☢ test - Í

Leggett v. State, 331 Ga.App. 343, 771 S.E.2d 50 (March 19, 2015). Burglary and child molestation convictions affirmed; no ineffective assistance in failing to raise hearsay objection to young child’s testimony. “At the motion for new trial hearing, counsel testified that he did not object to the testimony because he did not want to appear to the jury as though he was unnecessarily attacking or being ‘pointlessly argumentative’ with a young child. He explained that ‘you don't want to give the jury the impression that you're the bad guy, you're attacking a child, you're being pointlessly petty over legal things when it's just a child trying to explain what she saw.’ ‘We do not find this strategy unreasonable, and we therefore find no deficient performance on the part of trial counsel in this respect. [Cits.]’ Jessie v. State, 294 Ga. 375, 378(2)(c) (754 S.E.2d 46) (2014). See also Kilpatrick v. State, 276 Ga. 151, 153(2) (575 S.E.2d 478) (2003) (counsel not ineffective in failing to object to certain testimony because he did not want to appear to be insensitive in front of the jury); Thomas v. State, 318 Ga.App. 849, 858–859(5)(c) (734 S.E.2d 823) (2012) ( no ineffectiveness where counsel made strategic decision not to object during child's testimony for fear of alienating jury ).” Griffin v. State, 331 Ga.App. 550, 769 S.E.2d 514 (February 12, 2015). Cocaine trafficking and related convictions affirmed. No ineffective assistance in failing to object to evidence tags with defendant’s name on items sent out with jury. “Specifically, he points to four evidence bags: one in which digital scales were sealed, one in which 14 bags of suspected powdered cocaine were sealed, one in which plastic bags of crack cocaine were sealed, and one in which four cell phones were sealed. Listed on the front of each bag were the notations, ‘Offense: VGCSA 16 13 30,’ or ‘Offense: VGCSA,’ and ‘Suspect: Griffin, Patrick.’ Griffin also points to an evidence tag that was attached to state's exhibit 28, a handgun. That tag included the notation: ‘POSSESSOR INFORMATION: LAST NAME Griffin FIRST NAME Patrick.’ Griffin points to a Georgia Bureau of Investigations lab report that identified cocaine seized from the scene and listed Griffin as one of four ‘Case Individual Subjects.’ He also points to a Clayton County Police Department report that identified marijuana seized from the scene and listed Griffin as one of eight defendants.” “[T]he listing of Griffin's name as a suspect or defendant on the evidence bags, tags, and reports ‘hardly amounted to written testimony that could work any prejudice against [Griffin].’ Brown v. State, 195 Ga.App. 389, 390 (393 S.E.2d 514) (1990). See also Stokes v. State, 206 Ga.App. 781(2) (426 S.E.2d 573) (1992) (trial court did not err by admitting into evidence bag containing contraband to which tags were attached bearing defendants' names). Obviously, the jury knew that Griffin was a suspect and a defendant, given that he was currently on trial. Consequently, trial counsel was not ineffective in this regard.” Distinguishing Morris v. State, 161 Ga.App. 141, 142(1) (288 S.E.2d 102) (1982) (evidence tag recited that defendant lived at residence where scales were found, a “hotly disputed issue of fact”) and Spence v. State, 96 Ga.App. 19 (99 S.E.2d 309) (1957) (traffic citation contained admissions attributed to defendant). Conley v. State, 329 Ga.App. 96, 763 S.E.2d 881 (September 22, 2014). Convictions for aggravated sodomy and related offenses affirmed; no deficient performance shown in counsel’s failure to object to expert witness’s testimony. “Conley's ‘failure to ask trial counsel about this matter at the new-trial hearing means that we must presume counsel was acting strategically, thereby vitiating any ineffective assistance claim.’ (Citations and punctuation omitted.) Jones v. State, 304 Ga.App. 109, 114(2)(b), 695 S.E.2d 665 (2010). See also Allen v. State, 299 Ga.App. 201, 204(1)(b), 683 S.E.2d 343 (2009) (any decision not to object is presumed to be a strategic one that does not amount to ineffective assistance where defendant failed to question counsel about it at the new trial hearing).” Young v. State, 328 Ga.App. 857, 763 S.E.2d 137 (August 20, 2014). Armed robbery and related convictions affirmed; defendant failed to show that counsel was ineffective for failing to object to police officer’s qualification as an expert witness “in the meaning of cell phone records.” Although the transcript fails to show that the officer was qualified as an expert, “the trial court was not required to presume that the investigator in fact lacked sufficient knowledge, skill, experience, training, or education to offer expert testimony on the subject. Because Young failed to proffer evidence showing that an objection for lack of foundation would have been successful, the trial court's finding that Young was not prejudiced by trial counsel's failure was not clearly erroneous.” Accord, Smith (February 22, 2016), above. Mowoe v. State, 328 Ga.App. 536, 759 S.E.2d 663 (July 10, 2014). Rape conviction reversed; trial counsel was ineffective in failing to object to demonstration during prosecutor’s closing argument, which amounted to introduction of new evidence. “[D]uring closing argument, the prosecutor asked Mowoe's girlfriend to stand up and make her presence known even though the girlfriend had not been called to testify at trial.” Prosecutor then commented on defendant’s failure to call her to testify despite her presence. “Mowoe argues this procedure was improper and that his counsel's failure to object ‘directly and misleadingly undermined [his] credibility, and at the same time wrongly shored up [the victim's] credibility.’” Court of Appeals agrees, noting her testimony at hearing on motion for new trial which supported defendant. “Having Wise stand up during closing argument demonstrated to the jury that she was readily available to testify and could have been called as a witness in the case, facts that were not presented during the