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whether he was involved in the murder, and whether the murder weapon was a knife or a gun,” citing Delay v. State, 258 Ga. 229, 230(2)(b), 367 S.E.2d 806 (1988); Hatten v. State, 253 Ga. 24, 25, 315 S.E.2d 893 (1984). 26. RESIDENCES See also sub-headings CONSENT, EXIGENT CIRCUMSTANCES and HOT PURSUIT, above Colvard v. State, 296 Ga. 381, 768 S.E.2d 473 (January 20, 2015). In prosecution for murder and related offenses, trial court properly granted motion to suppress evidence obtained from warrantless search of defendant’s locked bedroom. “[Defendant’s] Uncle testified that Colvard lived with him in an apartment in Atlanta; Uncle consented to a search of the common areas of the unit; within the apartment was a locked bedroom used exclusively by Colvard; the door had been locked by Colvard and Uncle did not have a key; Uncle could not go into the bedroom when the door was locked; testimony was conflicting as to whether Uncle told the police officer that the officer could enter the bedroom; it did not appear that the bedroom door was securely fastened; a police officer gained entry to the bedroom by placing a knife between the door lock and its frame causing the door to pop open; and police officers entered the bedroom and discovered firearms in a bag in a closet, one of which apparently was the murder weapon.” Trial court properly found that uncle didn’t have common authority over bedroom, nor could police “reasonably believed that the third party did have such authority. Tidwell v. State, 285 Ga. 103, 105–106(1) (674 S.E.2d 272) (2009), quoting United States v. Matlock, 415 U.S. 164, 171(II) (94 S.Ct. 988, 39 L.Ed.2d 242) (1974). See also Illinois v. Rodriguez, 497 U .S. 177, 183–189(III)(B) ( 110 S.Ct. 2793, 111 L.Ed.2d 148) (1990).” Smith v. State, 324 Ga.App. 542, 751 S.E.2d 164 (November 7, 2013). Interlocutory appeal in drug prosecution. Trial court erred in denying motion to suppress, as officers couldn’t seize marijuana plants in curtilage of house, even if they were in plain view, without a warrant, and warrant here wasn’t properly proven for failure to produce supporting affidavit. “Since the officers were within the curtilage, we consider whether the agents, having observed the plants in plain view and identified them as marijuana, had a lawful right of access to them. See Galindo–Eriza v. State, 306 Ga.App. 19, 21(1) (701 S.E.2d 516) (2010). ‘An officer gains lawful access to an item in plain view by obtaining a search warrant, obtaining consent to search, or the existence of exigent circumstances.’ (Citation and punctuation omitted.) Id. at 21(1). ‘The presence of contraband without more does not give rise to exigent circumstances.’ (Punctuation and footnote omitted.) State v. Gray, 285 Ga.App. 124, 128(2) (645 S.E.2d 598) (2007). … ‘Even with probable cause, absent exigent circumstances or proper consent, warrantless searches and seizures within a home [or curtilage] by officers in pursuit of their traditional law enforcement duties are presumptively unreasonable.... Thus, even if officers have probable cause to investigate a crime, without a warrant, exigent circumstances, or proper consent, they may not enter a home or curtilage.’ (Citations and punctuation omitted.) Corey v. State, 320 Ga.App. 350, 353(1) (739 S.E.2d 790) (2013). Since the affidavit was not produced, and there was no evidence of consent or exigent circumstances, the seizure of the marijuana plants was illegal.” Mitchell v. State, 323 Ga.App. 739, 747 S.E.2d 900 (August 22, 2013). Convictions for manufacturing marijuana and related drug offenses reversed; trial court erred in denying motion to suppress. Search warrant was based on information obtained when officers with drug dog entered curtilage of defendant’s residence without consent, probable cause or exigent circumstances. Officers were searching for driver who fled traffic stop at night. After two hour stop, officers heard crashing sound in woods and went to investigate, walking down defendant’s driveway then cutting across defendant’s yard. While in yard, both officers and drug dog smelled strong odor of marijuana coming from defendant’s house. Defendant refused consent to search house. “The yard in which the officers and dog were walking when they smelled the marijuana was immediately surrounding the residence, an area within the curtilage of the residence, and was therefore an area in which Mitchell and [co-defendant] Tiller had a reasonable expectation of privacy protected by the Fourth Amendment's prohibition against unreasonable searches and seizures. Espinoza v. State, 265 Ga. 171, 172–173, 454 S.E.2d 765 (1995). [fn] This area is considered ‘part of the home itself for Fourth Amendment purposes.’ Oliver v. United States, 466 U.S. 170, 180, 104 S.Ct. 1735, 80 L.Ed.2d 214 (1984). Because the intrusion into this protected area occurred without consent, a warrant, or probable cause and exigent circumstances, the officers were illegally present in the area in violation of the Fourth Amendment. [FN2: Exigent circumstances can be established on the basis that police are in ‘hot pursuit’ of a fleeing suspect. The trial court made no such finding in this case. We find no basis to conclude that the officers were in ‘hot pursuit’ of the driver when they entered the curtilage of the residence. The officers had been searching unsuccessfully for the driver for two hours after he fled the traffic stop when they entered the curtilage to explore a hunch that the driver may have been in an adjacent wooded area. See Darby v. State, 216 Ga.App. 781, 782, 455 S.E.2d 850 (1995) (no continuity and immediacy of pursuit to establish ‘hot pursuit’; officers merely following a hunch that suspect was in residence). ] Corey v. State, 320 Ga.App. 350, 353, 739 S.E.2d 790 (2013).”