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cocaine with intent to distribute reversed; defendant received ineffective assistance of counsel where counsel failed to object to evidence of a statement he allegedly made to officers (admitting ownership of the cocaine) which was not previously disclosed in discovery. “With regard to prejudice, we may presume prejudice when wrongfully withheld evidence is disclosed for the first time during the trial because it deprives defense counsel of ‘the opportunity to reflect upon such evidence and to determine what other investigation may be required as a result of its use and how it impacts the existing trial strategy and the subpoena and call of witnesses.’ Baker v. State, 238 Ga.App. 285, 287(1) (518 S.E.2d 455) (1999). … Based on the egregious discovery violation by the State in this case, compounded by the false testimony that notice had been given to defense counsel in the motion to suppress hearing, we conclude that, if the State’s discovery violation had been brought to the trial court’s attention, a failure to order a mistrial would have been an abuse of discretion. Any other result would provide ‘the State with no present or future incentive to ensure full compliance with its discovery obligations. [Cit.]’ Marshall v. State, 230 Ga.App. 116, 119(2) (495 S.E.2d 585) (1998).” Lowe v. State, 259 Ga.App. 674, 578 S.E.2d 284 (February 14, 2003). Rape and related convictions affirmed. Failure to request a Jackson-Denno hearing regarding admissibility of statement of borderline-retarded defendant is not per se ineffective assistance of counsel, where statement was exculpatory and consistent with defense presented at trial. Accord, Hogan v. State , 330 Ga.App. 596, 768 S.E.2d 779 (February 4, 2015). 35. DEFENDANT’S PRESENCE, WAIVER New case! Everhart v. State, A16A0652, ___ Ga.App. ___, ___ S.E.2d ___, 2016 WL 3064872 (May 25, 2016). Child cruelty conviction reversed on other grounds, but no ineffective assistance based on strategic decision to waive defendant’s presence at doctor’s deposition. Defendant waived any such objection by acquiescing to the waiver at trial. “Moreover, trial counsel’s decision not to object to the introduction of the deposition testimony at trial falls within ‘the realm of trial tactics and strategy.’ Herndon v. State , 235 Ga. App. 258, 259 (509 S.E.2d 142) (1998).” Fisher v. State, 317 Ga.App. 761, 732 S.E.2d 821 (October 3, 2012). Armed robbery and related convictions affirmed; no ineffective assistance where trial counsel elected not to object to trial court’s private interaction with jurors. “The record shows that the trial judge was summoned to the jury room because the jurors' discussion was becoming hostile and tempers were flaring. … Trial counsel testified at the hearing on the motion for new trial that he did not object because the issue did not appear to be substantive or to be one that would affect the trial. He stated that it appeared to be more in the way of an emergency matter that involved security. [Co-defendant] Jadooram has not suggested that the recharge was incorrect nor has he shown that, had he been present or had counsel objected, the matter would have been dealt with differently.” Hood v. State, 292 Ga.App. 584, 666 S.E.2d 674 (July 9, 2008). “Hood contends that his defense counsel was ineffective because he failed to object to Hood's absence when the statutory oath and venire oath were given to the jury. The trial court found that Hood's defense counsel was not ineffective for failing to object because the administration of these oaths was not a stage of the trial or a critical stage of the proceedings requiring Hood's presence, and therefore counsel's performance was not deficient. We agree. Gilreath v. State, 247 Ga. 814, 824(3) (279 S.E.2d 650) (1981); Goodroe v. State, 224 Ga.App. 378, 380(1) (480 S.E.2d 378) (1997).” Peterson v. State, 284 Ga. 275, 663 S.E.2d 164 (June 30, 2008). “The United States and Georgia Constitutions both secure the fundamental right of criminal defendants to be present at all critical stages of the proceedings against them. Snyder v. Massachusetts, 291 U.S. 97, 105-106 (54 S.Ct. 330, 78 L.Ed. 674) (1934); Hanifa v. State, 269 Ga. 797, 807 (505 S.E.2d 731) (1998). However, there is a critical difference between the right protected by the Georgia Constitution and the corresponding federal constitutional right. Under governing United States Supreme Court precedent, denial of the federal constitutional right to be present is subject to harmless error review on appeal. Rose v. Clark, 478 U.S. 570, 576 (106 S.Ct. 3101, 92 L.Ed.2d 460) (1986); Rushen v. Spain, 464 U.S. 114, 117-120 (104 S.Ct. 453, 78 L.Ed.2d 267) (1983). By contrast, under our case law, a denial of the right to be present guaranteed by the Georgia Constitution is not. King v. State, 273 Ga. 258, 264 (539 S.E.2d 783) (2000); Holsey v. State, 271 Ga. 856, 860-861 (524 S.E.2d 473) (1999). A violation of the Georgia Constitution’s right to be present is presumed to be prejudicial. Sammons v. State, 279 Ga. 386, 387 (612 S.E.2d 785) (2005); Pennie v. State, 271 Ga. 419, 422 (520 S.E.2d 448) (1999). Thus, absent a valid waiver by the defendant, a violation of the right to be present enshrined in the Georgia Constitution triggers reversal and remand for a new trial whenever the issue is properly raised on direct appeal. Sammons, supra, 279 Ga. at 387; Carter v. State, 273 Ga. 428, 430 (541 S.E.2d 366) (2001).” Where issue is ineffective assistance of counsel, however, defendant must show prejudice. No prejudice here, where trial counsel did not insist on defendant’s right to be present during discussion of juror’s brief chance encounter with a State’s witness which did not require that the juror