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police may always enter a dwelling without a warrant if there was a report of an armed robbery in progress and there might be a teenaged person inside the apartment. Indeed, as in so many appeals of a ruling on a motion to suppress, we are not making any ruling whatsoever as a matter of law. We are merely affirming a factual decision made by the trial court. In the case at bar, we might well have affirmed, even if the trial court had ruled for the state.” State v. Durrence, 295 Ga.App. 216, 671 S.E.2d 261 (December 12, 2008). Trial court could grant motion to suppress, finding that search of residence was procured by coerced consent: “the evidence specifically shows that there were a number of police officers at the scene, Durrence was not free to leave, the officer requesting permission to search did not advise Durrence that he could refuse consent to search, and at least one officer testified that Durrence was intoxicated. The trial court found that this intoxication contributed to the invalidity of the search.” “Although there is no requirement that a defendant be informed of his right to refuse consent, this knowledge is one factor to be considered in assessing voluntariness. See [ State v. Westmoreland, 204 Ga.App. 312, 314(2) (418 S.E.2d 822) (1992)].” State v. Watson, 292 Ga.App. 831, 666 S.E.2d 90 (July 3, 2008). Trial court’s grant of motion to suppress vacated and remanded, as “it appears that the trial court may have erroneously concluded that an officer's approach to a person's back door after failing to get a response to a knock at the front door is per se unreasonable.” “‘[P]olice may approach the side door or the back door of a residence ... under certain circumstances, such as ... where no one answers the front door.’ King v. State, 289 Ga.App. 461, 464(2), 657 S.E.2d 570 (2008). See also Phillips v. State, 279 Ga.App. 243, 244-245, 630 S.E.2d 844 (2006) (officers could approach rear of defendant's home after receiving no response at front door); Galbreath [ v. State, 213 Ga.App. 80, 82-83, 443 S.E.2d 664 (1994)] (after no one answered front door, police were authorized to walk around to the back of the house to determine whether anyone was home). Under other circumstances, however, an officer's entry into a person's back yard is not permissible, such as to secure the property or for the purpose of instigating a search. See Morgan v. State, 285 Ga.App. 254, 259(1)(a), 645 S.E.2d 745 (2007); Kirsche v. State, 271 Ga.App. 729, 732, 611 S.E.2d 64 (2005) (officers wrongfully entered backyard where defendant had already responded to knock at front door).” Wall v. State, 291 Ga.App. 278, 661 S.E.2d 656 (April 24, 2008). Trial court properly denied defendant’s motion to dismiss; officer had limited authority to enter apartment to look for probationer who had reported the address as his own residence, in spite of occupant’s claim that probationer no longer lived there. Once inside, drugs in plain view authorized defendant’s arrest. Accord, Jones v. State , 314 Ga.App. 247, 723 S.E.2d 697 (February 21, 2012). State v. Kuhnhausen, 289 Ga.App. 489, 657 S.E.2d 592 (February 4, 2008). Trial court properly granted defendant’s motion to suppress; officers’ right to search residence of probationer didn’t validate warrantless search of brother/new defendant’s residence, which was other half of same mobile home, “which has been permanently divided with the construction of a wall down the width of the home” with no interior access between the units. “Although officers may have acted in good faith, believing the residence in which Shaun Kuhnhausen was living was part of Guy Kuhnhausen’s residence for which he had granted a Fourth Amendment waiver, that belief was erroneous, and the good faith exception to the warrant requirement does not apply in Georgia. See Gary v. State, 262 Ga. 573, 577-578 (422 S.E.2d 426) (1992).” Sherrer v. State, 289 Ga.App. 156, 656 S.E.2d 258 (January 9, 2008). “‘Where a police officer enters upon private property only to the extent of knocking on outer doors, the Fourth Amendment is not violated.’ (citation and punctuation omitted.) Pickens v. State, 225 Ga.App. 792, 793(1)(a) (484 S.E.2d 731) (1997).” Accord, Bryan (September 23, 2004), below. McLish v. Nugent, 483 F.3d 1231 (11th Cir., April 11, 2007). Trial court erred in granting summary judgment to deputies in [criminal] defendant’s § 1983 action; viewing evidence in favor of McLish, officer violated the Fourth Amendment by reaching into his home and grabbing him to effect an arrest when he answered their knock at the door . Based on Payton v. New York, 445 U.S. 573, 589-90, 100 S.Ct. 1371, 63 L.Ed.2d 639 (1980), “where the Court struck down a New York statute that permitted police to enter a private residence without a warrant, using force if necessary, to make a felony arrest.” “Although Deputy Terry may have only briefly intruded into the home, McClish’s location at the time of the arrest – firmly standing within his living room, completely behind the threshold – means that Deputy Terry crossed Payton’ s firm line. The Fourth Amendment, as interpreted by Payton and its progeny, does not permit an officer to cross this constitutional line and forcibly remove a citizen from his home absent an exigency or consent,” even where, as here, the defendant acknowledges that the police have probable cause to arrest. Burk v. State, 284 Ga.App. 843, 644 S.E.2d 914 (April 10, 2007). Exigent circumstances authorized officers’ warrantless