☢ test - Í

Court also held that even if the officers had probable cause to arrest for reckless driving before entering the home, the circumstances were not sufficiently exigent to justify a nonconsensual, warrantless entry. Id. ‘The reckless operation of the car and the consequent threat to public safety had ended.’ Id. at 596(1), 524 S.E.2d 276.”). 3. No evidence defendant consented to officer’s entry. “Although [Officer] Geuze testified that he began the conversation outside the garage, identified himself, and asked Corey if he could talk to her, and although Corey never asked Geuze to stop or not enter the garage, Geuze expressly testified that Corey did not consent to entry. There is no evidence that Corey spoke before Geuze entered or that she even looked at him. The only evidence of body language is that she had not turned to face him or otherwise responded to anything that he had already said. And even if Corey did speak before Geuze entered the garage, without more, we can infer only that Corey consented to a conversation, not to Geuze's entry into the garage. See generally State v. Jourdan, 264 Ga.App. 118, 121(1), 589 S.E.2d 682 (2003) (‘Mere acquiescence to the authority asserted by a police officer cannot substitute for free consent’) (citation and footnote omitted). Moreover, the fact that Corey continued the conversation with Geuze after that point does not establish consent. … Here, after Geuze entered Corey's home and at the same time that he was talking to her, he was in the process of noticing how she parked her vehicle, how she was holding a bag of prescription medications, and how she appeared unsteady on her feet. Furthermore, in this initial encounter, Corey expressed concern about her children and she stated that she had to urinate, which Geuze did not allow her to do. Instead he asked her to stand by with two other officers present while he went to talk to the off-duty officer who made the initial call, following which Geuze decided that Corey was not free to leave. Thus, Corey continued to try to disengage, but Geuze would not allow it.” Carter v. State, 308 Ga.App. 686, 708 S.E.2d 595 (March 23, 2011). Manufacture of methamphetamine and related convictions affirmed; officers had right to be in the rear of defendant’s home when approaching to execute arrest warrant for defendant’s brother, who also lived there. “‘An arrest warrant ... implicitly carries with it the limited authority to enter a dwelling in which the suspect lives where there is reason to believe the suspect is within.’ (Citations and punctuation omitted.) Wall v. State, 291 Ga.App. 278, 279, 661 S.E.2d 656 (2008). We find that this limited authority includes the right to enter the back yard of the home to prevent any attempted escape through the rear. Because the record in this case demonstrates that the brother lived with Carter and that he would be present in the home when the officers returned to serve the arrest warrant, the trial court did not err when it concluded that the police were authorized to enter the back yard of the premises and look into the open door of the shed. See id. (officers entitled to enter home of defendant to serve arrest warrant for another who also lived there); Reed v. State, 163 Ga.App. 233, 234, 293 S.E.2d 469 (1982) (officer entitled to enter storage room to look for defendant when serving arrest warrant at defendant's residence).” Distinguished from Steagald v. United States, 451 U.S. 204, 101 S.Ct. 1642, 68 L.Ed.2d 38 (1981), and other cases criticizing officers’ entry, or approach to, homes for arrest of persons who didn’t live there. Accord, Jones v. State , 314 Ga.App. 247, 723 S.E.2d 697 (February 21, 2012) (same quote from Wall ). Bowden v. State, 304 Ga.App. 896, 698 S.E.2d 372 (July 8, 2010). Defendant’s conviction for marijuana possession with intent to distribute reversed; trial court erred in denying defendant’s motion to suppress. Looking for a fugitive, officers got a housing authority officer to admit them to an apartment, based on standard lease term “allowing the director to enter the premises in the event of a threat to the health and safety of the residents. … It is well established, however, that the status of landowner and/or landlord does not in itself give one the authority to consent to a search of a tenant's residence . See Looney [ v. State, 293 Ga.App. 639, 642, 667 S.E.2d 893 (2008)]; Arnold v. State, 237 Ga.App. 857, 859(1), 517 S.E.2d 97 (1999); State v. Oliver, 183 Ga.App. 92, 92-93, 357 S.E.2d 889 (1987); Browning v. State, 176 Ga.App. 420, 421(1), 336 S.E.2d 41 (1985).” “[W]e reject the state's argument that the limited right of entry allegedly contained in the lease amounted to a waiver of any expectation of privacy as to all entries into the leased premises. See Arnold, 237 Ga.App. at 859(1), 517 S.E.2d 97. … And contrary to the state's argument, it is irrelevant whether the officer believed in good faith that the director possessed the power to consent to the search. See Oliver, 183 Ga.App. at 93, 357 S.E.2d 889 (‘[T]he fact that the officers believed in good faith that [a landlord] had authority to consent to their search [does not] make their search and seizure without a warrant lawful.’). See also Looney, 293 Ga.App. at 642, 667 S.E.2d 893.” Accord, State v. Carter , 305 Ga.App. 814, 701 S.E.2d 209 (September 2, 2010). Lawson v. State, 299 Ga.App. 865, 684 S.E.2d 1 (July 15, 2009). No improper entry into defendants’ residence occurred when defendant struck officer while standing in doorway of home and officers thereupon arrested him. “[F]or Fourth Amendment purposes, one who is in the threshold of his dwelling is in a public place and not within the dwelling. [ United States v. Santana, 427 U.S. 38, 41-42(II), 96 S.Ct. 2406, 49 L.Ed.2d 300 (1976).] … When Marcus held fast to the doorjamb, attempting to thwart or evade arrest, officers were authorized to effectuate an in-home arrest. See, e.g., Brock v. State, 196 Ga.App. 605, 607(2), 396 S.E.2d 785 (1990).”