☢ test - Í

S.Ct. 2150, 60 L.Ed.2d 738 (1979). U.S. Supreme Court reverses. “ Do the Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments grant Guzek a constitutional right to present evidence of the kind he seeks to introduce, namely new evidence that shows he was not present at the scene of the crime[?] That evidence is inconsistent with Guzek’s prior conviction. It sheds no light on the manner in which he committed the crime for which he has been convicted. Nor is it evidence that Guzek contends was unavailable to him at the time of the original trial. And, to the extent it is evidence he introduced at that time, he is free to introduce it now, albeit in transcript form [pursuant to Oregon statute]. We can find nothing in the Eighth or Fourteenth Amendments that provides a capital defendant a right to introduce new evidence of this kind at sentencing. ” “The Eighth Amendment insists upon ‘“reliability in the determination that death is the appropriate punishment in a specific case.”’ Penry, supra, at 328, 109 S.Ct. 2934 (quoting Woodson v. North Carolina, 428 U.S. 280, 305, 96 S.Ct. 2978, 49 L.Ed.2d 944 (1976) (plurality opinion)). The Eighth Amendment also insists that a sentencing jury be able ‘to consider and give effect to mitigating evidence’ about the defendant’s ‘character or record or the circumstances of the offense.’ Penry, supra, at 327-328, 109 S.Ct. 2934. But the Eighth Amendment does not deprive the State of its authority to set reasonable limits upon the evidence a defendant can submit, and to control the manner in which it is submitted. Rather, ‘States are free to structure and shape consideration of mitigating evidence “in an effort to achieve a more rational and equitable administration of the death penalty.”’ Boyde v. California, 494 U.S. 370, 377, 110 S.Ct. 1190, 108 L.Ed.2d 316 (1990) (quoting Franklin, supra, at 181, 108 S.Ct. 2320 (plurality opinion)); see, e.g., Johnson v. Texas, 509 U.S. 350, 362, 113 S.Ct. 2658, 125 L.Ed.2d 290 (1993); California v. Brown, 479 U.S. 538, 543, 107 S.Ct. 837, 93 L.Ed.2d 934 (1987).” This is so because “ sentencing traditonally concerns how , not whether , a defendant committed the crime. [Cit. to federal sentencing guidelines; italics in original.]” Also, this has previously been litigated; and the Oregon statute gives defendant the opportunity to present any such evidence admitted at guilt phase. Strongly hints, but expressly does not decide, that there is no “right to introduce at sentencing evidence designed to cast ‘residual doubt’ on his guilt of the basic crime of conviction;” holds that the issue is not before the Court, since the defendant here had the opportunity to re-introduce any such evidence that was admitted at his original guilt phase. Scalia, joined by Thomas in special concurrence, would eliminate any doubt and would hold that there is no right to introduce such evidence under the U.S. Constitution (although the states are free to allow it by statute). Smith v. Texas, 543 U.S. 37, 125 S.Ct. 400, 160 L.Ed.2d 303 (November 15, 2004). Trial court improperly limited jury’s consideration of mitigation evidence by its instructions. Jury was instructed to consider two aggravating factors as “Special Issues,” and to return a special verdict as to whether the aggravating factors existed; but if they found that defendant should not be sentenced to death based on mitigating evidence, they “shall answer at least one of the Special Issues ‘No’ in order to give effect to your belief that the death penalty should not be imposed due to the mitigating evidence presented to you.” Supreme Court finds that the case is controlled by Penry v. Johnson, 532 U.S. 782, 121 S.Ct. 1910, 150 L.Ed.2d 9 (2001) (“Penry II”): “[I]t would have been both logically and ethically impossible for a juror to follow both sets of instructions. Because Penry’s mitigating evidence did not fit within the scope of the special issues, answering those issues in the manner prescribed on the verdict form necessarily meant ignoring the command of the supplemental instruction. And answering the special issues in the mode prescribed by the supplemental instruction necessarily meant ignoring the verdict form instructions. Indeed, jurors who wanted to answer one of the special issues falsely to give effect to the mitigating evidence would have had to violate their oath to render a “‘true verdict.’” ‘The mechanism created by the supplemental instruction thus inserted “an element of capriciousness” into the sentencing decision, “making the jurors’ power to avoid the death penalty dependent on their willingness” to elevate the supplemental instruction over the verdict form instructions. There is, at the very least, “a reasonable likelihood that the jury ... applied the challenged instruction in a way that prevent[ed] the consideration” of Penry’s mental retardation and childhood abuse. The supplemental instruction therefore provided an inadequate vehicle for the jury to make a reasoned moral response to Penry’s mitigating evidence.’” Penry at 799-800 (citations omitted). Problem was compounded by prosecutor’s closing argument reminding jury that they swore to return a “true” verdict. “[T]he jury must be given an effective vehicle with which to weigh mitigating evidence so long as the defendant has met a low threshold for relevance, which is satisfied by evidence which tends logically to prove or disprove some fact or circumstance which a fact-finder could reasonably deem to have mitigating value” (internal quotes and cit. omitted). Texas appellate court erred in “holding that mitigation evidence requires a special instruction only when that evidence passes the threshold test of ‘whether the defendant’s criminal act was due to the uniquely severe permanent handicaps with which the defendant was burdened through no fault of his own (Cit.). … [A]s we explained in Tennard [see below], ‘[e]vidence of significantly impaired intellectual functioning is obviously evidence that “might serve as a basis for a sentence less than death.”’ 542 U.S., at 288 (some internal quotation marks omitted) (Cit.). There is no question that a jury might well have considered [defendant’s] IQ scores and history of participation in special-education classes as a reason to impose a sentence more lenient than death. Indeed, we have held that a defendant’s IQ score of 79, a score slightly higher than [defendant’s], constitutes relevant mitigation evidence. See Wiggins v. Smith, 539 U.S. 510, 535, 123 S.Ct. 2527, 156 L.Ed.2d 471