☢ test - Í

Morrow v. State, 272 Ga. 691, 532 S.E.2d 78 (June 12, 2000). Capital murder and related convictions affirmed; defendant’s death sentence was not disproportionate to the offenses. Cites similar cases which “involve the deliberate, unprovoked murder of two or more people, an intentional murder committed during a burglary, or a murder involving the OCGA § 17–10–30(b)(7) aggravating circumstance [torture, depravity of mind, or aggravated battery].” Drane v. State, 271 Ga. 849, 523 S.E.2d 301 (November 1, 1999). At defendant’s capital murder trial, death penalty was not disproportionate based on co-defendant’s life sentence, citing “ Waldrip v. State, 267 Ga. 739(25), 482 S.E.2d 299 (1997) (‘That different juries hearing different evidence might arrive at different punishment [for co-defendants] does not establish a claim of disproportionality.’); Carr v. State, 267 Ga. 547(11), 480 S.E.2d 583 (1997) (defendant's death sentence not disproportionate to co-defendant's life sentence despite claim that co-defendant was the ‘prime mover’ in the murder); Lee v. State, 258 Ga. 82(10), 365 S.E.2d 99 (1988) (defendant's death sentence not disproportionate to co- defendant's life sentence despite defendant's claim he was a ‘mere abettor’ to the murder); Beck v. State, 255 Ga. 483(6), 340 S.E.2d 9 (1986) (defendant's death sentence not disproportionate to co-defendant's life sentence when evidence inconclusive as to which defendant was the actual killer); Allen v. State, 253 Ga. 390(8), 321 S.E.2d 710 (1984) (death sentence not disproportionate to co-defendant's life sentence); McClesky v. State, 245 Ga. 108, 115, 263 S.E.2d 146 (1980) (‘There is not a simplistic rule that a co-defendant may not be sentenced to death when another co-defendant receives a lesser sentence.’).” Accord, Tate (June 1, 2010), above. Cook v. State, 270 Ga. 820, 514 S.E.2d 657 (March 19, 1999). Death penalty was not disproportionate for “the deliberate, unprovoked killing of two or more people. Jenkins v. State, 269 Ga. 282, 498 S.E.2d 502 (1998); DeYoung v. State, 268 Ga. 780, 493 S.E.2d 157 (1997); Stripling v. State, 261 Ga. 1, 401 S.E.2d 500 (1991); Isaacs v. State, 259 Ga. 717, 386 S.E.2d 316 (1989); Moon v. State, 258 Ga. 748, 375 S.E.2d 442 (1988); Romine v. State, 256 Ga. 521, 350 S.E.2d 446 (1986); Cargill v. State, 255 Ga. 616, 340 S.E.2d 891 (1986); Blanks v. State, 254 Ga. 420, 330 S.E.2d 575 (1985); Putman v. State, 251 Ga. 605, 308 S.E.2d 145 (1983); Wilson v. State, 250 Ga. 630, 300 S.E.2d 640 (1983); Burden v. State, 250 Ga. 313, 297 S.E.2d 242 (1982); Rivers v. State, 250 Ga. 288, 298 S.E.2d 10 (1982); Waters v. State, 248 Ga. 355, 283 S.E.2d 238 (1981); Gilreath v. State, 247 Ga. 814, 279 S.E.2d 650 (1981).” Accord, Morrow v. State , 272 Ga. 691, 532 S.E.2d 78 (June 12, 2000). 21. DEATH PENALTY, VICTIM IMPACT EVIDENCE See EVIDENCE – VICTIM IMPACT EVIDENCE, above Q. DETENTION CENTER See subheading PROBATION DETENTION CENTER, below R. DETERMINATE SENTENCE Kaiser v. State, 275 Ga.App. 684, 621 S.E.2d 802 (September 30, 2005). “[Defendant], a physician, pled guilty to more than 60 counts of the unauthorized manufacture, possession, and dispensation of controlled substances.” The negotiated sentence prohibited him from practicing medicine during the term of probation; the trial court amended the sentence to prohibit defendant from “ever” practicing medicine again in Georgia or any contiguous state. Held, the trial court’s attempt to stop defendant from “ever” practicing medicine again was an “indeterminate” sentence. “Under OCGA § 17- 10-1(a)(1), the sentencing judge ‘shall prescribe a determinate sentence for a specific number of months or years which shall be within the minimum and maximum sentences prescribed by law as the punishment for the crime.’ We have held that, under this Code section, ‘[t]he conditions of probation cannot exceed the length of the sentence.’ Ballenger v. State, 210 Ga.App. 627, 629(3) (436 S.E.2d 793) (1993). The challenged condition in this case, which bars Kaiser from ever practicing medicine, violates that precept. Kaiser’s sentence is therefore void and must be vacated. See State v. Hart, 263 Ga.App. 8, 10 (587 S.E.2d 164) (2003).” Burke v. State, 274 Ga.App. 402, 618 S.E.2d 36 (June 22, 2005). Burke’s life sentence for rape was authorized by OCGA § 16-6-1, notwithstanding the more general provisions of OCGA § 17-10-1 at the time of defendant’s conviction, which required “a determinate sentence for a specific number of months or years” in all cases except where “life imprisonment or the death penalty must be imposed.” OCGA § 17-10-1 was amended in 1993 to except those cases where life, life without parole, or death may be imposed. State v. Hart, 263 Ga.App. 8, 587 S.E.2d 164 (August 28, 2003). Sentence of incarceration of up to 27 months, but no more than concurrent federal sentence, was invalid as an indeterminate sentence under OCGA § 17-10-1(a)(1). Remanded for re-sentencing. S. DISCRETION, FAILURE TO EXERCISE