☢ test - Í

State v. Able, 321 Ga.App. 632, 742 S.E.2d 149 (April 24, 2013). In prosecution for possession of marijuana, trial court erred in granting defendants’ motion to suppress. Contrary to trial court’s ruling, officer’s knock on defendant’s apartment door didn’t violate Fourth Amendment. “[D]espite the trial court's obvious discomfort with the anonymous nature of the tip that led law enforcement to Able's doorstep, ‘knocking on the outer door of a residence for the purpose of investigating a reported crime is not violative of the Fourth Amendment.’ Bryan v. State, 271 Ga.App. 60, 63(2) (608 S.E.2d 648) (2004) (punctuation omitted); see State v. Schwartz, 261 Ga.App. 742, 744(1) (583 S.E.2d 573) (2003) (‘Undoubtedly, an officer may knock on the outside door of a home without implicating the Fourth Amendment.’); Strozier v. State, 244 Ga.App. 514, 515 (535 S.E.2d 847) (2000) (‘[W]hen a police officer enters private property only to the extent of knocking on outer doors, the Fourth Amendment is not violated. After all, such an officer is merely taking the same route as would any guest or other caller.’ (punctuation omitted)); see also Galindo–Eriza [ v. State, 306 Ga.App. 19, 22(1) (701 S.E.2d 516) (2010)] (‘[T]he evidence supports a finding that the police officers' attempt to initially conduct a “knock and talk” at the Norcross residence constituted a permissible first-tier encounter.’). This is true even when the information is provided by an anonymous tipster. Pickens [ v. State, 225 Ga.App. 792, 793(1)(a) (484 S.E.2d 731) (1997)] (holding that, despite complaint that information from anonymous tipster lacked sufficient ‘indicia of reliability’ to justify approaching defendant's motel room, law enforcement's approach to defendant's residence did not implicate the Fourth Amendment because there was no ‘stop’).” Florida v. Jardines, 11-564, ___ U.S. ___, 133 S.Ct. 1409, 185 L.Ed.2d 495, 2013 WL 1196577 (March 26, 2013). Affirming Florida Supreme Court, and trial court’s grant of motion to suppress in defendant’s marijuana trafficking prosecution. Trial court properly found that officer conducted a Fourth Amendment search without probable cause when he took his drug dog to the front door of defendant’s home and had it conduct a free air search there. As a result of the dog’s alert, the officer obtained a search warrant for the residence which resulted in the discovery of marijuana plants. “The government's use of trained police dogs to investigate the home and its immediate surroundings is a "search" within the meaning of the Fourth Amendment.” 1. Fourth Amendment violation results from physical intrusion on defendant’s property for purposes of conducting a search. “When ‘the Government obtains information by physically intruding’ on persons, houses, papers, or effects, ‘a “search” within the original meaning of the Fourth Amendment’ has ‘undoubtedly occurred.’ United States v. Jones , 565 U.S. ___, ___, n. 3, 132 S.Ct. 945, 181 L.Ed.2d 911, 919 (2012). By reason of our decision in Katz v. United States , 389 U.S. 347, 88 S.Ct. 507, 19 L.Ed.2d 576 (1967), property rights ‘are not the sole measure of Fourth Amendment violations,’ Soldal v. Cook County , 506 U.S. 56, 64, 113 S.Ct. 538, 121 L.Ed.2d 450 (1992), but though Katz may add to the baseline, it does not subtract anything from the Amendment's protections ‘when the Government does engage in [a] physical intrusion of a constitutionally protected area,’ United States v. Knotts , 460 U.S. 276, 286, 103 S.Ct. 1081, 75 L.Ed.2d 55 (1983) (Brennan, J., concurring in the judgment). That principle renders this case a straightforward one. The officers were gathering information in an area belonging to Jardines and immediately surrounding his house--in the curtilage of the house, which we have held enjoys protection as part of the home itself. And they gathered that information by physically entering and occupying the area to engage in conduct not explicitly or implicitly permitted by the homeowner.” “[W]hen it comes to the Fourth Amendment, the home is first among equals. At the Amendment's ‘very core’ stands ‘the right of a man to retreat into his own home and there be free from unreasonable governmental intrusion.’ Silverman v. United States , 365 U.S. 505, 511, 81 S.Ct. 679, 5 L.Ed.2d 734 (1961). This right would be of little practical value if the State's agents could stand in a home's porch or side garden and trawl for evidence with impunity; the right to retreat would be significantly diminished if the police could enter a man's property to observe his repose from just outside the front window.” 2. Officers’ entry onto premises with drug dog exceeded scope of license generally extended by citizens for entry by others. “‘A license may be implied from the habits of the country,’ notwithstanding the ‘strict rule of the English common law as to entry upon a close.’ McKee v. Gratz , 260 U.S. 127, 136, 43 S.Ct. 16, 67 L.Ed. 167 (1922) (Holmes, J.). We have accordingly recognized that ‘the knocker on the front door is treated as an invitation or license to attempt an entry, justifying ingress to the home by solicitors, hawkers and peddlers of all kinds.’ Breard v. Alexandria , 341 U. S. 622, 626, 71 S.Ct. 920, 95 L.Ed. 1233, 62 Ohio Law Abs. 210 (1951). This implicit license typically permits the visitor to approach the home by the front path, knock promptly, wait briefly to be received, and then (absent invitation to linger longer) leave. Complying with the terms of that traditional invitation does not require fine-grained legal knowledge; it is generally managed without incident by the Nation's Girl Scouts and trick-or-treaters. [fn] Thus, a police officer not armed with a warrant may approach a home and knock, precisely because that is ‘no more than any private citizen might do.’ Kentucky v. King , 563 U.S. 452, 469, 131 S.Ct. 1849, 179 L.Ed.2d 865, 881 (2011).” 3. “The scope of a license--express or implied--is limited not only to a particular area but also to a specific purpose. … Here, the background social norms that invite a visitor to the front door do not invite him there to conduct a search.” 4. Distinguishes cases “holding that the subjective intent of the officer is irrelevant. See Ashcroft v. al-Kidd , 563 U.S. 731, 131 S.Ct. 2074, 179 L.Ed.2d 1149 (2011); Whren v. United States , 517 U.S. 806, 116 S.Ct. 1769, 135 L.Ed.2d 89 (1996). … [T]hose cases merely hold that a stop or search that is objectively