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Brooks v. State, 281 Ga. 514, 640 S.E.2d 280 (January 22, 2007). No ineffective assistance despite fact that defense counsel elicited an in-court identification of defendant as perpetrator by State’s witness. “Trial counsel testified at the hearing on the motion for new trial that he deduced from the State’s failure to elicit in-court identification testimony from an employee of the hotel at which the victim’s car was found that the witness was unable to identify [defendant] as the man she saw. He decided to highlight this theory for the jury by asking the witness if she had ever seen [defendant] before. In response, the witness identified [defendant] as the man she saw with the victim’s car. Trial counsel’s solicitation of the in-court identification of [defendant] by the witness was a matter of trial strategy, and the trial court was authorized to conclude that counsel’s strategic decision was reasonable and fell within the range of professional conduct. Buchanan v. State, 273 Ga.App. 174(2) (614 S.E.2d 786) (2005). The trial court did not err when it concluded that [defendant] had not received ineffective assistance of counsel.” Meeker v. State, 282 Ga.App. 77, 637 S.E.2d 806 (October 24, 2006). “ Meeker … claims that his counsel was deficient in failing to cross-examine one of the officers who testified. At the hearing on the motion for new trial, counsel testified that because the officer’s testimony was so damaging, counsel made the strategic decision to get him off the stand as soon as possible. ‘[I]t’s the point that you have a witness whose testimony is boring a hole in your defense.... He’s got that white hot welding rod, and he’s going right through your defense with it, and no matter what you ask him, you’re not going to be able to put that out, so my position at that point would be, get him off the stand.’ Choosing on such grounds to not cross-examine a witness has been held to be an acceptable strategy and does not constitute deficient performance. [Cits.]” Jackson v. State, 281 Ga.App. 83, 635 S.E.2d 372 (August 11, 2006). “‘The scope of cross-examination is grounded in trial tactics and strategy, and will rarely constitute ineffective assistance of counsel.’ (Citation omitted.) Simpson v. State, 277 Ga. 356, 359(4)(b) (589 S.E.2d 90) (2003).” Accord, Williams v. State , 290 Ga.App. 841, 660 S.E.2d 740 (March 4, 2008); Lawrence v. State , 286 Ga. 533, 690 S.E.2d 801 (January 25, 2010); Smith v. State , 309 Ga.App. 241, 709 S.E.2d 823 (March 17, 2011); Funes v. State , 289 Ga. 793, 716 S.E.2d 183 (October 3, 2011); Hamlin v. State , 320 Ga.App. 29, 739 S.E.2d 46 (February 27, 2013). Ellis v. State, 280 Ga.App. 660, 634 S.E.2d 833 (July 25, 2006). No ineffective assistance where counsel elicited testimony that defendant had declined to take polygraph examination. Context: witness unexpectedly made reference to inadmissible conversations defendant had with police. “[T]rial counsel made the conscious decision to take the ‘lesser of the evils’ and ‘deal with it,’ rather than “make it appear that [he was] hiding something.’ ‘It was more important for the jury to know that you were not hiding something, rather than to make sure that inadmissible evidence stayed out.’ He considered this a ‘strategic decision.’” “[E]liciting inadmissible testimony to address or explain a matter raised by the evidence is a reasonable trial strategy that may well fall within the wide range of reasonable professional conduct. See Gordon v. State, 273 Ga. 373, 378-379(4)(f) (541 S.E.2d 376) (2001). Indeed, decisions to stipulate to or to not object to testimony relating to polygraph tests have been held to be strategic decisions that, whether wise or unwise, are not so patently unreasonable that no competent attorney would have chosen them. See Fargason v. State, 266 Ga. 463, 464- 465(2) (467 S.E.2d 551) (1996) ; Horne v. State, 273 Ga.App. 132, 134-135(5) (614 S.E.2d 243) (2005). Some evidence, including the testimony of trial counsel, supported the trial court’s similar findings here. Accordingly, the court did not err in denying Ellis’s motion for new trial that was based on this claim of ineffective assistance.” Serrate v. State, 268 Ga.App. 276, 601 S.E.2d 766 (July 1, 2004). “Although an attorney is permitted to thoroughly question a testifying co-defendant regarding the details of any plea agreement, it does not necessarily follow that counsel is ineffective for failing to elicit all details of the agreement. Here, Serrate’s attorney questioned [witness] about both a prior drug conviction and his expectation of favorable treatment in exchange for testifying. And counsel also questioned [second witness] regarding his hope that testifying against Serrate would be ‘taken into consideration’ with regard to his case. Thus, the factfinder – in this case the trial court – was provided with evidence that both [witnesses] were potentially biased.” “‘Although another lawyer may have conducted the trial differently, this does not mean that [defendant] did not receive a vigorous and complete defense.’ [Cit.]” Accord, Daugherty v. State , 291 Ga.App. 541, 662 S.E.2d 318 (May 16, 2008) (no ineffective assistance where counsel failed to explore all benefits State’s witness received from plea deal, where counsel “obtained testimony from [witness] that he had substantial motivation to testify against Daugherty”); Holder v. State , 319 Ga.App. 239, 736 S.E.2d 449 (November 27, 2012); Crider v. State , 336 Ga.App. 83, 783 S.E.2d 682 (March 7, 2016) (counsel not ineffective for not eliciting maximum sentence witness faced but for her cooperation with State; “trial counsel elicited testimony from Douglas that she had substantial motivation to testify against Crider.”).