☢ test - Í

informal cooperation).” Guertin v. State , 243 Ga.App. 322, 533 S.E.2d 159 (March 30, 2000). Convictions for statutory rape, incest, and related offenses affirmed; no ineffective assistance in failing to file formal discovery motions. “[C]ounsel testified that neither a discovery motion nor a Brady motion was necessary, since he had complete access to the State's file, knew what it contained, and no surprises occurred at trial.” Rice v. State , 243 Ga.App. 143, 531 S.E.2d 182 (March 14, 2000). Convictions for aggravated child molestation and related offenses affirmed; no ineffective assistance where counsel filed discovery motions on first indictment but didn’t refile them as to superseding indictment. “The record clearly shows that Rice's counsel filed his evidentiary motions based upon the earlier indictment and that he took advantage of his complete access to all of the State's files after that point.” State v. Lucious, 271 Ga. 361, 518 S.E.2d 677 (June 14, 1999). In prosecution for murder and related offenses, a 4-3 majority upholds constitutionality of the 1994 Georgia Criminal Procedure Discovery Act, OCGA § 17-16-1 et seq. Reciprocal discovery does not interfere with right to “the benefit of defense counsel’s judgment of whether and when to reveal aspects of his case to the State. … See United States v. Nobles, 422 U.S. 225, 241, 95 S.Ct. 2160, 45 L.Ed.2d 141 (1975) (‘[t]he Sixth Amendment does not confer the right to present testimony free from the legitimate demands of the adversarial system’).” Benham, Fletcher and Sears dissent. 41. ETHICAL VIOLATION Harris v. Upton, 292 Ga. 491, 739 S.E.2d 300 (March 4, 2013). Following convictions for felony murder and related offenses, habeas court properly denied Harris’s petition, based on ineffective assistance of appellate counsel. Appellate counsel wasn’t ineffective for failing to present evidence of trial counsel’s subsequent disbarment; appellate counsel “properly concluded that counsel's subsequent disbarment did not provide a basis for presuming deficient performance in Harris' case.” Thus, “appellate counsel's failure to subpoena these records and her strategic decision to primarily focus on Harris' other claims on appeal was not unreasonable under the circumstances.” Durham v. State, 292 Ga. 239, 734 S.E.2d 377 (November 19, 2012). Malice murder and related convictions affirmed. “Trial counsel did not perform deficiently in failing to disclose to his client a previous six-month suspension from the practice of law. ‘Under the Strickland standard, breach of an ethical standard does not necessarily make out a denial of the Sixth Amendment guarantee of assistance of counsel.’ Nix v. Whiteside, 475 U.S. 157, 165, 106 S.Ct. 988, 89 L.Ed.2d 123 (1986). Trial counsel's suspension occurred in 1996, more than 13 years prior to the trial in this case, and involved problems in the handling of trust accounts that are unrelated to his representation of a criminal defendant. See In the Matter of Cannington, 266 Ga. 605, 469 S.E.2d 165 (1996). Moreover, at the time of the trial in 2009, trial counsel was in good standing with the State Bar of Georgia.” Payne v. State, 289 Ga. 691, 715 S.E.2d 104 (September 12, 2011). Malice murder conviction affirmed; ineffective assistance analysis not affected by fact that “Payne's trial counsel was later disbarred as a result of misconduct unrelated to this case … . See Harris v. State, 279 Ga. 304, 306, 612 S.E.2d 789 (2005).” Blackshear v. State, 274 Ga. 842, 560 S.E.2d 688 (March 11, 2002). Felony murder conviction affirmed. Counsel, now deceased, was appointed to represent indigent defendant. Counsel informed defendant that a better deal could be reached for defendant if counsel were given $1,500.00. Defendant’s family paid counsel $950.00, believing the money would get defendant a negotiated plea of voluntary manslaughter. Defendant was convicted by jury of felony murder. Held, although counsel’s solicitation of a fee to achieve a better result violated ethical rules, an ethics violation does not per se establish ineffective assistance of counsel under Strickland v. Washington , 466 U.S. 668, 104 S.Ct. 2052, 80 L. Ed. 2d 674 (1984), as a defendant must still meet Strickland’s two-prong test of deficient performance and prejudice. Although a conflict of interest can arise from fee arrangements and can affect adequacy of counsel’s representation, only if an actual conflict appears will a court presume prejudice. Here, there was no showing of an actual conflict with respect to a material factual or legal issue or to a course of action nor was any prejudice arising from the fee agreement alleged or proven. Accord, Franks v. State , 278 Ga. 246, 599 S.E.2d 134 (June 28, 2004) (“[T]here is no evidence that [counsel’s] receipt of a fee from Franks’s family for the Haralson County charges distracted him from his zealous representation of Franks or impaired his loyalty to Franks.” Also no showing of ineffective assistance where counsel rented a house to defendant’s family during month-long trial).