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such that determining its absence or presence requires a jury trial under Ring. ” 3. Statute requiring defendant to prove mental retardation beyond a reasonable doubt is not unconstitutional. Ring v. Arizona, 536 U.S. 584, 122 S.Ct. 2428, 153 L.Ed.2d 556 (June 24, 2002). Reversing Arizona Supreme Court and overruling Walton v. Arizona, 497 U.S. 639, 647, 110 S.Ct. 3047, 111 L.Ed.2d 511 (1990); Arizona’s death penalty statute, allowing imposition of death penalty based on aggravating factors found by trial judge, not jury, is an unconstitutional infringement on defendant’s right to trial by jury. Based on Apprendi (June 26, 2000), below. “[W]e overrule Walton to the extent that it allows a sentencing judge, sitting without a jury, to find an aggravating circumstance necessary for imposition of the death penalty. See 497 U.S., at 647–649, 110 S.Ct. 3047. Because Arizona's enumerated aggravating factors operate as ‘the functional equivalent of an element of a greater offense,’ Apprendi, 530 U.S., at 494, n. 19, 120 S.Ct. 2348, the Sixth Amendment requires that they be found by a jury.” Scalia, writing for Thomas, concurs, pointing out that sentence may still be imposed by the judge, as long as the aggravating factors are found by the jury. Breyer concurs, but would require the jury to also impose sentence. O’Connor, writing for Rehnquist, dissents, would overrule Apprendi , not Walton . Harris v. United States, 536 U.S. 545, 122 S.Ct. 2406, 153 L.Ed.2d 524 (June 24, 2002). Affirming Fourth Circuit and defendant’s sentence for carrying a firearm in relation to drug trafficking. Statute requiring mandatory minimum sentence upon judge’s (not jury’s) finding that defendant “brandished” the firearm during the crime wasn’t unconstitutional. Distinguishing Apprendi (June 26, 2000), below (“‘ under the Due Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment and the notice and jury trial guarantees of the Sixth Amendment, any fact (other than prior conviction) that increases the maximum penalty for a crime must be charged in an indictment, submitted to a jury, and proven beyond a reasonable doubt,’” quoting Jones v. United States, 526 U.S. 227, 243, n.6, 119 S.Ct. 1215, 143 L.Ed.2d 311 (1999)), while reaffirming McMillan v. Pennsylvania, 477 U.S. 79, 86-88, 106 S.Ct. 2411, 91 L.Ed.2d 67 (1986) (state may increase minimum sentence faced by defendant based upon facts found by judge during sentencing). Plurality here: “ McMillan and Apprendi are consistent because there is a fundamental distinction between the factual findings that were at issue in those two cases. Apprendi said that any fact extending the defendant's sentence beyond the maximum authorized by the jury's verdict would have been considered an element of an aggravated crime-and thus the domain of the jury-by those who framed the Bill of Rights. The same cannot be said of a fact increasing the mandatory minimum (but not extending the sentence beyond the statutory maximum), for the jury's verdict has authorized the judge to impose the minimum with or without the finding As McMillan recognized, a statute may reserve this type of factual finding for the judge without violating the Constitution.” Plurality: “Whether chosen by the judge or the legislature, the facts guiding judicial discretion below the statutory maximum need not be alleged in the indictment, submitted to the jury, or proved beyond a reasonable doubt. When a judge sentences the defendant to a mandatory minimum, no less than when the judge chooses a sentence within the range, the grand and petit juries already have found all the facts necessary to authorize the Government to impose the sentence. The judge may impose the minimum, the maximum, or any other sentence within the range without seeking further authorization from those juries-and without contradicting Apprendi. ” Plurality: “The factual finding in Apprendi extended the power of the judge, allowing him or her to impose a punishment exceeding what was authorized by the jury. The finding in McMillan restrained the judge's power, limiting his or her choices within the authorized range. It is quite consistent to maintain that the former type of fact must be submitted to the jury while the latter need not be. Read together, McMillan and Apprendi mean that those facts setting the outer limits of a sentence, and of the judicial power to impose it, are the elements of the crime for the purposes of the constitutional analysis. Within the range authorized by the jury's verdict, however, the political system may channel judicial discretion – and rely upon judicial expertise – by requiring defendants to serve minimum terms after judges make certain factual findings.” O’Connor concurs, would overrule Apprendi . Breyer concurs in judgment, also doesn’t like Apprendi ; additionally, takes the opportunity to criticize mandatory statutory minimum sentences, which he says “rarely reflect an effort to achieve sentencing proportionality,” “transfer sentencing power to prosecutors” and away from judges, and “encourage subterfuge” in charges brought. Thomas, writing for Stevens, Souter, and Ginsburg, dissents, would overrule McMillan and apply Apprendi to factors setting mandatory minimum as well as maximum sentences: “‘if the legislature, rather than creating grades of crimes, has provided for setting the punishment of a crime based on some fact ... that fact is also an element,’” quoting his concurrence in Apprendi at 501 . OVERRULED, Alleyne v. United States , 11- 9335, ___ U.S. ___, 133 S.Ct. 2151, 186 L.Ed.2d 314 (June 17, 2013). Apprendi v. New Jersey, 530 U.S. 466, 120 S.Ct. 2348, 147 L.Ed.2d 435 (June 26, 2000). Reversing New Jersey Supreme Court, and finding New Jersey sentencing scheme for hate crimes unconstitutional. Defendant pled guilty to “possession of a firearm for an unlawful purpose,” a second-degree felony under New Jersey law carrying a possible sentence of 5-10 years. “A separate statute, described by that State's Supreme Court as a ‘hate crime’ law, provides for an