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seizure is “unreasonable” under the Fourth Amendment’). It therefore does not matter here – even if their subjective motives could be so neatly unraveled – whether the officers entered the kitchen to arrest respondents and gather evidence against them or to assist the injured and prevent further violence.” Followed, Michigan v. Fisher (December 7, 2009), above. Herring v. State, 279 Ga.App. 162, 630 S.E.2d 776 (April 20, 2006). Evidence was admissible despite defendant’s claim that “officers used trickery to enter the residence.” Tipped that Craven (homeowner) “was having ‘dope parties’ at his house,” “officers decided to conduct a ‘knock and talk’ operation. This officer knew Craven, and testified that he was the nervous type who would not come to the door if he saw police officers on his doorstep. The officer also stated that he never stood directly in front of the door for safety reasons. Therefore, instead of walking up to the door and knocking, the officer stood at the bottom of the steps, took a plastic cup, and threw it at the door. After the officer threw the cup, a man opened the door, looked out, and started walking down the steps. When he saw the officer, who was dressed in a green vest with the word ‘Sheriff’ in yellow letters across the front and back, he shouted and started ‘back-peddling’ up the stairs. The officer followed behind him and looked in the door, which had been left open. The officer saw a smoked-glass table with a line of white powdery residue and a rolled-up dollar bill. The officer stated that Herring, who had been seated on the sofa, got up and started walking toward the back of the house when she saw him at the door. Upon seeing this evidence of drug use, and concerned that Herring was leaving the room to destroy evidence, the officer entered the house. The officer stopped Herring from leaving the room and asked her to empty her pockets. Herring pulled out a clear plastic bag containing a white powder that was later determined to be cocaine.” Held, as it was permissible for the officer to knock on the door, the fact that he used a plastic cup “does not turn this into an impermissible encounter. The officer was in plain view at the bottom of the steps and was clearly identified as a member of the Sheriff’s Department.” Once the door was open, the cocaine was in plain view, and the officer’s entry into the house was justified by the exigent circumstance of “the likelihood that the contraband was in danger of immediate destruction.” Georgia v. Randolph, 547 U.S. 103, 126 S.Ct. 1515, 164 L.Ed.2d 208 (March 22, 2006). Affirms State v. Randolph , 278 Ga. 614, 604 S.E.2d 835 (November 8, 2004). “The question here is whether … an evidentiary seizure is … lawful with the permission of one occupant when the other, who later seeks to suppress the evidence, is present at the scene and expressly refuses to consent. We hold that, in the circumstances here at issue, a physically present co-occupant’s stated refusal to permit entry prevails , rendering the warrantless search unreasonable and invalid as to him.” Analysis is based on U.S. v. Matlock , 415 U.S. 164, 94 S.Ct. 988, 39 L.Ed.2d 242 (1974); Illinois v. Rodriguez , 497 U.S. 177, 110 S.Ct. 2793, 111 L.Ed.2d 148 (1990); and “the great significance given to widely shared social expectations,” that is, the “commonly held understanding about the authority that co-inhabitants may exercise in ways that affect each other’s interests.” The five-member majority here reasons that an ordinary guest at a dwelling would not likely enter in the face of opposition from one co-inhabitant, although invited by the other. Notes on the scope of this decision: it is taken as clear from context that Mrs. Randolph here had authority to invite the officers in; the search in question is purely a search for evidence, with no exigent circumstances such as concern for occupant safety or destruction of evidence. “[T]his case has no bearing on the capacity of the police to protect domestic victims. … [T]he question whether the police might lawfully enter over objection in order to provide any protection that might be reasonable is easily answered yes.” Majority concludes that the sanctity of one’s residence, though shared with another, makes it preferable to seek a warrant than to search in the circumstances at issue here: “The reliance on a co-tenant’s information instead of disputed consent accords with the law’s general partiality toward ‘police action taken under a warrant [as against] searches and seizures without one,’ United States v. Ventresca, 380 U.S. 102, 107, 85 S.Ct. 741, 13 L.Ed.2d 684 (1965); ‘the informed and deliberate determinations of magistrates empowered to issue warrants as to what searches and seizures are permissible under the Constitution are to be preferred over the hurried action of officers,’ United States v. Lefkowitz, 285 U.S. 452, 464, 52 S.Ct. 420, 76 L.Ed. 877 (1932).” Majority suggests that police may not remove an occupant they think will object, in order to get consent from the other occupant: “So long as there is no evidence that the police have removed the potentially objecting tenant from the entrance for the sake of avoiding a possible objection, there is practical value in the simple clarity of complementary rules, one recognizing the co-tenant's permission when there is no fellow occupant on hand, the other according dispositive weight to the fellow occupant’s contrary indication when he expresses it.” Police have no obligation, however, to track down a missing occupant to get his consent. Roberts, Scalia and Thomas dissent, chiefly (one might say) Roberts writing to argue that the Constitution protects privacy, not social conventions about expectations; and contending that “once privacy has been shared, the shared information, documents or places remain private only at the discretion of the confidant.” For more on facts of this case, see note on Court of Appeals decision (December 1, 2003), below. Distinguished in Valle (November 2, 2006), above; Shuler (December 4, 2006), above (boyfriend’s consent to search hotel room not contradicted by defendant, who gave first consent to enter and retrieve car keys). See also Preston (March 16, 2009), above (police can’t arrest defendant at residence, then search residence based