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court), at close of State’s case in chief, reviewed with defendant his right to testify, whereupon he declined; but didn’t go back over the subject with defendant after the State tendered defendant’s custodial statements in rebuttal. “In Rock v. Arkansas, 483 U.S. 44 (107 S.Ct. 2704, 97 L.Ed.2d 37) (1987), the United States Supreme Court recognized that a criminal defendant has a constitutional right to testify in his own defense. See Ambles v. State, 259 Ga. 406(2)(b) (383 S.E.2d 555) (1989). Defense counsel bears the primary responsibility for advising the defendant of his right to testify and the strategic implications of this choice, as well as for informing the defendant that the decision whether to testify is his to make. This advice is crucial because in the absence of an ‘intentional relinquishment or abandonment of a known right or privilege,’ there can be no effective waiver of a fundamental constitutional right. Johnson v. Zerbst, 304 U.S. 458, 464 (58 S.Ct. 1019, 82 L.Ed. 1461) (1938). See Burton v. State, 263 Ga. 725, 728 (438 S.E.2d 83) (1994) (whether to testify is decision for defendant to make after consultation with counsel). We have found no authority, and Thomas cites none, expanding this constitutional obligation so as to require counsel to inform a defendant of a ‘continuing’ right to testify or, as in this case, to re-advise a defendant of the right to testify after the State presents rebuttal evidence. Accordingly, we are not persuaded that counsel was deficient for failing to re-advise Thomas of his right to testify.” Accord, Stevens v. State , 329 Ga.App. 91, 762 S.E.2d 833 (August 29, 2014) (defense counsel has primary responsibility for advising defendant of right to testify); McDuffie v. State , 298 Ga. 112, 779 S.E.2d 620 (November 16, 2015) (“Counsel has no duty to re-advise a defendant throughout trial that he has the right to testify.”). Brown v. State, 288 Ga.App. 671, 655 S.E.2d 287 (November 30, 2007). No ineffective assistance for failing to prepare defendant to testify; “‘[W]here a defendant alleges that counsel rendered ineffective assistance by preventing him from testifying, he must show that this action actually prejudiced his defense such that, had he testified, there is a reasonable probability that the result of the proceeding would have been different.’ Turpin v. Curtis, 278 Ga. 698, 700(1) (606 S.E.2d 244) (2004) (citations omitted).” Accord, Lowe v. State , 295 Ga. 623, 759 S.E.2d 841 (June 16, 2014). Warner v State, 287 Ga.App. 892, 652 S.E.2d 898 (October 22, 2007). “At the motion for new trial hearing, one of Warner’s trial attorneys testified that she advised him not to testify at trial because she thought his testimony would actually give credence to the victim’s testimony. Warner’s other attorney testified at the hearing that she advised him not to testify at trial because he has a prior DUI offense that she thought the state might impeach him with, because there were several prior difficulties between him and the victim that the state could have fully explored on cross-examination, and because he had given inconsistent accounts of what happened between him and the victim and she was concerned that those discrepancies could harm him on cross-examination. Warner argues that the attorneys’ advice not to testify was faulty since DUI is not a crime of moral turpitude that the state could have used to impeach him. But regardless of that, it is apparent from the attorneys’ uncontradicted testimony that they advised him not to testify for several valid strategic reasons other than any concern about his prior DUI offense. ‘ Counsel’s advice against putting [Warner] on the stand was tactical and does not reach the level of deficient performance. ’ (Citation omitted.) Wooten v. State, 240 Ga.App. 725, 729(3)(d)(i) (524 S.E.2d 776) (1999).” Rogers v. State, 285 Ga.App. 568, 646 S.E.2d 751 (May 25, 2007). Burglary conviction affirmed. No ineffective assistance in counsel’s advice to defendant “to cooperate in a second police interview without counsel being present” where defendant said nothing inculpatory in the statement. Cross v. State, 285 Ga.App. 518, 646 S.E.2d 723 (May 23, 2007). Aggravated assault conviction affirmed. “At the hearing on Cross’s motion for new trial, counsel testified that he advised Cross not to testify ‘because of [the particular prosecutor’s] ample cross-examination skills.’ We refuse to second-guess either the merit of this advice or Cross’s tactical decision to accept it. See Lowery v. State, 260 Ga.App. 260, 262-263(3) (581 S.E.2d 593) (2003).” Guyton v. State, 281 Ga. 789, 642 S.E.2d 67 (February 26, 2007). Felony murder and related convictions affirmed. “Preston’s counsel did not render ineffective assistance because he failed to insist that Preston be afforded an opportunity to address the trial court personally on the subject of sentencing. Counsel spoke at the sentencing hearing on Preston’s behalf regarding mitigation and punishment. OCGA § 17-10-2(a)(2) (defendant or defendant’s counsel shall present argument regarding punishment); Murray v. State, 269 Ga. 871, 872(1) (505 S.E.2d 746) (1998); Blue v. State, 275 Ga.App. 671, 674(3) (621 S.E.2d 616) (2005).” Price v. State, 280 Ga. 193, 625 S.E.2d 397 (January 17, 2006). Felony murder conviction affirmed. No ineffective assistance where counsel ‘talked defendant out of testifying.’ “ Certainly, after being informed, it is the defendant and not the attorney that is to make the ultimate decision about whether the defendant will testify in his own behalf. Dewberry v. State, 271 Ga. 624, 626(2) (523 S.E.2d 26) (1999). The attorney is to counsel the defendant about any