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Warner v. State, 299 Ga.App. 56, 681 S.E.2d 624 (June 12, 2009). Armed robbery and related convictions affirmed. 1. Evidence allowed finding that defendant’s parents were acting as heads of household, not landlords, in allowing search of his bedroom in their home. “Warner was home for the summer from college and did not pay rent. Beyond the fact that he had no rental agreement with his parents, the court could readily discount his alleged sporadic payment of unspecified amounts as ‘rent’ when he had money. See Turner v. State, 246 Ga.App. 49, 51-52(2) (539 S.E.2d 553) (2000) (voluntarily contributing to expenses did not suffice as rent). At most, he performed some household chores like cutting the grass, which chores we have held do not necessarily establish a landlord-tenant relationship. See id.; Howard v. State, 207 Ga.App. 125, 126(1) (427 S.E.2d 96) (1993). His parents often went into his bedroom, which was left unlocked. Thus, some evidence supported the trial court's finding that as heads of household, the parents had the authority to consent to a search of their home, including their adult son's bedroom. See State v. West, 237 Ga.App. 185, 186-187 (514 S.E.2d 257) (1999).” “[I]f the parents were not Warner's landlords but instead were the heads of the household in which he lived, their consent to the search of his bedroom was valid. Benjamin v. State, 172 Ga.App. 3, 3(1) (321 S.E.2d 769) (1984). ‘The voluntary consent of the head of a household to the search of premises owned or controlled by such head of the household is sufficient to authorize a search of the premises without a search warrant, and such search does not violate the constitutional prohibition against unreasonable searches and seizures.’ (Punctuation omitted.) Id. See Montgomery v. State, 155 Ga.App. 423, 424(1) (270 S.E.2d 825) (1980).” See also Rhone (February 12, 2007), below. 2. “[E]ven if the parents in fact did not have the authority to consent to a search of Warner's bedroom, the circumstances led the police to reasonably believe that the parents had that authority, and therefore the search was valid. See Illinois v. Rodriguez, 497 U.S. 177, 186(III)(B) (110 S.Ct. 2793, 111 L.Ed.2d 148) (1990). ‘[A] warrantless search based on unauthorized consent could nonetheless be upheld if the law enforcement officer conducting the search reasonably (albeit erroneously) believed the consent given was valid.’ (Punctuation omitted; emphasis in original.) Ford v. State, 214 Ga.App. 284, 286-287(3) (447 S.E.2d 334) (1994). See Pike v. State, 265 Ga.App. 575, 577(1) (594 S.E.2d 753) (2004).” Preston v. State, 296 Ga.App. 655, 675 S.E.2d 553 (March 16, 2009). Trial court erred in denying defendant’s motion to suppress: police couldn’t arrest defendant at his home, then search the home based on the previously-obtained consent of defendant’s live-in girlfriend (not a search incident to arrest), without telling defendant basis for search and giving him an opportunity to object. Here, girlfriend called police and “accused Preston of physically abusing her and of possessing a firearm, drugs, and a large amount of money. [Girlfriend/co-occupant] Jones also signed a form consenting to a search of their residence. When she consented to the search, Jones was not at the residence or in the presence of Preston.” Officers went to the residence and arrested defendant on an outstanding warrant for a traffic violation. “While Preston sat handcuffed in the living room, the officers searched the residence. They did not tell Preston the reason for the search or inform him of Jones's consent. Preston did not object to or otherwise comment on the search. While the search was in progress, Jones arrived but remained outside the house, where she directed the officers where in the house to look. The officers ultimately found a pistol in the bedroom, $1,300 behind a television set in the living room, and crack cocaine in a hole in a bathroom closet.” Based on Georgia v. Randolph, 547 U.S. 103, 109 (126 S.Ct. 1515, 164 L.Ed.2d 208) (March 22, 2006, below ) (where both occupants present, officers can’t search residence based on consent of one in face of other’s objection). Here, “[w]hile Preston did not object to the search, he was not told the basis for the search and under the circumstances could erroneously have believed that the search was incident to his arrest.” “[T]he Court in Randolph expressed a concern that officers not be allowed to avoid a threshold colloquy with a present occupant concerning a search by ‘remov[ing] the potentially objecting tenant from the entrance for the sake of avoiding possible objections.’ Id. at 121. Yet here, the officers effectively removed Preston from the entrance of his residence by arresting him for the unrelated offense and not informing him that their search was pursuant to Jones's consent and not an incident to Preston's arrest.” This seems consistent with reasoning of Randolph. Query: what if defendant’s removal from premises was under more urgent/threatening circumstances, not readily offering opportunity to seek consent to search? What if co-occupant’s consent obtained after defendant’s removal, with no indication of police intent to circumvent defendant’s opportunity to object? State v. Culpepper, 295 Ga.App. 525, 672 S.E.2d 494 (January 13, 2009). Trial court didn’t err in suppressing evidence found in defendant’s apartment after warrantless, non-consensual search; trial court could find that no exigent circumstances existed. Police responded to report of armed robbery at apartment. There they met defendant and his girlfriend, who reported that robbers had left. “[T]he officers heard no movement or other sound from inside the apartment that would have indicated that the robbers were still inside the apartment.” “The trial court's finding that the officers' entry into the apartment was unjustified was supported by some evidence, and the trial court did not err in granting Culpepper's motion to suppress.” Note, “we are not ruling that, as a matter of law, the police may never enter a dwelling without a warrant, following a report of an armed robbery in progress when someone asserts that the robbers have fled and the police hear no ‘commotion’ inside the dwelling. We are obviously not ruling as a matter of law that the