and stated that Williams was a suspect when Williams took off in headlong flight. Aaron was therefore authorized to briefly detain Williams for an investigative stop.” State v. Quarterman, 333 Ga.App. 803, 777 S.E.2d 485 (September 15, 2015). Physical precedent only. In prosecution for attempted murder and related offenses, trial court erred by granting motion to suppress; officer had articulable suspicion to detain passenger who fled, along with other vehicle occupants, when stopped by police. Officer first attempted to stop vehicle for speeding, then chased the vehicle for some time before performing pit maneuver, forcing the vehicle to stop. Driver and two passengers then fled despite officer’s instructions to stop. Officer chased passenger Quarterman on foot and arrested him after physical altercation. “Quarterman’s flight, coupled with the circumstances of the stop, provided the officer with at least a reasonable articulable suspicion to warrant further investigation,” citing Ransom v. State, 239 Ga.App. 501, 504(2), 521 S.E.2d 430 (1999); McClary v. State, 292 Ga.App. 184, 187, 663 S.E.2d 809 (2008). Ewumi v. State, 315 Ga.App. 656, 727 S.E.2d 257 (April 18, 2012). Convictions for obstruction and related offenses reversed; trial court erred by denying motion to suppress based on unlawful stop. Defendant was entitled to walk and even run away from first tier encounter with officer. About 20 minutes after a shooting, officer “encountered 17–year– old Ewumi outside the relevant building while searching for shell casings on the ground. Ewumi was returning to his unit in the building after attending an event at school, and he was walking with a friend when he saw the officer. Ewumi and his companion emerged from behind a nearby garage, and the officer observed that Ewumi's head and hands were obscured by a hoodie ( i.e., a hooded sweatshirt). The officer approached Ewumi and said that he wanted to ask some questions, but Ewumi did not stop and mumbled an inaudible response before walking away. Thereafter, the officer attempted to close the gap between himself and Ewumi, [fn] and Ewumi began to run toward the building.” Held, these facts didn’t provide articulable suspicion for stop. “[T]he fact that Ewumi exercised his right to walk away from a first-tier encounter and avoid the officer did not give rise to reasonable, articulable suspicion to instigate a second- tier encounter, see [ Black v. State, 281 Ga.App. 40, 44(1) (635 S.E.2d 568) (2006)] (‘Because this was a first-tier encounter which [the individual] had every right to avoid, the State's arguments that reasonable articulable suspicion existed are misplaced and incorrect.’), which the officer did by quickening his approach toward Ewumi and indicating that compliance with the request might be compelled. See [ State v. Dukes, 279 Ga.App. 247, 249 (630 S.E.2d 847) (2006)] (‘Examples of circumstances that might indicate a seizure, even where the person did not attempt to leave, would be ... the use of language or tone of voice indicating compliance with the officer's request might be compelled.’ (punctuation omitted)). Indeed, these facts present a situation that is different from those in which we have held that flight from a first-tier encounter warranted a stop after the citizen voluntarily spoke with an officer, gave suspicious answers to questions, and then fled. See McClary v. State, 292 Ga.App. 184, 186–87 (663 S.E.2d 809) (2008) (holding that a second-tier stop was warranted after defendant spoke with officer during first-tier encounter, provided a suspicious answer, and then made headlong flight as officer made further inquiry into the basis of the