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appropriate ways to enforce the constitutional restriction upon [their] execution of sentences.’ Id., at 405, 416-417, 106 S.Ct. 2595.” Notes, however, that “clinical definitions of mental retardation require not only subaverage intellectual functioning, but also significant limitations in adaptive skills such as communication, self-care, and self-direction that became manifest before age 18. Mentally retarded persons frequently know the difference between right and wrong and are competent to stand trial. Because of their impairments, however, by definition they have diminished capacities to understand and process information, to communicate, to abstract from mistakes and learn from experience, to engage in logical reasoning, to control impulses, and to understand the reactions of others. [fn] There is no evidence that they are more likely to engage in criminal conduct than others, but there is abundant evidence that they often act on impulse rather than pursuant to a premeditated plan, and that in group settings they are followers rather than leaders. [fn] Their deficiencies do not warrant an exemption from criminal sanctions, but they do diminish their personal culpability.” Finds “serious question” that either of the two recognized justifications for the death penalty, retribution and deterrence, ( Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153, 183, 96 S.Ct. 2909, 49 L.Ed.2d 859, (1976)) applies in the context of retarded persons. Further, “[t]he reduced capacity of mentally retarded offenders provides a second justification for a categorical rule making such offenders ineligible for the death penalty. The risk ‘that the death penalty will be imposed in spite of factors which may call for a less severe penalty,’ Lockett v. Ohio, 438 U.S. 586, 605, 98 S.Ct. 2954, 57 L.Ed.2d 973 (1978), is enhanced, not only by the possibility of false confessions, [fn] but also by the lesser ability of mentally retarded defendants to make a persuasive showing of mitigation in the face of prosecutorial evidence of one or more aggravating factors. Mentally retarded defendants may be less able to give meaningful assistance to their counsel and are typically poor witnesses, and their demeanor may create an unwarranted impression of lack of remorse for their crimes. As Penry [v. Lynaugh, 492 U.S. 302, 109 S.Ct. 2934, 106 L.Ed.2d 256 (1989)] demonstrated, moreover, reliance on mental retardation as a mitigating factor can be a two-edged sword that may enhance the likelihood that the aggravating factor of future dangerousness will be found by the jury. 492 U.S., at 323-325, 109 S.Ct. 2934. Mentally retarded defendants in the aggregate face a special risk of wrongful execution.” Penry failed to find the consensus opposing execution of mentally retarded defendants found here. Rehnquist, Scalia and Thomas dissent, decrying reliance on sources other than legislatures and noting: “ The Court conveniently ignores a third ‘social purpose’ of the death penalty –‘incapacitation of dangerous criminals and the consequent prevention of crimes that they may otherwise commit in the future,’ Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153, 183, n. 28, 96 S.Ct. 2909, 49 L.Ed.2d 859 (1976) (joint opinion of Stewart, Powell, and Stevens, JJ.).” 16. DEATH PENALTY, MINORS Rogers v. State, 282 Ga. 659, 653 S.E.2d 31 (November 5, 2007). On habeas petition following murder conviction and death sentence, finding that defendant wasn’t mentally retarded affirmed. Death penalty was not prohibited in defendant’s case “merely because, at age 19 when he committed the crimes, he may have possessed the same attributes of a juvenile offender that prompted the United States Supreme Court to prohibit the imposition of the death penalty on offenders under age 18. Roper v. Simmons, 543 U.S. 551, 574(III)(B) (125 S.Ct. 1183, 161 L.Ed.2d 1) (2005). That Court recognized that ‘a line must be drawn’ and ‘[t]he age of 18 is the point where society draws the line for many purposes between childhood and adulthood. It is, we conclude, the age at which the line for death eligibility ought to rest.’ Id. at 574.” Accord, Gandy v. State , 290 Ga. 166, 718 S.E.2d 287 (November 21, 2011) ( Roper not applicable to 20-year old convicted of felony murder); Jessie v. State , 294 Ga. 375, 754 S.E.2d 46 (January 21, 2014) (life sentence not cruel and unusual for 22-year old convicted of murder). 17. DEATH PENALTY, MITIGATING CIRCUMSTANCES AND EVIDENCE/RESIDUAL DOUBT Kansas v. Carr, 14-499, ___ U.S. ____, 136 S.Ct. 633, 193 L.Ed.2d 535 (January 20, 2016). Reversing Kansas Supreme Court; in two separate murder trials, trial courts’ penalty-phase jury instructions didn’t violate the Eighth Amendment because they “failed to affirmatively inform the jury that mitigating circumstances need only be proved to the satisfaction of the individual juror in that juror’s sentencing decision and not beyond a reasonable doubt.” “[O]ur case law does not require capital sentencing courts ‘to affirmatively inform the jury that mitigating circumstances need not be proved beyond a reasonable doubt.’ [Cit.] In Buchanan v. Angelone, 522 U.S. 269, 118 S.Ct. 757, 139 L.Ed.2d 702 (1998), we upheld a death sentence even though the trial court ‘failed to provide the jury with express guidance on the concept of mitigation.’ Id., at 275, 118 S.Ct. 757. Likewise in Weeks v. Angelone, 528 U.S. 225, 120 S.Ct. 727, 145 L.Ed.2d 727 (2000), we reaffirmed that the Court has ‘never held that the State must structure in a particular way the manner in which juries consider mitigating evidence’ and rejected the contention that it was constitutionally deficient to instruct jurors to ‘“consider a mitigating circumstance if you find there is evidence to support it,”’ without additional guidance. Id., at 232–233, 120 S.Ct. 727.” The charge does not require such language “to avoid confusion. Ambiguity in capital-sentencing instructions gives rise to constitutional error only if ‘there is a reasonable likelihood that the jury has applied the challenged instruction in a way that prevents the consideration of constitutionally relevant