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whipped victim before shooting him in the back of the head from point blank range. Tate v. State, 287 Ga. 364, 695 S.E.2d 591 (June 1, 2010). Defendant’s convictions for murder, kidnapping and related offenses, and death sentence, affirmed; death sentence not disproportionate just because co-defendants weren’t sentenced to death. “The evidence in Tate's sentencing trial showed that one co-defendant, Chad Tate, was merely fifteen years old at the time of the murders and, accordingly, that he was ineligible for the death penalty. See Roper v. Simmons, 543 U.S. 551 (125 S.Ct. 1183, 161 L.Ed.2d 1) (2005); Walker v. State, 282 Ga. 774(14) (653 S.E.2d 439) (2007) (noting in a proportionality review that the co-defendant was ineligible for a death sentence based on his having been adjudicated as being mentally retarded). The evidence in Tate's sentencing trial also showed that the second co-defendant, Dustin Tate, was neither the actual killer nor the primary driving force in the decision to kill the victims. Accordingly, we conclude that Nicholas Tate's death sentences are not excessive per se or substantially out of line, even in light of the fact that Dustin Tate, the only other adult present during the murders, has received a sentence less than death. Gissendaner [ v. State, 272 Ga. 704(19)(b) (532 S.E.2d 677) (2000)] (weighing the relative culpabilities of co-defendants who each could reasonably have been argued to be more culpable than the other and finding no unlawful disproportionality).” Arrington v. State, 286 Ga. 335, 687 S.E.2d 438 (November 9, 2009). 1. Defendant’s death sentence not disproportionate based on armed robbery and beating death of disabled female, showing that “the murder was outrageously or wantonly vile, horrible, or inhuman in that it involved depravity of mind.” “The evidence showed that he struck Hutchens in the head with a hammer and a metal stool at least 12 to 14 times with sufficient force to cause the skull to ‘cave in on itself’ and to be ‘essentially punched into the cranial cavity’ and that he acted for the purpose of obtaining the money she had just received from cashing her disability check.” 2. “Arrington … contends that this Court's proportionality review does not meet statutory and constitutional requirements. This Court has rejected similar arguments. See, e.g., McMichen v. State, 265 Ga. 598, 611(25) (458 S.E.2d 833) (1995) (citing McCleskey, 481 U.S. at 306-308). See also Gissendaner v. State, 272 Ga. 704, 717(19)(a) (532 S.E.2d 677) (2000) (stating that this Court's proportionality review concerns whether the death penalty ‘is excessive per se’ or is ‘substantially out of line’ for the type of crime involved and not whether there ever have been sentences less than death imposed for similar crimes). Arrington has presented nothing that supports a contrary conclusion in this case. See Terrell v. State, 276 Ga. 34, 44(9) (572 S.E.2d 595) (2002).” Accord, Ellington v. State , 292 Ga. 109, 735 S.E.2d 736 (November 19, 2012); Accord, Martin v. State , 298 Ga. 259, 779 S.E.2d 342 (November 2, 2015). Walker v. State, 281 Ga. 157, 635 S.E.2d 740 (October 2, 2006). 1. Death penalty for defendant, who was “the moving force[ ] behind [victim’s] murder” was not disproportionate to co-defendant, whom defendant identified as “just the driver of the vehicle” and who received ten years to serve without possibility of parole and ten years on probation. 2. Fact that another, equally-culpable, defendant has not yet been tried and may not receive the death penalty does not make defendant’s sentence disproportionate. “‘That different juries hearing different evidence might arrive at different punishment does not establish a claim of disproportionality.’ Waldrip [ v. State, 267 Ga. 739, 752-753(25) (482 S.E.2d 299) (1997)]. Moreover, it is not the rule that one co-defendant may not be sentenced to death because another co- defendant receives a lesser penalty; each case must be decided on its own factual circumstances. Carr v. State, 267 Ga. 547, 559(11) (480 S.E.2d 583) (1997). Accord, Tate (June 1, 2010), above. Gissendaner v. State, 272 Ga. 704, 532 S.E.2d 677 (July 5, 2000). Capital murder conviction affirmed; death sentence wasn’t disproportionate. 1. “[A]n argument, like one raised by Gissendaner, that a specific defendant in an unrelated murder case received a sentence less than death, while not irrelevant, cannot alone compel a finding of unlawful disproportionality.” 2. “ We conclude that the deliberate, even insistent, manner in which Gissendaner pursued her husband's death, the fact that the murder was the unprovoked and calculated killing of a close family member, the fact that she arranged the murder to obtain money, and the fact that she attempted to avoid responsibility for her conduct by suborning perjury and orchestrating violence against witnesses all weigh heavily against her claim that the death penalty in her case is disproportionate. Our review of the sentences imposed in similar cases in Georgia reveals that the death sentence imposed in Gissendaner's case, considering both the gravity of her crime and the apparent depravity of her character, is not disproportionate. OCGA § 17-10-35(c)(3).” Lists in Appendix cases “that each involved the careful devising of a plan to kill, killing for the purpose of receiving something of monetary value, kidnapping with bodily injury, or causing or directing another to kill.” 3. Death sentence wasn’t disproportionate to co-conspirator’s sentence where defendant was “the moving force behind the murder” of her own husband and stood to gain financially from his death. “Unlike her co-conspirator, who cooperated with authorities and confessed his guilt, Gissendaner devised a plan to suborn perjury and to do violence against witnesses.”