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vehicle from the driver's side and walked him to the rear of the vehicle, but did not cuff him. Officer Hensley testified that while he had Snead outside the vehicle, Officer Croyle then entered the vehicle ‘to secure the weapon’ so that ‘it was no longer an issue as to what was going on.’” Croyle also testified that, before he opened the door, he saw marijuana residue and a white powdery substance in the truck. “Officer Croyle testified that he then opened the passenger-side door to retrieve the contraband pipe and spoon, and he searched the passenger compartment of the vehicle, finding in the glovebox several needles, small baggies, and empty prescription bottles, one of which contained an Oxycodone pill.” The trial court found Croyle’s testimony not credible, and found that he had not cause to enter the vehicle, given that Snead was already secured outside the vehicle and thus away from the weapon. Held, while credibility determinations are for the trial court generally, “the trial court erred by finding that Officer Croyle was not authorized to open the passenger door of the vehicle in order to secure the weapon simply because Snead had been removed from the interior of the vehicle. Officer Hensley, the officer whom the trial court found more credible, testified that Snead was not handcuffed while Officer Croyle was opening the passenger-side door to retrieve the weapon, and that Officer Croyle's act of doing so was ‘simultaneous’ to Hensley's removal of Snead from the truck. But even accepting the trial court's finding that Officer Hensley had removed Snead to the rear of the vehicle by the time Croyle opened the door and secured the weapon, Officer Croyle was authorized to secure the weapon for both the officers' safety because Snead was not handcuffed [fn] at that point according to Officer Hensley.” “[T]he entry into the vehicle was authorized to secure the known weapon and conduct a Terry -style protective sweep for others, and the officer's potentially ulterior motive of searching for contraband does not play a part in our Fourth Amendment analysis. See Cotton v. State, 237 Ga.App. 18, 513 S.E.2d 763 (1999). See also Whren v. United States, 517 U.S. 806, 813(II)(A), 116 S.Ct. 1769, 135 L.Ed.2d 89 (1996) (‘the fact that the officer does not have the state of mind which is hypothecated by the reasons which provide the legal justification for the officer's action does not invalidate the action taken as long as the circumstances, viewed objectively, justify that action.’) (punctuation omitted).” McCormack v. State, 325 Ga.App. 183, 751 S.E.2d 904 (November 22, 2013). Drug convictions reversed; trial court erred in denying motion to suppress. Officer encountered defendant walking in the roadway, forcing cars to swerve to avoid him. Defendant seemed incoherent, possibly under the influence of something. Defendant had a pocket knife clipped to the outside of his pants pocket, so officer conducted a patdown search. “The officer felt a small square hard box in McCormack's pants pocket. The officer testified that he did not believe that the object was a weapon, instead ‘believ[ing] it to be contraband’ because people ‘put narcotics and illegal substances in those containers’ and McCormack appeared to be ‘under the influence of something.’ The officer testified that he was not certain from patting down McCormack's clothing that the pill box, a type which he confirmed could be purchased at a store and which people also use to store medication such as aspirin, was contraband.” Defendant consented to officer removing the box from his pocket, but officer opened it without asking for consent. It contained Xanax and Loratab, for which defendant didn’t have prescriptions. Held, opening box wasn’t justified as part of Terry pat-down. “The officer testified that he did not believe that the small box he felt in McCormack's pocket during the pat-down was a weapon, and he was not able to immediately identify it as contraband; he testified that he was not certain that the pill box was contraband, and asked McCormack what the box was and what it contained.” Felton v. State, 322 Ga.App. 630, 745 S.E.2d 832 (July 3, 2013). Physical precedent only on this point. Conviction for marijuana possession reversed; trial court erred in denying motion to suppress, as Terry pat-down was improper. Officer responded to dispatch about a domestic argument in a convenience store parking lot. Encountering a man and a woman, officer decided to pat down the man, who kept putting his hand in his pocket despite instructions not to. “Here the officer who conducted the pat-down of Felton's outer clothing never testified that he believed that Felton was armed and dangerous. Instead, he merely asserted that he believed that people who kept their hands in their pockets might be hiding something. Accordingly, the State failed to establish that the officer was authorized to conduct a pat-down of Felton, and the trial court's conclusion that because the officers were conducting an authorized Terry stop, they were authorized to conduct a pat-down of Felton's person is contrary to our law.” Defendant here didn’t consent to pat-down. Bradley v. State, 322 Ga.App. 541, 745 S.E.2d 763 (July 1, 2013). Aggravated assault and armed robbery convictions affirmed; no ineffective assistance in failing to file motion to suppress. Officer’s Terry pat-down was proper where he was advised that defendant was armed with a pair of scissors which he had brandished as a weapon. “‘In the context of a second-tier encounter, an officer may conduct a pat-down search of a person whom he reasonably believes to be armed or otherwise dangerous to the officer or others. A reasonable search for weapons for the protection of the police officer is permitted where he has reason to believe that he is dealing with an armed and dangerous individual, regardless of whether he has probable cause to arrest the individual for a crime.’ (Citations and punctuation omitted.) Lewis v. State, 307 Ga.App. 593, 595, 705 S.E.2d 693 (2011).”