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or the public, or to maintain the status quo,” citing Bolden v. State , 278 Ga. 459, 604 S.E.2d 133 (2004); United States v. Williams, 185 Fed. Appx. 866 (11th Cir., 2006). “See also United States v. Gil, 204 F.3d 1347, 1351(II)(B) (11th Cir., 2000) (holding that ‘to maintain the safety of the officers and the ongoing investigation, handcuffing [the suspect] and detaining her in the back of the police car was reasonable’); United States v. Hastamorir, 881 F.2d 1551, 1556-1557 (11th Cir., 1989).” United States v. Williams, 185 Fed. Appx. 866 (11 th Cir., June 21, 2006). Not published in F.3d per Eleventh Circuit Rule 36-2. Trial court properly denied defendant’s motion to suppress; the Terry stop was not unreasonable, though defendant was handcuffed for most of the hourlong detention. “To determine whether the manner and length of an investigatory detention during a Terry stop was reasonable, we ‘apply four non-exclusive factors.’ United States v. Acosta, 363 F.3d 1141, 1146 (11th Cir., 2004). The factors are: (1) the purpose of the detention; (2) the diligence of the police in conducting the investigation; (3) the scope and intrusiveness of the detention; and (4) the duration of the detention. Id. ” Purpose here was to investigate reports that defendant was discharging a firearm outside boarding house; officers were diligent in promptly investigating the incident. “As for the third and fourth Acosta factors, we observe that handcuffing and placement in a patrol car is a severe form of intrusion. However, in this unusual case, there were reports that Williams had discharged a shotgun at a boarding house residence, had left the scene once, and had come back and fired a shotgun again. Thus, in order to maintain the safety of the officers, the public, and the ongoing investigation, the officers secured Williams for approximately one hour in the patrol car while they investigated. Under and limited to the specific factual circumstances of this case, we conclude that Williams’s hour-long detention in the patrol car was reasonable. [fn] See [ United States v. Gil, 204 F.3d 1347, 1351 (11 th Cir., 2000)]; see also United States v. Hernandez, 418 F.3d 1206, 1211 (11 th Cir., 2005).” Ward v. State, 277 Ga.App. 790, 627 S.E.2d 862 (February 28, 2006). “[Officer’s] request that Ward step out of the vehicle, while he was still in possession of her driver’s license, escalated their contact to a second-tier encounter.” Reason: “Ward would not have felt free to leave when Officer Beltran asked her to step out of her vehicle because he was still in possession of her driver’s license.” Accord, State v. Lanes , 287 Ga.App. 311, 651 S.E.2d 456 (August 21, 2007). But request to exit vehicle doesn’t constitute arrest, see Brice v. State , 242 Ga.App. 163, 529 S.E.2d 178 (February 1, 2000). White v. State, 267 Ga.App. 200, 598 S.E.2d 904 (April 27, 2004). Cocaine possession conviction affirmed; trial court properly denied motion to suppress, based on articulable suspicion for stop. “Officers … drove onto residential property where individuals performed automotive work for the general public,” where they encountered defendant. “While White was speaking, [officer] noticed that White’s left thumb and index finger were pinched together as if he were hiding something. White’s behavior prompted [officer] to inquire whether White had any drugs. White responded that he had ‘a nick weed,’ which is street language for a small amount of marijuana. When [officer] pointed to White’s hand and asked if the marijuana was located between his fingers, White lowered his hand. Fearing that White would try to get rid of the drugs, [officer] grabbed White’s hand, and White dropped a piece of crack cocaine onto the ground.” Held, officers were entitled to enter premises open to public; and officer could ask about drugs without cause, since defendant was not restrained or forced to answer. “Undoubtedly, [officer’s] encounter with White escalated to a second-tier stop when Branham grabbed White’s hand. [Cit.] But given White’s statement regarding his possession of a ‘nick weed,’ [officer] had reasonable suspicion at that point to suspect that White was involved in criminal activity.” Accord, Walker v. State , 314 Ga.App. 67, 722 S.E.2d 887 (February 9, 2012) (“We agree with Walker that his encounter with the deputy escalated to a second-tier detention when the deputy held onto his arm in an attempt to prevent him from leaving the apartment before showing his identification.”). Thomas v. State, 261 Ga.App. 493, 583 S.E.2d 207 (June 5, 2003). “Nothing in [OCGA § 40-8-91]… invalidates traffic arrests, or investigatory stops, made in an unmarked vehicle.” Accord, Sapp v. State , 297 Ga.App. 218, 676 S.E.2d 867 (March 31, 2009). Peters v. State , 242 Ga.App. 816, 531 S.E.2d 386 (March 16, 2000). Conviction for cocaine possession with intent to distribute reversed; trial court erred in denying motion to suppress, as officers lacked articulable suspicion to stop him. “The evidence … showed that two armed and uniformed DeKalb County police officers prevented Peters from getting into his car and leaving an apartment complex because they ‘observed a black male, the defendant, come out of a breezeway in a hurried fashion.’ … Because the officers verbally commanded Peters to stop and prevented him from entering his automobile, we find that it was a second-tier encounter for which a reasonable, articulable suspicion of criminal activity was required. See State v. Blair, 239 Ga.App. 340, 521 S.E.2d 380 (1999). In this case, the officers