☢ test - Í

also knew that when the porch light was turned off, people interested in making drug deals would come to the apartment. Steward, who arrived while the porch light was off, matched the description of the Miami dealer. When Steward presented the officers with his wallet, it contained both a Florida driver’s license and a large wad of cash. These facts were sufficient to give the police probable cause to believe that Steward was the Miami supplier and that he was either in possession of, or a party to the possession of, unlawful contraband. See Logan v. State, supra at 885(3), 219 S.E.2d 615.” State v. Guillory, 236 Ga.App. 230, 511 S.E.2d 591 (February 4, 1999). Officer’s warrantless entry into defendant’s college dorm room was illegal, as there were no exigent circumstances (or, for that matter, probable cause). “‘[A]n exigent circumstance which does justify the warrantless entry of a private home is the officer’s reasonable belief that such action is a necessary response on his part to an emergency situation.” Coker v. State, 164 Ga.App. 493, 496(5), 297 S.E.2d 68 (1982). Watson testified he went to LeRoy Hall to interview Guillory to determine if he had been involved in the [bomb scare] incident. Watson acknowledged that he did not believe there was a bomb in Guillory’s room and that he did not search for one there. He offered no other explanation of exigency for entering Guillory’s dormitory room.” Minnesota v. Carter, 525 U.S. 83, 119 S.Ct. 469, 142 L.Ed.2d 373 (December 1, 1998). Police officer, acting on a tip, peeked through a drawn window blind of an apartment. There he saw defendants, along with the lessee of the apartment, bagging cocaine. Majority of U.S. Supreme Court finds that the defendants had no legitimate expectation of privacy because they “had come to the apartment for the sole purpose of packaging the cocaine. [They] had never been to the apartment before and were only in the apartment for approximately 2 ½ hours. In return for the use of the apartment, [defendants] had given [lessee] one-eighth of an ounce of the cocaine.” Distinguished from Minnesota v. Olson , 495 U.S. 91, 110 S.Ct. 1684, 109 L.Ed.2d 85 (1990) (“overnight guest in a house had the sort of expectation of privacy that the Fourth Amendment protects”). “[T]the purely commercial nature of the transaction engaged in here, the relatively short period of time on the premises, and the lack of any previous connection between [defendants] and the householder, all lead us to conclude that [defendants’] situation is closer to that of one simply permitted on the premises. We therefore hold that any search which may have occurred did not violate their Fourth Amendment rights.” Does not reach the issue of whether the officer’s peek constituted a search; Scalia concurs and asserts that the officer’s peek was not a “search” as proscribed by the Fourth Amendment because, as it relates to defendants, it was not a search of their persons or house. (Scalia would thus dispense with any discussion of “expectations of privacy that society is prepared to recognize as reasonable.”) 27. SEARCH WARRANT PREMISES, PERSONS PRESENT Hall v. State, 242 Ga.App. 280, 527 S.E.2d 624 (January 11, 2000). Convictions for cocaine trafficking and possession with intent to distribute affirmed; trial court properly denied motion to suppress. “[B]ased on the totality of the circumstances, including Hall's presence on the premises, his knocking on the door of Ward's apartment [while police were searching it for drugs pursuant to a search warrant, expecting a drug delivery], his carrying a bag, his dropping the bag and attempting to flee, and the information from Ward himself that a delivery of drugs was to be made at his residence within the hour, provided probable cause to believe that Hall was in possession of contraband. [fn] On this basis the officers were justified in searching Hall and the backpack.” State v. Holmes, 240 Ga.App. 332, 523 S.E.2d 698 (October 12, 1999). Trial court properly granted defendant’s motion to suppress; officers’ search of defendant based merely on presence at search warrant premises “was not justified to protect an officer or to prevent the disposal or concealment of drugs sought in the warrant.” “When asked why Holmes was detained and searched, the officers testified that he was detained because he was on premises subject to a search warrant and was searched because of their general policy to conduct a weapons pat-down search when a warrant is executed. Holmes was not detained or searched because he looked like he had a weapon, and the officers knew nothing about him before the search.” “When executing a search warrant, it is illegal to search a person not named in the warrant but found on the premises to be searched, without independent justification for a personal search. Bundy v. State, 168 Ga.App. 90, 308 S.E.2d 213 (1983). The only justifications for such a search include: (1) protecting the executing officer from attack; or (2) preventing the disposal or concealment of items described in the search warrant. OCGA § 17-5-28; Wyatt v. State, 151 Ga.App. 207, 209(1), 259 S.E.2d 199 (1979). The inclusion of language in the warrant authorizing the search of ‘any persons present’ on the premises does not broaden the powers of the searching authorities beyond the limited terms of OCGA § 17-5-28. Wallace v. State, 131 Ga.App. 204, 205(1), 205 S.E.2d 523 (1974). To support a search under OCGA § 17-5-28(1), the officer must be able to articulate specific facts that would support a reasonable belief or suspicion that the person to be searched was armed and dangerous. Bundy, supra at 91, 308 S.E.2d 213. The officers testified that Holmes was walking away from them and the house as they approached to execute the search warrant, had his hands in his pockets, and did not appear to be armed. Because nothing about Holmes's